



## Doctorate Thesis

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# The Prerequisite Cultural Changes for the Implementation of Democracy in Algeria

*A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Degree of an LMD Doctorate in English  
Language, Literature and civilization.*

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## **DECLARATION:**

I declare that the dissertation entitled: “The Prerequisite Cultural Changes for the Implementation of Democracy in Algeria” is the result of my search for knowledge, and all sources are stated by means of complete references for the necessity of scientific research.

Ms. Imen Loucif

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my beloved family especially my parents, my brothers and sister and my husband.

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### **Abstract:**

The present research aims at investigating the prerequisite cultural changes for the implementation of democracy in Algeria. Thus, we set these research problems on whether Algerians fully understand democracy and whether our culture permits a robust implementation of democracy and if no, what can we change in our culture to achieve democracy. Data for the study were collected from 271 participants from different wilayas who answered an email survey. The methodological aspect of it was mainly based on both of Almond and Verba and Inglehart studies of political culture and democracy. Our empirical study was carried out during 2017. The results obtained revealed that most participants had vague conceptualisation of democracy, they did not trust the political institutions and they preferred economic development over a democratic system of government exhibiting what Almond and Verba coined as a subject culture. Conclusions drawn from this work led to understand that in order to implement democracy in Algeria, citizens must acquire a participant culture.

*Keywords:* democracy, prerequisites, culture, political culture

## ملخص:

يهدف البحث الحالي إلى استقصاء المتطلبات الثقافية الأساسية من أجل تحقيق الديمقراطية في الجزائر. وعليه فإن مشكلة بحثنا تتمحور حول ما إذا كان الجزائريون يفهمون الديمقراطية فهما تامًا وما إذا كانت ثقافتنا تسمح بتحقيق قوي للديمقراطية، أما إذا كانت الإجابة بالنفي، فما الذي يمكننا تغييره في ثقافتنا لتحقيق الديمقراطية. لقد تم جمع بيانات الدراسة التي أجريت في عام 2017 من 271 مشاركًا من ولايات مختلفة أجابوا على استطلاع عبر البريد الإلكتروني. ولقد اعتمد الجانب المنهجي منها بشكل أساسي على دراسات ألموند وفيربا وإنغلهارت للثقافة السياسية والديمقراطية. كشفت النتائج المحصل عليها أن معظم المشاركين لديهم فهم محدود للديمقراطية ، وأنهم لا يثقون في المؤسسات السياسية كما أنهم يفضلون التنمية الاقتصادية على نظام حكومي ديمقراطي مظهريين ما صاغه ألموند وفيربا بثقافة موضوعية. كخلاصة، فنتائج هذا البحث تظهر أنه من أجل تحقيق الديمقراطية في الجزائر يجب على المواطنين إن يكتسبوا ثقافة المشاركة.

*الكلمات المفتاحية: الديمقراطية ، متطلبات ، ثقافة، ثقافة سياسية*

## **Résumé:**

Cette thèse vise à étudier les changements culturels préalables à la mise en œuvre de la démocratie en Algérie. Ainsi, on pose des questions pour savoir si les Algériens comprennent la démocratie pleinement et si notre culture permet une mise en œuvre solide de la démocratie et si le contraire, que pouvons-nous changer dans notre culture pour parvenir à la démocratie. Les données de l'étude ont été recueillies auprès de 271 participants de différentes wilayas qui ont répondu à un questionnaire par e-mail. L'aspect méthodologique de cette étude est principalement basé sur les études d'Almond, Verba et Inglehart sur la culture politique et la démocratie. Notre étude empirique a été réalisée en 2017 et les résultats obtenus ont révélé que la plupart des participants avaient une vague conceptualisation de la démocratie, qu'ils ne faisaient pas confiance aux institutions politiques et qu'ils préféraient le développement économique à un système de gouvernement démocratique présentant ce qu'Almond et Verba ont inventé comme culture subjective. Les conclusions tirées de ce travail ont conduit à comprendre que pour mettre en œuvre la démocratie en Algérie, les citoyens doivent acquérir une culture participative.

*Mots clés :* démocratie, prérequis, culture, culture politique

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## **Introduction**

### **1. Background**

Democracy might be a word familiar to most people but either properly understood or used or not depends on its concrete practice in different societies. The idea of democracy has prevailed through a long history of disorder and democratic government is still continuing to evolve and flourish throughout the world. Democracy, which derives from the Greek word demos i.e. people, is basically defined as government in which the supreme power is given to people. In some ways, democracy can be exercised directly by people. However, in large societies; it is by the people through their elected agents. In other words and in the memorable phrase of President Abraham Lincoln, “democracy is government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

England, in 1642, began the first popular rebellion against monarchy which climaxed to the execution of King Charles I and resulted in the establishment of a democratic government instead of an autocratic one. Such action was inspired and guided largely by political philosophers, notably the French philosophers Montesquieu and Jean Jacques Rousseau, and the American statesmen Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Before the end of the 19th century, every important Western European monarchy had adopted a constitution limiting the power of the Crown and giving a considerable share of political power to the people. In many of these countries, a representative legislature modeled on the British Parliament was instituted. At that time, British politics was the epitome of the world democracies, yet the French Revolution also exerted a powerful influence. Add to this, the success of democratic institutions in the United States served as a model for many peoples later.

The major features of modern democracy include individual freedom; equality before the law and universal suffrage. Such features have been proclaimed in great historic documents, for example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which asserted the right to life, liberty,

and the pursuit of happiness; the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which affirmed the principles of civil liberty and of equality before the law; and the Atlantic Charter, which formulated the four basic freedoms.

By the middle of the 20th century, every independent country in the world, with only a few exceptions, had a government that, in form if not in practice, embodied some of the principles of democracy. Although the ideals of democracy have been widely professed, the practice and fulfillment have been different in many countries.

Algeria was perceived as a model for democracy in the developing world from 1989 until 1991, a model that would shift from an authoritarian regime to a liberal government. This democratic shift, led by former president Chadli Ben Djedid, was important for two reasons. First, for the West that perceived Algeria as a catalyst for democracy not just with African dictatorships, but for the Arab Middle East as well. Second, Algeria was turning into a true case of democratic thinking and acting in a post-colonial era. Regrettably the democratic transition did not complete and Algeria still remains an authoritarian state. Yet, some of the democratic practices implemented during Ben Djedid's presidency are still in place, mainly a (somewhat) free press and multiparty elections.

## **2. Statement of the Problem:**

Aspiring for democracy has become a mutual issue for nations and leaders all over the world. In this context, individuals started claiming for more democratic governments. Even if these claims are different, it all proves that democracy is still being a popular demand for more than two centuries. This claim is well-noticed in Algeria and the idea of democracy is increasingly taking over the attention of the Algerian. But despite the growing interest in democracy in Algeria, no research has yet seriously examined whether Algerians really grasp the meaning of democracy and the extent to which the cultural texture of the Algerian society affect the practice of democracy in Algeria.

### **3. Objectives and aims:**

This thesis seeks to examine the prerequisite cultural changes for the implementation of democracy in Algeria. The research has three main objectives. Initially it seeks to understand the current cultural practices in Algeria and what impacts and informs its method of reflecting the notion of democracy. Secondly examines any changes in democratic ideas over time through the historical overview of Algerian democratization. Thirdly, it seeks to understand how the existing theories on culture and civic culture are able to account for the implementation of democracy in Algeria.

### **4. Research questions:**

Taking the previous aims into consideration, my thesis tries to answer the following questions

- Do Algerians fully understand democracy?
- Does our culture permit a robust implementation of democracy?
- What can we adopt to our culture to achieve democracy?
- What are the cultural factors associated with the Algerian conception of democracy?
- Has Algerian democratic participation changed over time?

It is my intention that this thesis would not only extend our knowledge of Algerians political democratic behaviour, but also test our cultural aptitude to effectively meet democracy.

### **5. Methodology:**

#### **5.1. Research Method:**

Both historical and descriptive methods are used in this research. The historical method involves finding, using, interpreting and correlating information within primary and secondary sources in order to understand past events. Historical analysis is therefore, a method of discovering what happened in the past and gain insights into social phenomenon. For describing the situation and developing appropriate guidelines the descriptive research

method is also used. In addition, both qualitative and quantitative approaches in gathering data are adopted. We adopt these approaches along with using the survey method in which participants answer questions administered through interviews or questionnaires and that will be later analyzed.

## **5.2 Sampling:**

Simple random sampling (also called random sampling) is the most wholesome and direct probability sampling strategy. It is the most common way for selecting a sample among population for a wide range of purposes too. In simple random sampling each member of population is equally likely to be selected as part of the sample. It has been indicated that “the logic behind simple random sampling is that it removes bias from the selection procedure and should result in representative samples” (Gravetter and Forzano, 2011, p.146). Ideally, the sample size of more than a few hundred is required in order to be able to apply simple random sampling in an appropriate manner (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). It can be said that simple random sampling is easy to understand in theory, but demanding to perform in practice. This is since working with a large sample size is not easy and it can be challenging to get a realistic sampling structure.

## **5.3 Research Instruments:**

This research adopts quantitative as well as qualitative approaches in gathering data that are intended to be used in addressing the research questions. For the purpose of primary data collection, a questionnaire is designed as an instrument to collect the necessary data for the study. It contains 36 items with multiple choice answers. Closed-ended questions are easy to statistically analyze, but they seriously limit the responses that participants can give. The items are designed for evaluating Algerians’ perspectives about democracy, how well they understand it and how far the Algerian culture affects their understanding. The items are not



divided into any section for the purpose of spotting any discrepancy in the participants' answers.

## **6. Overview of Chapters:**

This study is divided into three parts. The first part is in itself divided into two chapters that will conceptualize democracy and its prerequisites respectively with an emphasis on the cultural one. The first chapter will try to provide a thorough definition to democracy, its history, its elements, conditions and its different kinds. Moving forward, the second chapter provides the different preconditions of democracy, then a definition of culture, different interpretations of culture and its use in politics. The second part deals with Algeria and is also divided into two chapters. So, the third chapter provides a historical overview on Algeria, focusing on the democratic developments in Algeria throughout the different phase of its modern history. The fourth chapter supplies an evaluation of democracy, democratization and the cultural prerequisite in Algeria. The last part is the empirical study; it explains the adopted methodology and analyzes the findings of a survey.

# **Chapter One: Conceptualizing Democracy**

## **Introduction:**

Democracy has been defined in various ways by different people including government of the people, by the people and for the people (Greg, 2001 ), government with the approval of the governed, and a form of regime that derives from popular sovereignty in which ordinary citizens are given the right and ability to govern themselves. Democracy was originally an exclusively political concept. The first-mentioned definitions in recent dictionaries preserve this sense of the word. The Webster's 1828 Dictionary gives us the first definition of democracy: "Government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the people collectively." The first meaning in the American College Dictionary is "Government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system." (1953). In other words, both dictionaries have primarily explained democracy by a system of government in which the people rule.

Etymologically, the word democracy is derived from the Greek word *Demokratia*, the root meanings of which are *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule)(Pennock, 1979). Even the contemporary studies on the theory of democracy are based on this simple etymology of the word. Accordingly, we can literally translate democracy to be a form of government in which – contrary to monarchies and aristocracies – the people rule (Hanssen, 1991).

However, in spite of the simplicity of the notion of democracy as "government by people" may sound, there is a wide variety of types and concepts of democracy in contemporary political science. In fact, the whole history of the idea of democracy is "complex and marked by conflicting conceptions" (Held, 2006, p1). This is the case because democracy is understood both as a "set of political institutions" and a "set of political ideals" (Hansen, 1996, p. 90).

Another reason why definitions of democracy vary to a great extent is that each element of the phrase democracy, demos and kratos, is open for interpretation. First, one can argue how demos can be defined (citizenship), what its characteristics are (in terms of resources, skills, motivations, and attitudes) and finally what the scope of their competences in ruling should be (kind and amount of participation). Second, the element kratos (rule) is being disputed in terms of what the term rule covers (fields of government activity) and how broad the scope of rule should be (Held, 2006).

As a result, reviewing the historical development of democracy is a necessity, because it is by going to the root of the idea that we fully understand it. This is going to be achieved by tracing its conceptualization in the mind of some of the thinkers who are referred to in current writings about democracy.

### **1.1.Touchstone Theorists :**

Aristotle, Tocqueville, and Schumpeter are among the most prominent of traditional thinkers often and appropriately referred to in current writings about the democratic theory. The fact that each of these classic predecessors confronts democracy with serious challenges is one reason for summarizing their essential conclusions about democracy in this presentation.

#### **1.1.a. Aristotle**

Born in Macedonia and living during his intellectual prime in Athens during the fourth century BC, Aristotle embarked on a research project that intended to identify every currently known political system. This constituted a large number of different forms of government, successful and otherwise, both in the city states of that area and Macedonian empire of Philip and Alexander to rival empires to the east and south. His work is entitled “Politics” and it is divided into eight books which are further divided into chapters.

Generally speaking, government might be exercised according to him by one person, by a few people, or by many people, and in each case such rule may be exercised properly or improperly. Appropriate (or ‘right’) rule is assumed for the common good (or “highest” as he called it) while inappropriate rule aims to serve private interests, whether of the one, the few, or the many themselves. By ‘common good’ Aristotle did not mean the interests that people happen to share, but that which is **good for their community, since a good community for him promotes the well-being of all its members by allowing them to exercise their proper potentials and to lead virtuous and successful lives.** This produces an initial classification of six forms of rule: *royalty*, where one person rules in the common interest; *tyranny*, a ‘deviation’ of royalty, where one person rules in his private interests; *aristocracy* or proper rule by the few; *oligarchy*, which is the deviant form of aristocracy; proper rule of the many, called ‘*polity*’ by Aristotle; and its deviation for which he reserved the term *democracy* (Aristotle 1986 [c.320 BC]: bks gamma and delta). Of those mentioned forms, the distortions are as follows: of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all (Book 3, chapter 7) As a result, rule of the poor and rule of the rich are always correlated with the many and the few.

Likewise, for wealth is unfairly distributed, hence is virtue or nobility in a way that the majority poor will be less noble than the few rich. Aristotle argued that of these six forms of government the fittest would be a royalty, where a single noble ruler executed his appropriate function, followed by an appropriately functioning aristocracy. Aristotle argued, however, that in the world of actual politics, such governments are seldom found, and he lists many ways that when achieved they degenerate into self-serving leadership. With respect to the typical, deviant forms of government, Aristotle reversed the ranking he assigned to ideal

politics and considered democracy the ‘most tolerable’ (book 4, chapter 2) of the three deviations of proper rule: at least more people profit from a democracy’s self-serving rule; some advantages are gained by the collective experiences of many people; and majority discontent is dampened. Thus the often-quoted view of Winston Churchill that “democracy is the least bad form of government” was in fact much earlier expressed by Aristotle (Lindbom, 1996).

### **1.1. b. Locke and Montesquieu:**

According to Robert Faulkner's article, "The First Liberal Democrat: Locke's Popular Government" (Winter, 2001, pp. 5-39), John Locke was the first to lay the seeds for the liberal democracy. It was during the European Enlightenment in the 18<sup>th</sup> century that the basics of modern democracy were laid. In a period that was marked by the rejection of traditional social, religious, and political ideas and its emphasis on rationalism.

In 1690 Locke published his pivotal Two Treatises of Government. **His declaration that all legitimate government rests upon "the consent of the governed"** greatly changed discussions of political theory and encouraged the development of democratic institutions. With his assertion of Natural Law, Locke contested the claim that government, specifically monarchy, was a characteristic of a divinely ordained chain of being. Locke argued that Natural law is identical with the law of God and guarantees to all men basic rights, including the right to life, to certain liberties, and to own property and keep the fruits of one's labor (Locke, 1963). To secure these rights, **Locke sustained, men in civil society enter into a contract with their government. The citizen is committed to obey the law, while the government has the right to make laws and to defend the commonwealth from foreign harm; all for the public good.** Locke declared that **when any government becomes lawless and arbitrary, the citizen has the right to overthrow the regime and institute a new government.** (Waldron, 2002)

Locke's theory of natural law inspired a generation of Enlightenment philosophers in Europe and the New World, from France with Jean Jacques Rousseau to Scotland with David Hume, to Germany with Immanuel Kant, and with Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin in the United States. But his notable successor was probably Montesquieu who, like Locke, believed in republican government based on the consent of the governed, but not in democracy founded on majority rule. In *The Spirit of Laws*, published in 1748, Montesquieu promoted separating and balancing powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government as a way of guaranteeing the freedom of the individual. This doctrine also helped to form the philosophical basis for the U.S. Constitution, with its division of power among the presidency, the Congress, and the judiciary (Russell, 2001).

### **1.1. c. Tocqueville:**

Democracy as he considered was rule by the people, and by the 1830s, when he visited the US, where his initial intent to study its penal system was replaced by a general study of political institutions and mores (Levin, 1993, p.113), Tocqueville found it in what he considered “pristine form”: he declared “The people reign in the American political world as God over the universe” (Tocqueville, 2003, p.70). He believed that American democracy was mainly built on the “equality of condition,” that is, by equality in people’s access not just to voting or holding public office but also to economic and cultural advantages in anti-aristocratic attitudes. The equality Tocqueville’s contemporary Americans enjoyed was not created by them out of nothing, but was the product of a long evolution in Europe, beginning with the extension of offices of the clergy beyond noblemen and the encroachment of the power of royal families by lawyers and well-off tradesmen.

Like Aristotle, Tocqueville was able to categorize a highly democratic situation and to grasp many advantages and virtues to democracy while remaining critical of it. While for Aristotle democracy was the best option of an available bad lot of forms of government,

Tocqueville considered the ‘democratic revolutions’ of his time, particularly the French Revolution and American Revolution, as the inevitable consequences of the history of growing equality in Europe. His great fear was that democracy would contribute the rise to the “tyranny of the majority”, which would demolish the political and civil rights he very appreciated, “My main complaint against a democratic government as organized in the United States is not its weakness, as many Europeans claim, but rather its irresistible strength” (Tocqueville, p.292). He clarified this point in a parliamentary speech in 1841: “I passionately love liberty, the rule of law, and respect for rights, but not democracy” (as cited in Hobson, 2015, p121). So, Aristotle was prepared to tolerate democracy only resentfully and Tocqueville was at best reluctant about it. However, in different ways each echoes what has come to be known as the “classical” perspective of democracy. One pillar of this perspective is that democracy involves self-government; of the people in Tocqueville’s formulation or of the many in Aristotle’s. **The other main pillar of classical theory is that democracy promotes the common good of whatever public is exercising self-government.**

#### **1.1. d. Schumpeter:**

In his 1942 published book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Schumpeter advanced a theory of democracy which challenged what he called the “classical doctrine” which he defined as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 2003 [1942], p.250). He plainly criticized the traditional pillars of democratic theory in what has come to be called the “realist” challenge to the classical understanding of democracy. He refuted the idea that democracy was a process by which the electorate identified the common good, and politicians carried this out for them. Schumpeter argued that this is not to be found anywhere, neither in the intentions of those who vote for public officials, voting on the basis of personal



preferences, nor in the outcome of a vote since members of a majority naturally have varied motivations for casting their ballots: “Health” might be desired by all, yet people would still disagree on vaccination and vasectomy.” (p. 252). Instead he promoted a minimalist model, whereby democracy is the mechanism for competition between leaders “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (ibid, p. 269). Although periodic votes by the general public legitimise governments and keep them accountable, the policy programme is considered as their own and not that of the people and the participatory role for individuals is usually strictly limited in order to avoid the chaos of endless elections or referenda. He also insisted that democracy is not rule by the people, but rather rule by politicians, who compete freely for the people's vote.

Even if any political society in which there are free elections is as democratic as any other on this definition, Schumpeter assumed that democracies could still be classified according to how well they encounter the requirements for the democratic method to ‘succeed.’ According to him these conditions are: availability of qualified political leaders; assurance that experts who decide matters requiring special knowledge or talents and not the public; a well-qualified bureaucracy; and a public whose fellows are tolerant of one another and are willing to allow politicians a quite freedom in governing. Schumpeter identified the opinion that on balance a social democratic society maintained the most promise since it could provide a more trained bureaucracy than a capitalist-dominated society, and the latter was more predisposed to raise profound frictions within a population, thus making trust in political leaders and tolerance difficult to sustain.

## **2. Classical Athenian democracy and the practice of citizen involvement:**

After depicting what had been said about democracy by pioneering thinkers who shaped the angles of democracy, now and in the following segment a thorough presentation of the

evolution of the Athenian democracy will be given in order to fully understand how the idea of democracy itself came out. We will do this by tracing back the Greek history and the different systems of rule it witnessed. Then we will end it with comparing the institutions of democracy now and then.

The history of Greece can be drawn back to Stone Age hunters. Later, it came a Greek Bronze Age, a period that persisted roughly for three thousand years (3000-1150BC) and saw major developments in social, economic, and technological advances that made Greece the centre of activity in the Mediterranean. It included three different civilizations; the Cycladic civilization advanced in the islands of the Aegean, and more precisely around the Cyclades, while the Minoans occupied the large island of Crete and in the Greek mainland is classified as there was the Mycenaean civilization which is also known as the “Age of Heroes” because it is the source of the mythological heroes and epics like Hercules, the Iliad and the Odyssey (Dickinson, 1994).

With Dorian invasion and the end of the Mycenaean civilization circa 1100 BC, there came “the Dark Ages” (Cartledge, 2009, p. 46). During the Early Dark Age (**1150–900**), the cities and palaces, and other products of civilization were destroyed and the Mycenaean civilization ceased either through “internal strife”, or outside invasions with the notable exception of Athens (Sacks, 2005, p. 216). Within these three centuries, the people of Greece lived in small groups that moved frequently in accord with their new pastoral lifestyle and livestock needs, though there were not written record left behind so it was concluded that they were illiterate. Ahead in the Dark Ages, the period between 950 and 750 BC was a time of renewal and growth for Greece. Communication and trade routes were renewed, literacy re-emerged with a new written language adopted from the Phoenicians, and artistic creativity began to be expressed again (Sacks, p. xi).

Following the Dark Ages, there now came an **Archaic** age which lasted for about two hundred years from (750/700–490 BC). This epoch identified the emergence of city-states which the Greeks termed “Polis”. The period that the polis started to emerge can be considered not only as the time of recovery but also the peak of Greek Civilization in politics, society, economy and culture.

Thomas.N. Mitchell (2015) argued that the story of the occurrence of Greek democracy has its roots in the principal form of political organisation that was established in the Greek world between 800 and 500 B.C., and that is known as the “polis” or city- state (p7). In his “*Politics*”, Aristotle, in fact, claimed that the polis was the natural situation for mankind. He said

The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like an part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state (book one, 1253, pp.2-3).

The geography of Greece had a strong impact on the development of cities in Greece. The Greek peninsula was mountainous and divided by many small rivers. Geographical features acted as barriers to contact and communication. As a result, villages were isolated and developed independently and some became more powerful than others. Stronger villages exerted power over the weaker and eventually brought all the villages in an area under one control. The process of unification is called **synoecism** “*sunoikismos*”, or 'coming to live together ' (Pomeroy, Burstein, Donlan & Roberts, 2004, p62). The polis tended to develop from the hilltop sites that had sprung up in the Dark Ages. The upper place of the hilltop, known as the “*acropolis*”, would be the location of important public buildings such as

temples and government structures. The marketplace, or “*agora*”, was another important place in a Greek city-state. It was where citizens congregated, not only to trade and make deals, but also to spread news and conduct politics (M.H Hansen, 2006). As trade became a more popular occupation than farming, ancient Greek people moved into cities. The movement from country to city and the increase in population helped city state institutions centralise power and the “polis” (city-state) came to birth. Greek political theorists arbitrated that “5 to 10,000 citizens” was the ideal size of a Greek polis. In such a sized community, most citizens could at least recognize by face most other citizens (T.Mitchell, p8).

Now, why Athens and not any other polis? As a matter of fact, the Athenian system of government went through several stages on the way to the mature form of democracy it reached in the fifth century BC. Aristotle’s *Politics* is replete with the varieties of political structures that arose during the formative years of the Archaic period. As stated by him, Athens was not the only polis in Ancient Greece that instituted a democratic regime; "Yet, it is only with reference to Athens that we can attempt to trace some of specific sixth century events that led to the institution of democracy at the end of the century" (Clarke, P.B. and Foweraker (2003, p.96 )

According to Aristotle, prior to the development of what was an extremely active democracy, the Athenians were under various forms of government, including monarchy, oligarchy and tyranny.

### **2.1. Monarchy:**

Monarchy had died out in Greece with the end of Mycenaean civilization, except for the dual kingship that existed in Sparta as part of its complex oligarchic system rather than as a monarchy in the ordinary sense (T. Martin, 1996, p70).

From about 2000 B.C.E. to 800 B.C.E., most Greek city-states were governed by monarchs. At first, the Greek kings were selected by the people of the city-state. When a king died,

another one was selected to take his place. Over time, however, kings demanded that their power be passed on to their children, usually to the oldest son. The kings of ancient Greece ruled by making laws and setting taxes, acting as judges, overseeing religious ceremonies, leading the army during wars, deciding punishments for people who disobeyed the laws or didn't pay taxes. Most kings had councils of advisors who helped them make decisions (R. Brock and S. Hodkinson, 2000). Usually these advisors were educated, wealthy men from the city-state. As they grew rich, they developed into a powerful body that was called the Areopagus. The Areopagus was the name of the hill on which these men met. Over time, these advisors decided that they should have more power than the king. They recognized that they had strength in their numbers: they were more numerous than the king. Eventually, these advisors overthrew the monarchy and took the power for themselves. By 800 B.C.E., most of the Greek city-states were no longer ruled by kings. It was from this group that the oligarchy would develop.

## **2.2. Oligarchy:**

Throughout the Dark Age, a closed aristocracy of birth and wealth ruled as masters over a large dependent and economically exploited peasantry (Mitchell and Rhodes, 1997, p. 21). Athenian tradition refers to a period of monarchy followed by rule by leading noble families through the Council of the Areopagos with officers called 'arkhons' (simply 'rulers') (Grote, 2001, p5). To put dates to this process is difficult, but it seems likely that by about 700 BC the kings had gone and that the Council of the Areopagos (appointed by the powerful noble families from their own members) was effectively in charge. In the early days after the removal of the monarchy there were apparently three arkhons, the "Basileus (king)" in charge of religious and state rituals, the "Polemarch" in charge of war, and one called simply the "arkon", who had general administrative duties. Then six more arkhons were added, called "*thesmothetai* ('law-setters')", who were in some way in charge of the state's laws, though

details remain obscure (Mitchell. P29). By the time these latter were added the period of office of the arkhons had been reduced from ten years to an annual appointment, and it seems to have become established practice that ex-arkhons automatically entered the Areopagos. They were undoubtedly the chief officers of the state, aided by a collection of minor officials mainly for financial matters, and responsible perhaps to the Council of the Areopagos, but even this seems in no way to have been formalised. “We have no knowledge of the process by which arkhons were appointed, except that they were selected from those of noble birth and considerable wealth. The process was certainly entirely within the hands of the noble families” (Grote, p5-6). All in all, Arckonships were available only to members of the aristocracy. These aristocrats utilized their position and power to serve only their family. The single political body capable of calling these people to task was the Areopagus. As the single check on aristocratic power was other aristocrats, the rest of the population’s needs were ignored. So, unrest, rioting by the lower classes and overall disapproval shattered the city-state. By the middle of the 7th century, in an attempt to correct the government, a series of tyrants ruled Athens.

### **2.3. Tyranny:**

To the Greeks the term tyrant did not have the negative connotation it does today (Shapiro. P15). A tyrant was someone who controlled the state. Sometimes this was done by force and other times it was by the will of the people. Three rulers from that era were highly influential—Solon, Peisistratus and Cleisthenes.

#### **2.3. a. Solon:**

In 621 BC, an arkon called Drako codified a set of "notoriously harsh" laws “imposing the death penalty for most offences” that were “a clear expression of the power of the aristocracy over everybody else.” This did not stop the aristocratic families feuding amongst themselves to obtain as much power as possible. (Thorley, 2005, p.10). Therefore, by the 6th century

BC, the majority of Athenians "had been 'enslaved' to the rich", and they called upon Solon, an archon at the time, to liberate them and stop the feuding of the aristocracy. "Solon instituted a series of reforms intended to reduce the tensions between the wealthy, the *agathoi*, and the poor, the *kakoi*" (Clarke and Foweraker, p241). He reshaped the city

by absorbing the traditional aristocracy in a definition of citizenship which allotted a political function to every free resident of Attica. Athenians were not slaves but citizens, with the right, at the very least, to participate in the meetings of the assembly. (Thorley, p.12)

Under these reforms, the position of archon "was opened to all with certain property qualifications, and a Boule, a rival council of 400, was set up. However, The Areopagus kept its "guardianship of the laws" (Thorley, p.12). Another major contribution to democracy was Solon's setting up of an "Ecclesia or Assembly", which was open to all male citizens.

However, "one must bear in mind that its agenda was apparently set entirely by the Council of 400", "consisting of 100 members from each of the four tribes", that had taken "over many of the powers which the Areopagos had previously exercised" (Thorley, p.13). His changes to Athenian law were the first to give the lower classes a fairer chance. However, the positions of power were still only available to those of wealth. It was the effects of class inequality that Solon tackled, not the causes of them. So, the "enfranchisement of the local laboring classes was succeeded by the development of chattel slavery, the enslavement of, in large part, foreigners" (Farrar, 1988, p7). Having completed his reforms, Solon resigned his power and left the city, making the Athenians promise to hold to his system for 10 years before making any changes. Yet in less than five years, the Athenian aristocrats had managed to undermine this system once again, and Solon's cousin Peisistratos seized control. Though Peisistratos ruled fairly, shared wealth and power and generally tried to protect the poor from the rich, his son, Hippias, was not so caring and began a reign of terror (Rhodes, P. J. 2006).

### 2.3. b. Cleisthenes:

After the exclusion of the son of Pisistratus in 510, Cleisthenes seized authority through the populace support. He set reforms that undermined the domination of the aristocratic families and connected every Athenian to the city's rule. "Cleisthenes fixed the boundaries of the polis as a political rather than a geographical entity by formally identifying the free inhabitants of Attica at that time as Athenian citizens" (Farrar, 1988, p21). He did this by making the traditional classifications politically irrelevant and instituting ten new tribes, each made up of about three "trytties", each consisting of several "demes" (139 villages or clusters of villages and hamlets) each taken from the city, the country and the coast (Hansen M.H, 1999, p34). As a consequence to this new division "Every male citizen on reaching the age of 18 was now to be registered in his deme. It was this registration which confirmed his citizenship" (Throley, p.23) i.e. any male who registered with their *deme* automatically became a citizen and so could participate in the new council of 500, the *boule*, where everyone had an equal right to speak.

For the ordinary citizens (i.e. males only) the reforms would allow them to access institutions and power previously reserved for the traditional aristocratic families. In this way, and though maybe not completely realized yet in practice, Cleisthenes founded democracy in Athens and paved the way for more reforms over the next years which would generate an entire and direct democratic system of government in which all citizens could participate. Furthermore, he introduced the institution of ostracism. Ostracisms in Athens were banishments from the polis for ten years (Rhodes, 2006, p5). This enabled the citizens to expel political leaders who supported unpopular agendas or who were too powerful. Solon had made all citizens equal before the law and reduced the influence of the landed Athenian aristocracy in the previous century, but in Classical Athens it was Cleisthenes who was credited with being the true "founding father" of Athenian democracy (Sacks, 2005, p.179).



A third set of reforms was brought about by Ephialtes in 462/1. While his opponents were away attempting to assist the Spartans, Ephialtes persuaded the Assembly to reduce the powers of the Areopagus: “in effect stripping it of all its controlling and supervisory powers and leaving it only as a court for cases of homicide and certain offences of sacrilege” (Thorley, 2005, pp. 55–56).

However, it was in the age of Pericles when the pillars of Athenian democratic regime concretely stood and it was in his age that the word “democracy” first used in addition, the only contemporary definition of the term that survives is provided by Pericles in the Funeral Oration attributed to him by Thucydides, where he says that the Athenian model of government is called “**demokratia**” because “its management is in the control, not of the few, but of the greater number”: in other words, it gives power “kratos” to the mass “demos” (Mitchell, p48).

So as we reach the two elements *demos* and *kratos* that compound the word democracy, we will have to focus on both of them in order to analyze the ideal and the working of democracy in the ancient Athenian democracy. In Athens’ democracy, the *demos* encompassed all citizens, namely all male inhabitants with political rights excluding women, immigrants and slaves from participating. The rule of citizens was established mostly on two essential principles: the people and the equality of citizens. As a matter of fact, certain features of the official structure of democratic government in antique Athens –the *kratos* component of democracy – are rather related to those of the modern democratic system: there was a citizens’ assembly which fulfilled a legislative function, the “council of the five hundred” which functioned as an executive, and people’s courts whose members were chosen yearly by lot. These institutional arrangements were intended and actually did ensure that the *demos* itself did literally rule.

However, the Athenian democracy was quite different from the modern democratic governance. Perhaps the most important difference was that in the Athenian state the distinction between state and society, specialized officials and citizens, or the “people” and the government was not part of the political philosophy (Held, 2006). The principle of democratic government was “direct participation”. The idea of an active, involved citizenry in a process of self-government was central to the understanding of governance; the governors were literally the ones to be governed. All citizens met to debate, decide, and enact the law; there was an enormous extent of political engagement. The public opinion, first of all, was formed mainly through extensive discussions and deliberation of public affairs at the assembly and the council. Freedom of speech was hereby the key element in opinion building. The will of the demos was, then, formed through joint deliberation by the physically present demos in the assembly. To this extent one can speak of a collective will of the demos that is more than an aggregation of individual opinions. Hence, the process of government was based on deliberative decision-making and not solely casting one’s vote. What Pericles refers to as “proper discussions” (as cited in Held 2006 p.15), is a free and unrestricted discourse, guaranteed by an equal right to speak in the sovereign assembly. The only restriction was that the proposed issue should be justified in terms of the utility for the polis, i.e. an issue subject to discussion was only legitimate if it appealed to the common good and was therefore non-particular in nature. Finally, the demos of Athenian democracy was “not an imagined collective subject (as it is the case in the modern nation-states) but a tangible collective subject” (Zittel and Fuchs, 2007, pp. 29-54.) and this was made possible to a great extent by the small number as well as the ethnic-cultural homogeneity of the citizenry (Fuchs, 2007).

Athenian democracy was a community in which all citizens could and indeed should participate in political life and in the conducting of public affairs. The principle of equality was guaranteed in the sense that citizens faced no obstacles to involvement in public affairs or

engagement in legislative and judicial functions based on rank or wealth. Though this freedom also included the freedom of nonparticipation, each individual was expected to be interested in the affairs of the state, no matter how occupied they were with their own personal business. As Pericles says: “we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all” (as cited in Held, 2006 p.14). As it is clear from this statement, Athenian democracy was marked by a general commitment to the principle of civic life.

To conclude, the development of democracy in Athens has formed a central source of inspiration for modern political thought. Athenian political ideals, such as equal rights to participate in the assembly or to hold and to control public office, have shaped political thinking in the West through the ages. Perhaps the most important deficit of Athenian democracy is the highly restricted understanding of citizenship. Only male citizens with an Athenian background were given citizens’ rights; other groups in the society (women, slaves, non-Athenians) were excluded from this status and the rights attached to it. In that sense, the principle of equality was realized only to a limited extent and the principle of freedom was nonexistent. The arbitrariness of decision-making and legal processes- as it has become visible e.g. in the trial and death of Socrates in 399 BC – was another point of criticism on ancient democracy. A common understanding of rule of law, in terms of modern liberal practice was not present in Athens (Cartledge, 2009, p. 111). Yet despite these limitations, certain aspects of the antique democracy, such as the extent of participation by citizens and the nature of public opinion building and decision-making have inspired modern Western democratic thought.

### **3. The Rise of Modern Democracy:**

#### **3.1. 16th Century Reformation and the First Democratic Ideas:**

The Greek institutions of democracy waned under the attacks first of the Macedonian and later of Roman empires. Even if that the Republican Rome had popular assemblies “comitia”, in which the citizens met to elect officials and make laws, the comitia lost their powers first to the aristocratic Roman Senate and ultimately to the Roman emperors later (Hammer, 2015, p.47). The collapse of Rome in the 6th century A.D. created a European society that was mainly concerned with security rather than with democratic institutions. This gave rise to the rigidly hierarchical systems of feudalism. Political attitudes were, furthermore, shaped by the powerful Christian church, which taught, in effect, that existing institutions had divine sanction (Morkot, 1996). The medieval kings claimed divine authority to rule relying on their principal baronial vassals for practical advice establishing what it became to be called Absolutism (Rowley C.K and Bin Wu, 2014, p2). It is up till the 16<sup>th</sup> century that “...the modern political thought which may be broadly called democratic takes its rise in the sixteenth century” (Gooch, 1898, p.1). In the same source Gooch asserts that

Democracy is the child of Reformation... Reformation largely owed its origin to the enunciation of two intellectual principles, the rightful duty of free inquiry, and the priesthood of all believers. ...Free inquiry, ..., led straight from theological to political criticism, and the theory of universal priesthood indicated the general direction of the investigation. The first led to liberty, the second to equality. (pp. 8-9)

The Reformation or the Protestant Reformation was a schism from the Roman Catholic Church which is usually considered to have started with the publication of the Ninety-five Theses in 1517 by Martin Luther in 1517 and lasting until 1648. Luther launched his protests by a call to purify the church by condemning the sale of indulgences, claiming that the

Pope had no authority over Purgatory and that the Catholic doctrine of the merits of the saints had no foundation in the Bible. He went on declaring the Bible as the only source of faith and practice (“sola scriptura” (p.104)) and that faith in Jesus, and not good works, is the only way to obtain salvation “sola fide” (p.8) (Quentin, 1978). By promoting these ideas, reformation first challenged the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and ended into a new form of Christianity, called Protestantism and second raised up the individual and individualism by terminating the possibility of the transfer of religious merit from the more to the less Godly by stressing the idea that men are equal in god’s eye. Over the course of the 16th century Reformation spread to other European countries ensuing one of the most devastating wars in Europe; the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants and Protestants against each other ,involving nearly all major European countries. The war saw the decline of Catholic influence and Habsburg supremacy, as well as the establishment of the concept of nation-states through “the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 finally terminate a struggle that had changed the map of Europe and had wrecked much of Central Europe” (Rowley & Wu, 2014, p.24).

### **3.2. Absolutism, Religion and the English Civil Wars:**

In England, reformation was due to a parliamentary act that King Henry VIII forced in 1534 in order to “annul” his first marriage, remarry and get his male heir. The act marked the split and confirmed the divine rights of the king by making him Head of state and church. (Rowley & Bin Wu, p.31). However, This was not a clean and final cut from the Catholic Church; Edward VI led further reformations to secure Protestantism in England, under Mary the country reverted back to Catholicism resulting in executions of many protestants, and it was Elizabeth I who restored Protestantism in England once and for all (ibid, pp.32-36). What concerns me here precisely is not how the English schism was attained, but the claims that the religious reformation was a cause of the English civil war which brought about the

end of monarchical absolutism and set for the constitutional monarchy. The existence of an English parliament could be traced back to the late 13<sup>th</sup> century, and it had been divided into two houses since the middle of this century, with knights and burgesses sitting in what developed as the House of Commons while clergy and nobility sat in the House of Lords (Rowley C.K and Bin Wu, 2014, p15). During the rule of Charles I, pervasive fears of Catholicism in England spread due to his inclinations along with his marriage to a Catholic.

fear by the covenanting Scots that the king aimed to extirpate Presbyterian worship and church government; fear by the Anglican party in England that the puritans in Parliament would abolish the prayerbook, and rip up the Church of England root and branch; fear of Catholics in the three kingdoms that the English Parliament would not be content until every Catholic was dead; and fear of parliamentarians of a fiendish jesuitical plot to impose the popish religion on England. (Gentles, 1993, 409)

In 1641, the Irish Catholics revolted, killing English and Scottish Protestants who had lived there. Charles wanted to overturn the Irish uprising but didn't have the money to raise troops on his own. He called Parliament, but the Parliament rejected giving him money or raising troops for him unless their own grievances were addressed like the requirement that the king had to call Parliament at least once a year. The quarrel between King Charles and Parliament reached its zenith in 1642 when the king came to Parliament demanding the surrender of five members for treason to the crown. They fled, and the subjects of the kingdom took sides as the first of three English civil wars initiated. Most of northern and western England with much of Ireland sided with the king. These were the Royalists, or Cavaliers. The Parliamentarians, also known as Roundheads, having the support of the Royal Navy, controlled southeast England. Oliver Cromwell, a member of Parliament, raised troops for the Parliamentarians in the provinces. In 1643, Charles' victory over the Parliamentarians seemed

grounded however an alliance between the Parliamentarians and Scotland placed that victory in uncertainty. With the intervention of Scottish forces, the Parliamentarians progressively gained the upper hand over Charles' Royalists. In 1644, Charles lost control of northern England. By 1645 the Parliamentary forces, under the command of Oliver Cromwell, had overcome the king's principal army and captivated the king. Charles was not willing to give up to the English Parliamentarians instead he surrendered to the Scots and planned his escape.

After his capture, the king stimulated more violence that became known as England's Second Civil War. The Parliamentarians thought there would be no peace in the kingdom unless the king was killed, so they arrested him on charges of high treason. The king was tried, found guilty and beheaded in January 1649. After the execution of Charles, a republic was formed in England. Oliver Cromwell was charged with the re-conquest of Ireland, which had been run by a Catholic Confederation since 1642. With Cromwell in Ireland, Charles II, the executed king's son, appeared in Scotland. In 1651 he was crowned king of Scotland and sent Scottish forces to invade England, launching the Third English civil war. While fighting in Ireland was persisting until 1642, Cromwell invaded Scotland to overthrow the forces of Charles II. In 1653, Cromwell was entitled "lord protector" of the commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland; the only non-royal ever to rule the three kingdoms. Charles II, who had run away to France, returned to the throne after Cromwell's death in 1660 (Morill, 2000, pp.25- 60). Because of the Civil War, monarchy had been removed and then returned in a weakened form, paving the way for the constitutional monarchy that exists today.

Another incident that deserves mentioning here is the way how the notion of parties developed. In 1678, a rumour spread through England that Roman Catholics were conspiring to kill King Charles II and give the throne to his Roman Catholic brother, James, Duke of York. There was no real popish plot, but a frightened Parliament stripped all Roman Catholics from public offices and attempted to take away the Duke of York's right to inherit

the throne through the Exclusion Bills. However to King Charles II, Parliament sounded to be challenging royal authority so he decided to dissolve it. All over England people were either for or against the king's deed. Those who pressed the king to summon a new Parliament were called "Petitioners". Those who supported the king's action were called "Abhorrrers" since they abhorred any effort to control the king's actions. Later, the two factions acquired other names. Petitioners were called Whigs which was an old word for Scottish Presbyterians who opposed the government. The king's supporters were called Tories. "Tory" was formerly a name given to Irish Roman Catholics who had suffered under Protestant rule (Rowley C.K and Bin Wu, 2014). The principle distinction between Whigs and Tories in the 1600s was their opinion of what government should do and how strong it should be (. Tories sought rule by a strong king. Whigs required ordinary people to own more rights and gain more control of their government. In time, as Parliament won greater control, both Whigs and Tories settled into organized parties. These old names took on new meanings.

Nonetheless, it was the arrival of William of Orange from Holland to take the throne from the catholic James II, again because of religious fears and on the verge of another civil war, which headed the creation of the Bill of Rights (the period became to be known as the Glorious Revolution 1688), making the king "the chief servant of the law, but not its master; the executor of the law, not its source; that laws should only be alterable by Parliament-Kings, Lords and Commons together" (Trevelyan, 1938, p. 87 cited in Rowley & Wu, p.102). So constitutionally preventing absolute rule by the Kings and Queens of Great Britain to this day, and leaving Parliament as the true seat of power in the country along with granting the freedom of speech in Parliament, regular elections to Parliament , the right to petition in the monarch without fear of retribution .



### 3.3. The Enlightenment and the Right of Man:

Most of the previous events coincided with very significant developments in the human thinking and reasoning; the Enlightenment. It was the age of Enlightenment that sparked most of the democratic ideas that we are familiar with today. Beginning in the second half of the seventeenth century and lasting for over a century and a half, the enlightenment era “was the most important and profound intellectual, social, and cultural transformation of the Western world since the Middle Ages and the most formative in shaping modernity” (Israel J. 2011, p3).

Philosophers of this era such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau advanced the earliest concepts on relationships between individuals, and between the individual and the government around the idea of a “social contract”. Hobbes in his *Leviathan* (1651) and Locke in his *Two treatises of Government* (which was published the year after the Glorious Revolution; 1690) agreed upon the notion that citizens need to willingly give up some of their rights in favor of others’ rights in order to found the state as a sovereign which would defend the rights of individuals and control their relationships with each other.

However, Hobbes stated that people were by nature ambitious (Hobbes, p.61). He believed that the kind of government required to control selfish ambitions men was absolute monarchy. Contrary to Hobbes, Locke provided a strong argument against the divine right of kings “...to make way for this doctrine (absolute monarchy), they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom; whereby they have not only, as much as in them lies, exposed all subjects to the utmost misery of tyranny and oppression...” (p.8). As we have seen earlier, Locke said that all human beings had naturally the right to life, liberty, and property. So as to protect these natural rights, they formed governments and the people had an absolute right, he assumed, to rebel against a government that violated or failed to protect their rights (p.205).

A hundred years later, Rousseau, unlike Hobbes, identified the social contract as an agreement among free individuals to create a government that would respond to the people's will, he said

.... Find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint strength, the person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract gives the answer. (Betts C., 1994, p.55)

He also emphasized the idea of popular sovereignty, which can only be achieved when each individual puts his power under the rule of law. This necessitated people to delegate power to a government which will apply the law and therefore protect the popular sovereignty or "the general will" against individual interests (p.58). This early thought was consequently the precursor of modern democratic relations such as people's sovereignty and the legitimation of political authority by the rule of law.

Another influential philosopher is Montesquieu who also recognized liberty as a natural right. In *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), Montesquieu decided that liberty could be best secured by a separation of powers, that is, by dividing government into three separate branches (p187). These branches were (1) a legislature to make laws, (2) an executive to enforce them, and (3) courts to interpret them. The United States and many other democratic countries use this basic plan.

DEMOCRATIC and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free.

Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power: but constant experience shews us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. ... To prevent this

abuse, it is necessary, from the very nature of things, power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits. (Montesquieu, book11, chapter4, p.186)

### **3.4. The Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights:**

Moving to a different setting but remaining in the same era, we find one of the most critical documents for the study of the growth of democracy in the world; the Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776.

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed, by their CREATOR, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.— That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government...(Byer, J.B. 2012, p.3)

It presented the colonists' philosophical explanation for the American Revolution and reflected the ideas of Locke and Rousseau. It contained "the most potent and consequential words in American history" (Ellis J.J., 2007, p.56) and due to it the new United States of America came to be the first modern democratic state. After independence in 1783, the new nation existed as a loose federation, or union, of states under a plan of government called the Articles of Confederation. Fearing that a strong government would lead to the kind of tyranny they had rebelled against, inspiring lessons from the English experience "Americans learned that a free people are those who live under a government so constitutionally checked and controlled that its powers must be reasonably exercised without abridging individual rights" (Levy, 1999, p4). In 1787, a chosen group of American leaders met in Philadelphia to frame,

a better plan of government. The result of their efforts was the Constitution of the United States which was only ratified by 9 states. For the sake of total ratification, the constitution was amended in 1791 resulting in one of the most far-reaching documents in the history of the growth of democracy which was the Bill of Rights. Being an aspiration and a model for new democracies around the world for more than two centuries, the American constitution endured because “it was written to control government, not people” (Levy, p43).

### **3.5. More Liberty and Equality with the French Revolution:**

Justice has its anger, Monsieur Bishop, and the wrath of justice is an element of progress. Whatever may be said matters not, the French revolution is the greatest step in advance taken by mankind since the advent of Christ; incomplete it may be, but it is sublime. It loosened all the secret bonds of society, it softened all hearts, it calmed, appeased, enlightened; it made the waves of civilisation to flow over the earth; it was good. The French revolution is the consecration of humanity. (Hugo, 1992, p36)

The French revolution is an indispensable matter in tackling the subject of the underpinning elements in modern democracy. Prior the French revolution, like most Europeans, the French people were divided in three social estates, clergy, nobility and the lowest Third Estate; the commoners and the absolutist king. In May 1789, an economically broke and spoiled monarchy tried to increase taxes on commoners. So, Louis XVI called the Estates- General, which had not been called to meet since 1614, into session. The Third Estate, however, felt their class was not fairly represented. They left in protest and formed the National Assembly. In June 20<sup>th</sup>, the Third Estate took Tennis Court Oath, declaring its intention not to dissolve until a constitution is adopted for France. On July 14<sup>th</sup>, 1789, Burdened by taxes, suffering from hunger, dissatisfied with the “ancien régime’s” reforms, fueled by the Enlightenment ideas of social contract and freedom and inspired by the

American Revolution that threw off an oppressive rule, the French peasants revolted, storming the Bastille, a prison in Paris that signified royal tyranny, then spread throughout the country. On August 26<sup>th</sup>, 1789, the National Assembly introduced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It insisted that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights” and guaranteed security and resistance to oppression to all citizens. In 1791, a new elected Legislative Assembly replaced the National Assembly. However, it was not accepted by the king, the aristocracy, or many Catholics. Adding to the civil riots, the country was torn apart by an exterior war. In August 1792, the king, queen and their son were imprisoned for believing that the king betrayed them and the first Republic took place. In September, the Legislative Assembly created a new legislature, the National Convention, which was elected by universal manhood suffrage. But because of fraction within the Convention, a more radical legislature took charge and the Revolution entered a year period called the Reign of Terror in 1793. People who were supposed to be against the revolution were guillotined for their beliefs. Included among them were the king and queen. Finally, in 1799, a military leader, Napoleon Bonaparte, took control of France and created a dictatorship (Fremont-Barnes, 2007). Although the Revolution started and ended with a monarch, it had a crucial impact on Europe and world history and laid to the foundation of a modern state governed by the people, “We may say of it that it created man a second time, in giving him a second soul, his rights. The nineteenth century inherits and profits by its work...” (Hugo, p.864). The French Revolution demonstrates the hardships of achieving democracy. Promising equality and freedom or having a representative government is not enough. For democracy to work, a society must have rule by law, protections for both civil rights and civil liberties, tolerance of opposition, and acceptance of majority decisions by the minority.

### **3.6. The 19<sup>th</sup> century and the Extension of Suffrage:**

So what we have learnt from the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century's thoughts is that democracy must encompass representation, though with restriction, popular sovereignty, rule of law, liberty and equality along with an accountable government.

#### **3.6. a. The Ideological Mood of the 19<sup>th</sup> century:**

In the light of the Enlightenment democratic advancements, some key concepts of modern democracy weren't yet fully shaped. In fact, "For much of the nineteenth century democracy would be 'almost unanimously' linked to Jacobinism (Naess et al. 1956: 113), blamed (somewhat unfairly) for the revolutionary wars, and portrayed as a great menace to stability and peace" (Hobson, 2015, p108) . Voices disfavoured democracy turned louder due mainly to the Terror period witnessed by the French. Those negative analyses of democracy were not exclusive in Europe that survived the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; they reached even the fledging American republic. Consequently a dominant view surfaced the debate explaining that democracy was possible only in a small land among a small number of citizens "applying the ancient form of democracy to the modern world had been the chaos, violence and tumult of the revolution" (Hobson, p.109). The answer to this concern was advanced by John Stuart Mill (Hoch-Dayican, 2010). According to Mill, the rise of the nation-state needed the setup of system of representation in which those defined as citizens with economic, legal, and social rights would elect representatives: "since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate in any but minor portions of the public business", in other words, the model of a perfect government must be representative (as cited in Hoch-Dayican, p25). In fact, the grouping of the principle of representation with the classical democratic principle of liberty gave birth to a new type of democracy referred to as "liberal democracy", which can also be defined as representative democracy in view of its institutional structures. Without a doubt, the combination of the democratic principle with the

representative principle ascertained the view that a democracy was only possible in small states was “completely abandoned” (Dahl, 1989 as cited in Hoch-Dayican, p, 25).

### **3.6. b. The Extension of Suffrage:**

Moving away from the ideological aspects of the development of democracy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we find tangible actions that paved the path for today’s democracy, which is suffrage. It is in this period that movements for universal suffrage were initiated. In the early nineteenth century, the United States extended suffrage to all white males through removing property requirements reaching unprecedented amount of voting population. Therefore, even though this level of suffrage barely looks democratic today, the United States is often regarded the world's first true democracy.

In Europe, it was another story. Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most European states started to undertake the side effects of the Industrial Revolution, concentration of populations in the cities, unemployment, low wages, urban poverty, the bankruptcy of the artisans and handicraftsmen and all of this led to numerous political movements.

Liberal agitation began to revive in Britain, France, and the Low Countries by the mid-1820s. Liberals wanted stronger parliaments and wider protection of individual rights. They also sought a vote for the propertied classes. They wanted commercial legislation that would favour business growth, which in Britain meant attacking Corn Law tariffs that protected landlord interests and kept food prices (and so wages) artificially high. Belgian liberals also had a nationalist grievance, for the Treaty of Vienna had placed their country under Dutch rule. (Campbell, 2011, pp.25-26)

Following the American model, democracy gradually gained ground across Europe. In **Britain**, parliament continued to gain power at the expense of the monarch, and suffrage was finally extended in a smooth way. In contrast, throughout Continental Europe, democratization was a much more violent process, including many rebellions; notably, the

year 1848 that witnessed a wave of revolutionary struggles that absorbed most European nations except for a few, including Russia, Spain, and Britain and came to be known as the “springtime of the peoples” (Campbell, p.127) . Most of the people who became revolutionaries in that year demanded a more inclusive and representative government, with some hoping to achieve this through banishing foreign rulers.

In Britain, political reforms came very gradually. Nevertheless, they were escalated after 1848, on account of the peril of revolution, although the 1848 revolution did not sweep across Britain. By 1815, only the upper classes were represented in the parliament, and only 5 per cent of the adult male population were eligible to vote. Then reforms ushered in as follow:

**a. Reform Bill of 1832:** liberal elements within the British government passed the bill that lowered property qualifications, enabling most upper-middle class males to vote; also abolished "rotten boroughs:" the practice of having one person running for election to parliament from several electoral districts.

**b. The Chartist Movement:** Unpleased with the Reform Bill of 1832, in 1838 working class leaders drew up the People's Charter calling for universal male suffrage, election by secret ballot, and removal of property qualifications for office. These people were called Chartists and their greatest demonstration came in 1848, which coincided with the continental revolutions of 1848, but the Chartist movement never grew politically powerful.

**c. Reform Bill of 1867:** Doubled the electorate, gave vote to the lower middle class for the first time, restricted working hours, established sanitary codes, created housing standards and aided labour unions.

**d. 1884 Reform Bill:** gave two thirds of adult males the vote; implemented civil service examination and also opened army service to talent (Tilly, 2004, pp.3-5)

Compared with Britain, France endured more dramatic changes, mainly because it was the cradle of the French Revolution and people just had a deeper memory of it, and the promises



of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" that they were taught to be within their reach. In 1824, Louis XVIII was succeeded to by Charles X, who wanted to re-establish conservatism by dissolving the lower house of the parliament, Chamber of Deputies, which headed to a revolution in 1830 led by liberals and workers. The new king, Louis-Philippe wanted to seem close to the people and doubled the electorate "producing a new and slightly more liberal monarchy, an expanded middle-class voting system, and some transient protections for freedom of the press" (Campbell, p.26). In the 1848, aggrieved that the constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe represented largely the wealthy, and not the working class, the workers rioted against the government troops and a new revolution erupted. It ended by electing Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, president of the Second French who after four years established the Second French Empire. In spite of the restoration of the empire, Napoleon III started universal male suffrage, though it was written into the Constitution of 1793, this only became effective on 2nd March 1848, in the heat of the February revolution, promoted industrialization and economic growth. The Franco-Prussian war terminated Napoleon III's Second Empire. From then on, France has stayed a republic till today (Ibid).

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the major features of modern democracy including individual freedom; equality before the law; representation, popular sovereignty and suffrage had been asserted. Such features have been reflected by great philosophers like Hobbes and Locke and have been proclaimed in great historic documents, such the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Throughout the twentieth century, the remaining obstacles to suffrage including discrimination based on gender and ethnicity were finally removed in Western nations and aspiring for democracy has become a mutual issue for nations and leaders all over the world.

#### **4. Elements of Democracy:**

From what was mentioned earlier the following elements of democracy can be drawn.

##### **4.1. Political Pluralism:**

Broadly defined, pluralism is a belief in or a commitment to diversity or multiplicity of opinions, ethical values cultural norms or lifestyles. Narrowly, pluralism can be used to indicate “a theory of the distribution of political power” (Heywood, 2000, p.77). It says that power ought to be widely and evenly distributed in society, rather than concentrated in the hands of an elite or a ruling class. In this way pluralism is “usually seen as a theory of group politics, in which individuals are largely represented through their membership of organised groups, and all such groups have access to the policy process” (ibid). In other words it signifies the existence of electoral choice and a competitive party system. So, in a democracy, the government should not be only the only source of power. This assumes that the many organised groups in a democratic society do not depend upon government for their existence, legitimacy, or authority. Most democratic societies have thousands of private organisations, some local and some national. Many of these organisations serve a mediating role between individuals and society’s complex social and governmental institutions, filling roles not given to government and offering individuals opportunities to become part of their society without being in government.

##### **4.2. Democratic Participation:**

Participation is a “component of democracy which refers to the process whereby people act in political ways to connect themselves to government and thus become self-governing” (Grigsby, 2008, p. 351). People in a democratic system have opportunities to participate through different methods, from local to national levels. In a democracy, the most common process of political participation is voting in elections. Apart from voting for other candidates people can also become candidates themselves and run for public office. Referenda and consultations by leaders (for example through community meetings) are other forms of

political participation beyond elections. Some alternative forms also exist but can be institutionalised to a certain extent; for instance people can join political parties or form certain interest and lobby groups. Moreover, there are others of a more temporary or spontaneous nature, such as petitions, campaigns for certain projects or services and protest movements and demonstrations. The media can also provide chances for participation, mainly by providing stages for publicly expressing opinions on political matters. Thus, democratic participation can take place in two ways: first, people can participate through established structures of the adopted forms of democracy; and second, they can participate through civil associations. In democracies, the election of leaders must be free and fair. In some societies, a referendum is used to decide on major issues of the day. In this way citizens become part of decision-making and governance. The second is through civil associations, for example; farmers, youth, academics, women, persons with disabilities, veterans, entrepreneurs, environmentalists etc. Participation in such associations is important as they help to protect group interests and as they raise awareness about specific issues and, therefore, can be educative. Besides, participation via such associations and groups eradicates individual isolation and reinforces the position of the people in engaging leaders for their own interests and those of the community in general (Department of Political Science and Public Administration, p.14).

### **4.3. Representation:**

Owing to the main challenge presented by direct democracy, indirect or representative democracy was introduced. Representation is defined as

the process by which political power and influence which the entire citizenry or a part of it might have upon governmental action, ..., is exercised on its behalf by a small number among them, with a binding effect upon the whole community thus represented (Friedrich, 1968, p.278).

Scholar J.S. Mill argued that “the people must possess this ultimate power in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government” (Mill, 1963, p.104). From the above conceptualisation, five essential principles of representation in a liberal democracy stand out, namely:

- The ultimate power lies with the people (the popular sovereignty principle);
- This popular power is exercised by a selected few on behalf of the many (the deputation principle);
- The representatives or deputies are mandated by the people through periodical elections (the popular consent principle);
- Decisions made and actions carried out by these deputies have a binding effect on the community (the governance principle); and
- As ultimate masters, the people remain the final judge of performance of the government and their deputies (the accountability principle).

#### **4.4. Elections:**

Since in a democracy the ideal is seeking the consent and mandate of the citizens for any leader to be accepted as legitimate, citizen participation in the choice of their leaders is important. Elections as the “means of filling public offices by competitive struggle for the popular vote” (Heywood, 1997, p.68) have become synonymous with democracy as it empowers the common citizens with the right to choose their leaders. As a result, elections have become one of the yardsticks for measuring how democratic a country is. As such, participation in the decision-making process and the conduct of free and fair elections are some of the major principles of democracy, to the extent that one of the political responsibilities of every citizen is to vote for responsible leadership in their community or country. The elements of democratic elections include:

- Elections must be competitive: The freedom of speech, assembly and movement

necessary to openly voice criticism of the current government and to bring alternative policies and candidates to the voters must be guaranteed to the opposition parties and candidates.

- Elections must be periodical: Democracies do not elect dictators or presidents-for-life. Elected officials are accountable to the citizens and they must return to the voters at prescribed intervals to seek their mandate to continue in office or face the risk of being voted out of office.

- Elections must be inclusive: Who is entitled to vote and how widely is the franchise drawn? The definition of the citizen and voter must be large enough to include the adult population, which in the case of almost all countries is someone who is 18 years and above. A government chosen by a small, exclusive group is not a democracy no matter how democratic its internal workings may appear.
- Elections must be definitive, as they define who the public office bearers will be for a specified period of time.
- Voters in a democracy must be permitted to cast their ballots in secret to minimise the opportunity for intimidation. At the same time, the protection of the ballot box and the tallying of the votes must be conducted as openly as possible, so that the citizens are confident that the results are accurate and that the government does, indeed, rest upon their consent (U.S. Department of State, Democracy in Brief (Global Publishing Solutions:19 – 22)).

After the election, the losers accept the judgment of the voters. If the incumbent party loses, it must turn over power peacefully. No matter who wins, both sides must agree to cooperate in solving the common problems of the society. There are different forms of electoral systems. The way elections of public officials are conducted varies from country to country. There is the ‘winner-take-all’ system or under a system of proportional representation, each political party is represented in the legislature according to its percentage

of the total vote cast nationwide. Whatever the system used, election processes must be seen as fair and open so that the election results are recognized as legitimate.

#### **4.5. Rule of Law:**

Democracy without the rule of law is quite literally unthinkable. Being subjected to the rule of law may sometimes be a vexation but it is the only sure and certain protection we have against tyranny, demagogues, and mob rule (Myers, 2002, p.138).

The rule of law is the principle that the law should rule in the sense that all people are equal before the law. It means that no individual, whether president or private citizen, stands above the law. The rule of law is thus a core democratic principle, embodying ideas like “constitutionalism” which is the practice of the rule of law and limited government (Heywood, 1997, p. 284). The rule of law guards central political, social, and economic rights and preserves the citizen from the threats of tyranny and lawlessness. Democratic governments practise authority through the law and are themselves subject to the law’s restraints.

#### **4.6. Human Rights and Individual Freedoms:**

Human rights are “universal legal guarantees that protect the fundamental freedoms and human dignity of every individual”. These rights assert that every human being is entitled to equal treatment and opportunities, regardless of gender, economic status, ethnicity etc.

Human rights can be civil, cultural, social, economic or political. Human rights are universal, equal and interdependent (Heywood, 1997, pp.57-58). They protect individuals and groups, oblige the state and all its institutions and cannot be waived or taken away. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in various international and regional treaties as well as national constitutions. These instruments oblige the government to protect the citizens from violations of human rights and also limit

the government's ability to interfere with the rights of the individual. Equality and freedom from discrimination, Protection of the right to life, Protection of personal liberty, Respect for human dignity and protection from inhuman treatment, Protection from slavery, servitude and forced labour, Protection from deprivation of property, Right to privacy of person and other property, Protection of freedom of conscience, expression, movement, religion, assembly and association, Right to education, Rights of women, Rights of children, Rights of persons with disabilities, Protection of minorities, Right of access to information and Right to just and fair treatment in administrative decisions are the most common rights in all constitutions.

#### **4.7. Political Leadership:**

Leadership can “either be understood as a pattern of behaviour or a personal quality” (Heywood, 1997, p. 330). As a pattern of behaviour, leadership is the influence exerted by an individual or group over a larger body to organise or direct its efforts towards the achievement of desired goals. As a personal attribute, leadership refers to the character traits which enable the leader to exert influence over others; leadership is thus equated with charisma, which is the personal charm or power to lead. The virtues of good leadership are:

- It musters and motivates people who would otherwise be passive and aimless;
- It engenders unity and encourages members of a group to direct their efforts in the same track;
- It reinforces organisations by establishing a hierarchy of responsibilities and roles.

On the other hand, bad leadership may lead to undesired outcomes like:

- Concentration of power and it can thus lead to corruption and tyranny, hence the democratic demand that leadership be checked by accountability;
- Creation of a situation of subservience and deference, which may discourage people from participating in issues that concern them and thus lead to failure to take responsibility for their own destiny;

- Because of the nature of flow of information from the top to the bottom rather than from the bottom to the top, bad leadership will often stifle debate and argument.

Democratic political leaders therefore have to be mindful of the side effects of their leadership style on the people they lead, lest the undesirable effects derail the democratic process.

#### **4.8. Good Governance and Accountability:**

Governance is the procedure of “decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented” (UNESCAP, June 2009, p.1). As decisions making is the analysis of the process by which we arrive at decisions, this requires that we understand who the actors are in governance. Indeed, they include government itself and other actors such as: non-governmental organisations, political parties, the military, the police, farmers’ organisations, religious leaders, the media, multinational corporations, lobbyists and many others. All the other actors, apart from government and the military, are known as civil society. Good governance is, therefore, that kind of governance that adheres to the following characteristics:

- It is participatory by allowing the masses to be part of the decision-making process;
- It is consensus-oriented as it seeks for broad consensus in society rather than permitting minority views to override all other views;
- It is accountable since leadership at national or local government level as well as in the private and public spheres will have to answer to the masses at some point in time;
- It is transparent in that decisions are taken and enforced in a manner that conforms to the rules and regulations of a given community; It is responsive in that institutions and processes seek to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe;
- It is effective and efficient as processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of the resources at their disposal, i.e. sustainable use of resources and protection of the environment;



- It is equitable and inclusive as all members feel that they have a stake in what is being done and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society; and
- It adheres to the rule of law for fairness and impartiality.
- It is accountable since leadership at national or local government level as well as in the private and public spheres will have to answer to the masses at some point in time;
- It is transparent in that decisions are taken and enforced in a manner that conforms to the rules and regulations of a given community. It is responsive in that institutions and processes seek to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe;
- It is effective and efficient as processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of the resources at their disposal, i.e. sustainable use of resources and protection of the environment;
- It is equitable and inclusive as all members feel that they have a stake in what is being done and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society; and
- It adheres to the rule of law for fairness and impartiality.

Concerning government accountability, it requires that public officials, elected or unelected have an obligation to explain their decisions and actions to the citizens (US Department of State, 2008). Government accountability can be achieved through a number of methods. These can be political, legal or administrative methods designed to combat corruption and to guarantee that public officials remain answerable and accessible to the people they serve. Government accountability can be achieved through the following ways:

- Conducting free and fair elections. Fixed terms of office and elections for elected officials to account for their performance and provide opportunities for their political opponents to give the citizens alternative policy choices. If voters are not satisfied with the performance of a political leader, they may vote him/her out of office when their term expires.

- Political accountability of public officials is determined by whether the officials occupy an elected versus appointed position, how often they are subjected to re-election and the number of terms they can serve in a political office.
- The legal accountability mechanisms include instruments like the constitution, legal acts, decrees, rules and regulations that prescribe actions that such public officials can and cannot take and how citizens may take action against those officials whose conduct is considered unsatisfactory.

#### **4.9. Civil Society and Civic Action in a Democracy:**

Civil society has been defined variously. According to Heywood:

civil society is distinguished from the state, and is used to describe a realm of autonomous groups and associations, such as businesses, pressure groups, clubs, families and so on. It thus consists of what Edmund Burke (1729–97) called the ‘little platoons’ (1997, p.8)

In other words, civil society or civic space occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector; it is where we talk with neighbours about the things that concern our families and wellbeing, how to improve our community school, how our church or mosque can help widows and orphans in our community, or where we organise a football match for our youth. In this domain, civil society are ‘public’ beings and share with government a sense of publicity and a regard for the general good and commonwealth; but different from government, civil society does not lay under a monopoly of legitimate coercion. Rather, civil society works voluntarily and in this sense inhabits a ‘private’ space devoted to the cooperation (non-coercive) pursuit of public good. This neighbourly and cooperative domain of civil society shares with the private sector the gift of freedom: it is voluntary and is constituted by freely associated individuals and groups; but unlike the private sector, it aims at the common good and consensual, i.e. integrative and collaborative, modes of action. Civil

society is thus public without being coercive, voluntary without being privatized (U.S. Department of State, 1997: 27). Civil society, though, is an essential arm that helps to guarantee that the state is retained in check in its interactions with the citizens. So, in general, the concept of civil society is an all-embracing one that includes within it a variety of social formations, including social movements, Non-Governmental organisations, trade unions, professional associations, students' organisations, women organisations, youth organisations and religious and traditional institutions.

### **5. Democratic Theories of Contemporary Western Society:**

As a consequence of the developments in democratic thought and democratic practice, the principle of representation was carried to the front to a remarkable extent in the second half of twentieth century, and the practice of representative democracy was largely limited to the selection of political elites for decision-making positions. Several attempts have been made to develop and systemize conceptualizations of democracy, which promote different opinions on the necessary amount of citizen participation in democratic systems. These can be divided into two broad types (Held 2006):

**1. Liberal or Representative Democracy:** a system of rule embracing elected “officers” who undertake to “represent” the interests and views of the citizens within the framework of “the rule of law”.

**2. Participatory or Direct Democracy:** a system of decision-making about public affairs in which the citizens are directly involved.

This classification has been made according to the contradicting views of the two theoretical strands on the relationship between citizen and the state, particularly on the conception of citizens and their role within the political decision-making process.

According to liberal theories, citizens of contemporary societies are noticeable by low interest in and poor knowledge and information about politics; thus, their willingness to participate in

politics would also be rather low. For this reason, their role in the policy-making process should be restricted to selecting elites which make necessary decisions on their behalf. On the contrary, participatory theories of democracy support the idea that the citizens are equipped with high levels of political interest and knowledge, which improves the possibility that they will be willing and able to be active in politics. As a result, they should be handed the possibility to take an active role in all stages of democratic decision-making. Below we will first present both theoretical aspects and their opinions on the necessary extent of political participation in democracies. Within the theory of liberal democracy, we will focus on two variants: first, we will discuss the theory of competitive elitism which was developed by Max Weber and extended by Joseph A. Schumpeter; second, we will focus on the pluralist theory of democracy which forms a basis for the contemporary variants of the theories on representative democracy. We will then continue with the theory of participatory democracy.

### **5.1. Liberal theories of democracy:**

We start embarking on this element by adopting the following key features of a liberal-democratic regime then we go and tackle each type apart;

- constitutional government based upon formal, usually legal, rules;
- guaranteed civil liberties and individual rights;
- institutional fragmentation and a system of checks and balances;
- regular elections respecting the principles of universal suffrage and ‘one person, one vote’;
- political pluralism in the form of electoral choice and party competition;
- a healthy civil society in which organised groups and interests enjoy independence from government;
- a capitalist or private enterprise economy organised along market lines. (Heywood, 200, p.74)

### **5.1. a. Competitive elitist theory:**

Thinkers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have abstracted a fairly limited understanding of democracy, minimizing democratic participation to “a means of choosing decision-makers and curbing their excesses” (Held 2006, p. 125). One influential argument in this school of thought was Schumpeter’s view of democracy as a form of government in which the mass of ordinary citizens were restricted, more or less, to the role of choosing between competing elites. This view was largely based on Weber’s reflections on modernization and aspects of industrial society such as class conflict, rationalization, and bureaucratization as challenges that the liberal social order had to face (Held 2006, p. 125). According to Max Weber, the growing complexity of the industrial society makes a sophisticated division of work in these societies inevitable. Consequently, the development and extension of bureaucratization is a part of the process of rationalization in the modern societies. This points out to a very specific conception of politics and democracy, since it makes the emergence of a new type of career politician necessary, which must be capable of mobilizing opinion and of offering a plausible political programme. Moreover, he declared competition and freedom of choice to be the central democratic values within the institutional arrangements in these societies to maintain a liberal political culture. Largely influenced by Weber’s ideas, Schumpeter focused more on developing an empirically based theory to explain how actual democracies work. His masterpiece, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942), had a great impact on the progress of democratic theory in the aftermath of World War II. Many social scientists wanted to extend Schumpeter’s main hypotheses on the behaviour of political leaders and voters, and their relation to each other (Dahl, 1956, 2006). Schumpeter’s notion of competitive elitism was based on an open rejection of classical democracy. He criticized the classical model on essentially two reasons. First, he rejected the idea of a common good “which all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument”

(Schumpeter 1942, p. 251). He believes that in modern economically distinguished and culturally diverse societies there will certainly be different interpretations of the common good, as individuals have different needs and values. Second, Schumpeter perceives the popular will as a social concept which has little, if any, rational foundation. This is since citizens have a fragile background to make sound judgments about competing ideologies and policies. People are far from holding definite and rational opinions about all political questions; they can only give weight to such opinions by choosing representatives who will carry out their will (Held, 2006, p. 146).

All in all, citizen participation has only a limited role in competitive elitist theory. Democracy is characterized by political competition between groups of leaders for the support of the population, which is conveyed at periodic elections. According to Schumpeter, democracy is nothing more than a method in which the people as electors periodically select between teams of leaders. Therefore, citizen participation is restricted to the act of voting. For that reason, the concept of democratic legitimacy is also limited to the legitimation of the rule of competing political elites. Consensus to a competitive electoral system is supposed to necessitate a belief in the legitimacy of the system. Schumpeter, yet, has not put much weight on legitimacy as a condition for a stable democracy. To him, the following conditions are of greater importance for democratic stability: the quality of politicians, a restricted range of political questions, a well-trained independent bureaucracy to assist politicians, and a culture capable of tolerating differences. (Held, 2006, pp. 150-151)

Schumpeter's theory can be reproached for a number of reasons. The first criticism can be made on his suppositions about the citizens. Schumpeter claims that the majority of citizens are uninvolved, uninterested, and consequently incapable to think about politics, due mainly to the detachment of the latter from most people's lives. So citizens are not able to form reasonable judgments about political questions. Nevertheless he does not give details on how

these populations can be able of discriminating between different groups of leaders despite their low skills. Another criticism is pointed toward the conception of legitimacy. However, the concept has been narrowed by Schumpeter to the legitimation of the place of those in authority by passive behaviour and occasional participation by voting at elections. It is highly arguable if submission to authority or an occasional vote would be enough to legitimate a political system. Furthermore, it has not been clarified why casting a vote from time to time should express the rightness or appropriateness of a whole political system in the eye of the citizens. Finally, Schumpeter focuses utterly on individual citizens and the elected leadership and does not take mediating factors like interest groups into account. In spite its weaknesses, competitive elitism has offered a basis for and was extended by the theory of pluralist democracy. This theory has a more advanced vision of the democratic citizen and the role of participation. We will focus below on the most important elements of this theory.

### **5.1. b. Pluralist theory of democracy**

Unlike the competitive elitist theory by Schumpeter, where the main emphasis is on the individual citizen and selected elites, the pluralist theory places specific importance on intermediary groups and institutions such as interest, or pressure groups (Dahl 1956). To a large extent, the theory builds upon the concepts of competitive elitism; the principle of representative government and the arguments on citizens' characteristics were broadly accepted by the pluralists. What the supporters of pluralism reproach Schumpeter about was, however, the notion of concentration of power in the hands of elected representatives. They propose that power is distributed not only among a team of political elites, but among many power centres. Between them, interest groups and pressure groups which try to impose specific group interests upon elites form the most important competitors for power. The presence of diverse, competitive interests in a complex political system is "the basis of democratic equilibrium and of the favourable development of public policy" (Held 2006,

p.159); thus group politics are an important source of legitimation. They ensure that public policy does not appear solely as a result of direct impact of representatives as opinion leaders, but rather as a result of relatively uncoordinated transmission of interests to the government by a plurality of competing forces.

As stated earlier, pluralists and competitive elitism views about the characteristics of citizens are common. They approve that citizens are apathetic, inactive in, and uninformed about politics. Unlike competitive elitism, however, the pluralist theory did not consider this as a purpose for limiting citizen participation to voting because influencing public policy through forming interest groups, in addition to voting, was necessary. Moreover, pluralists did not maintain that people should refrain from participating in political life through channels beyond voting. People's choices to participate in political processes and institutions were their decisions alone. Still, the pluralist theory proposed that low levels of involvement in political life or a degree of apathy can be functional for the stability and continuity of the democratic system. A high degree of citizens' involvement in politics can lead to instability and social conflict, as the experience in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy has shown (Held 2006, p. 162). Lack of political involvement can, on the contrary, be interpreted as a sign of trust in government and high satisfaction with the functioning of the democratic system (Almond & Verba 1963). To sum up, democracy in the sense of pluralists "does not seem to require a high level of active involvement from all citizens, it can work quite well without it" (Held 2006, p.162). In this light, the concept of pluralism does not vary much from competitive elitism regarding their views on the necessity of citizen participation in a democratic system. The pluralist theory discriminates itself from competitive elitism by the increasing stress given to the control function of citizen participation. In Dahl's view (1956), control can be guaranteed if the politicians' range for action is limited by regular elections and political competition among a crowd of actors. Specifically political competition which includes not



only elites but also a variety of interest groups with different dimensions and power has been related closely with control of leaders. It brings about a high number of preferences which must be taken into consideration by political elites in making policy choices. The result is a system of rule by multiple minorities, which is referred to by Dahl as “polyarchy”. What this concept supplements to the elitist interpretation of democracy is consequently that it distinguishes the role of participation as a medium for citizens to express their preferences over the “choices made by government personnel”, that is, over policies (Miller, 1992, in Hehd, p.78). Thus participation is perceived as an influential action through which citizens try to make the political system react to their will. The focal goal of participation is the responsiveness of the political system, which leads to equal protection of interests at the individual level. According to Dahl (1956), most attention within this type has been directed towards party competition in general elections as a means to bring about responsiveness (Miller, 1983). However, participation is still only regarded as an indirect action which is powerless of regulating the policy outcomes. Likewise, no reference is made to the origins of the preferences and perceived needs upon which citizens act (Teorell 2006, p. 789).

## **5.2. Participatory theory of democracy**

In contrast to the two models introduced above, the participatory model of democracy puts the greatest emphasis on citizens’ political engagement (Barber, 1984). While drawing upon the ideas of Rousseau and Mill, the theorists of the participatory model build their arguments around a strict criticism of existing liberal democracy. The most important problem with liberal democracy is, according to this view, the notion of the individual and individual interest where the undisputed dominance of particular interests in politics is bound to wear away the foundations of the democratic process itself (Barber 1984). The two principal characteristics of participatory democracy are the directness of participation by citizens in governing and the deliberation in public opinion formation (Fuchs 2007, p.39.). With respect

to citizen participation, participatory democracy contrasts liberal democracy in the sense that it “involves extensive and active engagement of citizens in the self-governing process; it means government not just for but by and of the people” (Barber 1995, p. 921). According to Barber, citizens are not apathetic since they are not interested in politics (and this is one of the main divergences to representative democracy), they are just not able to control the outcomes through the available channels, and therefore stay passive. Participation in elections is then a necessary but far from sufficient precondition for a democracy to blossom. Citizens should also be involved in the decision-making process through raising demands, suggesting solutions, and even taking the decisions. The second point portraying participatory democracy is the creation of a collective will. Since democratic politics are controlled by the collective will of the demos and its purpose ought to be the pursuit of common goods. It should be emphasized here however that the various threads of the theories on participatory democracy have different positions towards representative democracy. Some participatory theories reject representative democracy altogether, because a real democracy should contain participation of citizens on all levels, thus representation is insufficient. However, other versions see representative democracy as a necessary evil and participation should be increased in order to alleviate these evils (Held, 2006).

### **Conclusion:**

There is an ample literature relating to democracy either as an ideal or as a theory, with countless definitions of what democracy should be and what democracy is. For most of us, democracy can be defined as the rule of the people; yet this simple definition holds ambiguous and different meanings. Indeed, the great 19th-century French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville feared that flawed definitions of democracy would confuse people’s understanding of it and threaten its very existence. So, he wisely warned about definitions and uses of words to the defenders of democracy against despotism. He said,

It is our way of using the words “democracy” and “democratic government” that brings about the greatest confusion. Unless these words are clearly defined and their definition agreed upon, people will live in an inextricable confusion of ideas, much to the advantage of demagogues and despots (Sartori, 1962, p.21).

Tocqueville wanted people to realize that if they were unable to tell the difference between a true democracy and its counterfeit imitators then government of, by, and for the people democracy would be at jeopardy.

Hence, from our overview, **we ended with two angles when defining democracy. The first is minimalist, the second is maximalist.**

On one hand, the narrow minimalist concept was framed by Joseph Schumpeter. For him democracy is simply a mechanism for choosing political leadership. Citizens are given a choice among competing political leaders who compete for their votes. Between elections, decisions are taken by the politicians. At the next election, citizens can substitute their elected officials. This capacity to choose between leaders at election time is democracy. In Schumpeter’s words:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. (Schumpeter, 1942, p.260)

On the other hand, the maximalist comprehensive notion of democracy suggested by David Held is as follow:

Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the processes of deliberation about the conditions of their own lives and in the

determination of these conditions, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others (Held, 2006, p.264)

Held's definition enacts a principle he calls "democratic autonomy" that requires both an accountable state and a democratic reordering of civil society.

Moreover, Michael J. Sodar defined democracy as:

The essential idea of democracy is that the people have the right to determine who governs them. In most cases they elect the principal governing officials and hold them accountable for their actions. Democracies also impose legal limits on the government's authority by guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms to their citizens." (Sodaro, 2004, pp. 31)

Thus, to conclude and for the sake of our thesis we will assume democracy as a system of rule which undertakes the representation of the interests and views of people through the free and fair elections of representatives who belong to multiple political parties within applying the rule of law equally to all citizens and guaranteeing the human rights of all citizens who need to actively participate in political and civic life.

# **Chapter Two: The Prerequisites of Democracy and Democratization**

## **Introduction:**

By reaching this phase of discussion, we enter into the core of our thesis which tries to look at the prerequisites for the implementation of democracy in Algeria, though with a special emphasis of the cultural one. That's why we prefer to clearly set record ahead before embarking on the empirical part of our thesis. Hence, providing explanations of the two key words of the study is a necessity. Simply, we choose to supply definition of "implement" and "prerequisite" through adopting the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary.

- **implement** verb BrE /'implɪmənt/; NAmE /'ɪmplɪmənt/

~ sth(formal) to make something that has been officially decided start to happen or be used.

SYN **carry something out. to implement changes/decisions/policies/reforms**

- **Prerequisite:** noun BrE /,pri:'rek.wɪ.zɪt/ NAmE /,pri:'rek.wə.zɪt/

~ (for/of/to sth)(formal) something that must exist or happen before something else can exist or happen. SYN **precondition.**

All in all, we are going to identify the elements, and specifically the cultural ones, that must exist before democracy which has been already officially decided in Algeria to start to happen.

Dankwart Rustow (1970, p. 346) argues that "the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis". For the scope of this study, the discussion focuses on the factors that shape attitudes towards democracy and its implementation in a given society. But beforehand, we'd rather look at the process that brings democracy into existence and then the factors that keep it alive.

### **1. Democracy and Democratization:**

Democracy has had diverse meanings. It has in the course of history come to mean different things to different people as we have seen. On the one hand, in ancient Athens,

where the idea of democracy arguably was born, the word meant ‘demos’ meaning ‘people’ and ‘kratein’ meaning ‘to rule’. Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President of the United States (1861-1865), popularised democracy as ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’, On the other hand, some saw it as an ideal like Robert A. Dahl who coined the term ‘polyarchy’, the closest real-life approximation to democracy, to describe a real-world condition marked by high levels of participation and contestation (Dahl, 1971).

As an ideal of government, democracy is today embraced more persistently than ever before in the world. The number of states described as democracies has developed five folds since the end of World War II. According to one classification, while in 1950, there were about 20 democracies in the world, this number grown to 40 by 1975, and to 120 out of the 193 states in today’s world. The prevalent increase has occurred since 1991 following the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union. Even most of the states which do not show the basic democratic standards of public participation and contestation, with freedom of choice, have saw it as an imperative at any rate to adopt the vocabulary of democracy and claim some relevant measures of political legitimacy to label their governmental systems as popular, representing the will of the majority of their respective publics. Many have pointed to the existence of some forms of ‘pluralist representation’ and ‘electoral legitimacy’ to lay claim to popular sovereignty and ultimately a functioning democratic system of governance (US Department, 1998).

So, the history of democracy was not a regular continuous progress. In the understanding of political scientist Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University, it was a progression of waves that have advanced and then receded. Writing in the *Journal of Democracy*, Huntington (1991) identifies three historical waves of democracy. Later, he expands in this in a book entitled *The Third Wave: Global Democratization in the 20th Century* (1993). According to his definition,

A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time” (Huntington, 1993, p. 15).

At the same time he talks about an opposite wave which he calls a “reverse wave” which means a period of time when the breakdowns of democracy and the transitions away from democracy significantly outnumber transitions to democracy.

The first began in the early 19th century when democracy was very gradually expanding through mainly incremental reforms with the widening of the democratic practice and the extension of the right to vote to a large proportion of the male population in the United States. A wave of democratic reforms gradually unfolded in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Northern Europe and Scandinavia through the breakthroughs that achieved universal franchise in a number of Western democracies and continued until the 1920s. During this period, some 29 democracies came into being (Huntington, 1991). The ebb, or reversal, of the first wave started in 1922 with the accession of Mussolini to rule in Italy and lasted until 1942, when the number of the world's democracies had been reduced to 12 (Huntington, 1991).

A second wave began with the triumph of the Allies in World War II, cresting in 1962 when the number of democracies had risen to 36. Most of these new democracies then began to experience great difficulties of their own to give rise, more or less quickly, to new forms of populace authoritarian regime or military governments, what Huntington has called a second reverse wave; a new period of the collapse or contraction of democracy, with a fascination about authoritarian populist alternatives and the expansion of the communist model in some countries. The ebbing of the second wave between 1962 and the mid-1970s made it back down to 30. Huntington also notes that reverse waves and the beginning of new waves of democratization overlap in time. As the reverse wave was kind of finishing in 1974-75 a new



wave of democratic expansion was beginning and that was the third wave of global democratization that began with the revolution of the Carnations and the toppling of the Salazar Caitano's dictatorship in Portugal with the April 1974 revolution. Since 1974, however, democracy's third wave has added approximately 30 new democracies, doubling the number of such societies.

## **2. Prerequisites:**

As what was seen earlier, each wave of democratization witnessed regressing scenarios for several countries, where democracy was not sufficiently consolidated (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p. 96). Democratic transition, no matter how much it is demanded by the people, cannot be perceived as a homogenous process with a set of rules and steps that will always have positive outputs. In any case, there were prerequisites that seemingly had to be met for democracies to flourish or otherwise, for instance a historical presence of human rights and a system of checks-and-balances within the people's traditions (Hague and Harrop 2004, p. 92). France for example became a democracy after the first wave of democratization because of the presence of individual and citizen rights in its constitution since the revolution of 1789. Moreover, Huntington analysed the complex set of political and cultural forces at work in different regions of the world without drawing any definitive conclusions. "Judging by the record of the past, the two most decisive factors affecting the future consolidation and expansion of democracy will be economic development and political leadership," Huntington writes. "Economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real." In addition, many analysts strongly maintain that the prelude to the creation of democratisation is building civil society, where several political, social and cultural groups and practices play a role in defining the limits of public authorities, and expanding public participation in the processes of policy formulation and policy implementation, therefore protecting citizens' rights and liberties.

In fact, as many other concerns related to democracy, the pre-conditions, which are essential for democracy and democratic transition are extremely disputed among scholars. Ghabdian (2002) distinguishes two sets of arguments for democratic transition among scholars. The first group of arguments is associated with economic conditions and the second is related to the political culture (Ghabdian, 2002, pp. 23-26). The former argument proposes that there is a positive relation between democracy and “economic and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and predominant urban residence” (Rustow, 1970, p.337). In the same way Welzel and Inglehart maintain that emancipative values (“those which give priority to gender equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority and participation over security” (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, p. 131)), which are crucial for democratic transition, tend to spread with the development of socioeconomic modernization (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, p133).

Indeed the prerequisites for democracy have been seriously discussed within the literature and have been credited several names and concepts. We have thus chosen the most discussed leading prerequisites: economic development; education; civic society; legitimacy and effectiveness along with culture that represents the core of our work.

### **2.1. Economic Development:**

A chief amount of the literature on democracy recognises economic crises as a destabilizing event that can mount the possibility of a regime change, including more specifically a democratic transition (Leigh and Burke 2008, p. 3). Many authors believed that economic well-being is of great significant to a stable liberal democracy. Lipset concluded in his *Political Man* (1960, pp.48-49) that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. More particularly Leigh observed through the work of Zac and Feng that, generally speaking, transition to a more democratic state is essentially driven by the economic position of the middle class (Zac & Feng, 2003, cited in Leigh and Burke 2008, p.

4). So as to fully understand its complex role in democratization, looking at this precondition through several lenses is necessary.

Economic development is defined as “a process in which an economy grows or changes and becomes more advanced, especially when both economic and social conditions are improved” (Cambridge English Dictionary, 2016). Economic growth comes generally measured currently by particular indicators such as GDP, and GDP per capita. Concerning a more theoretical perspective, Huntington held that throughout the last wave of democratization “the combination of substantial levels of economic development and short-term economic crisis or failure was the economic formula most favourable to the transition from authoritarian to democratic government” (Huntington, 1991, p. 72). One of the justifications as to why economic growth may weaken an authoritarian regime is by “making the economy too complex to be ran by command”, while economic deterioration may also carry a dictatorship by “undermining its central claim to legitimacy” (Przeworski A., 2004, p. 7). It can offer a chance for the population to demonstrate. The level of growth meanwhile, mostly as measured by per capita income, is one of the principle factors that allow the stabilization of a democracy (Przeworski A. 2004, p. 9).

Though economic development might not certainly lead to democracy, the idea is that it can further help a nation in many indirect ways. Therefore, associated to this precondition of economic development are possible investments and extra development in things such as education, infrastructure and security. Prosperity also impacts the extent to which given countries develop “universalistic” norms among upper-strata and extremist lower-strata (Lipset S. 1959, p. 84), sentiments that can then spread within a society. Economic development and the growth of a “middle-class mentality” leads to a change from a triangular moulded society to a more diamond moulded society, which Lipset believes diminishes conflicts and penalises extremists (Lipset S. 1959, p. 83). The basic argument is that industrial


and capitalist economic growth generated a middle class that tremendously believed in individual responsibility (Lipset S. 1959, p. 85). An extension of these beliefs, as we will see later on, contributes to a civic society that more enables democracy to become stable. In fact, industrialization and modernization are crucial parts of the economic development process that permitted the democratic transition of many Western states (Lipset S. 1959, p. 83). In Griffith E. et al.'s work, the industrial age is claimed to have brought with it a particular societal change: specialization led to a new division of men into economic groups, themselves divided into sub-groups (Griffith E. et al. 1956, p. 109). The determination and the interests of these groups are what occupy most of the agenda of the elected government (Griffith E. et al. 1956, p. 109). We come back here to Lipset's idea of a triangular shaped society moving towards a more diamond shaped society: there is less conflict between two or mass social classes, and more interplay between many sub-groups within the population. Industrialization also leads to an expectation of higher income net of taxes, valuable for the elite who consequently promote democracy (Seim and Parente 2013, p. 36). In Seim and Parente's empirical analysis, they concluded that no long-lived autocracy is rich while every long-lived democracy is (Seim and Parente 2013, p. 53). However, they concluded that more work needs to be done however in order to be able to predict a democratic transitional success or failure founded on an examination of the economic development (Seim and Parente 2013, p. 54).

To sum up, economic development is in itself a complex concept. It is essential for democratic transition in that a safe and flexible environment is necessary to develop new cultural and social beliefs. An economic crisis can be beneficial because it permits protest of the masses, but can also permit for the spread of extremist ideologies and violence. A positive long-term economic development as we've studied could allow more encouraging possibilities for consensus and peace.

## 2.2. Education:

A lot of 20th century theorists maintain that the preservation of liberal democratic institutions is an essential prerequisite of the preservation of liberalism itself, particularly through the education of liberal democratic citizens (Levinson M. 1999, p. 39). Nowadays, stable democracies are liberal democracies, that is, they are made of certain features: free elections, various political parties, sovereignty of rule of law and an ingrained respect for civil and human rights. So, education has been regarded as a key basis for civic society and for active and well-maintained political participation of the multitudes. Lipset created in 1959 a table entitled “Comparison of European English-speaking and Latin American countries, divided into two groups: the ‘more democratic’ and the ‘less democratic’, by indices of wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization”, collected largely from data provided by the International Urban Research centre at University of California (Lipset S. 1959, p. 76). Taking education as an example from this table, we can perceive that in the more democratic countries of Europe the lowest rate of literacy was 96%, while in most dictatorial states in Latin America this percentage was as low as 46%.

Glaeser and Ponzetto’s work examined the correlation between the change in Jagers and Marshall’s democracy score (Polity IV Project 2003, cited in Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007, p. 78) and the education level in 1960, as per Barro-Lee’s database (Barro and Lee 2001, cited in Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007, p. 78), of the countries that had the lowest democracy ratings in 1960. They found that the correlation coefficient between these variables is 66%, as shown in the following figure entitled *Schooling and the growth of democracy 1960-2000* (Glaeser and Ponzetto 2007, p. 78):



Of particular importance for us is the composition of state provided education. For operative liberal citizens to live and embrace a liberal state there exist a number of principles and concepts to be learned at a young age (Levinson M. 1999, p. 44). Tolerance is a typical characteristic of a liberal state (Levinson M. 1999, p. 45) and young generations need to learn that it is in no citizen's right to impose their own conception of good on other citizens.

In order to support and maintain liberal states' core commitments to constitutional democracy, toleration, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity, and non-sectarianism, future citizens must learn to read and write, to see their own backgrounds and commitments as contingent, to respect people who hold beliefs or ways of life that are antithetical to their own, to recognize their and other citizens' rights within a liberal democracy. (Levinson M. 1999, p.45)

Levinson presents a very significant issue arising from this type of state-provided education (civic education): it may threaten the existence of communities and deep-rooted traditions by supplying the means to think critically, with young generations facing the risk of questioning

their own beliefs and perhaps choosing alternative routes (Levinson M. 1999, pp. 52-54). Yet, he contends that this threat is only so if older generations rebuff the changes that will come together with a democratic transition. The population in question must then embrace change and it is education itself that will arrange for a better understanding of this change and the nation as a whole.

The relation between education and democracy is a whole debate in itself, but we must bear in mind two things. First, the literacy rate has a major influence on democratic transition: the more an un-democratic nation is literate, the more opportunities it owns to becoming a democracy. Still, it is hard to guess the time needed for such a transition. Furthermore, once democratic transition has been established, nothing can assure the continuity of mass schooling other than the people themselves. Second, education in itself should be constituted of fundamental characteristics in order to be favourable for democracy. Such characteristics are also debatable, but generally speaking most theorists approve that it must promote a civic culture that comprises a deep understanding of the society in which the young generations can decide to thrive in. Education is then a key precondition, and it is the starting point of the establishment of a civil society, the kernel of any democracy.

### **2.3. Civil Society:**

As Przeworski claims, “to establish democracy, different groups must agree to disagree: they must accept a framework of institutions within which they would process their conflicts” (Przeworski, pp. 7). A democracy cannot do if there is no peaceful performance of power. This follows on from the precondition of economic development: by enhancing the life of the lower-strata with means provided by economic development, their engagement in a unified national culture rises and is different from a previously existing isolated lower class culture, affecting them to be much more open to ‘middle class values’ (Lipset S. 1959, p. 83). With the existence of an ideal economic development and of an education constituted of civic

values, a civil society can occur, being the body over which the state and the demos arise together to seek stable and fair governance.

Based on the Oxford Dictionaries, civil society can be defined simply as “a society considered as a community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity” (Oxford University Press 2014). Almond and Verba meanwhile maintain that “voluntary associations are the prime means by which the function of mediating between the individual and the state is performed” (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 300). That which improves the prospects of a democratic transition, along with the previous preconditions analysed, are these intermediate organizations and the institutionalisation of interest groups. These can act as sources of countervailing power, the deficiency of which will lead to a more dictatorial potential (Lipset S. 1959, p. 84).

The efficiency of this course hangs on a core characteristic of civil society: civic culture. Almond and Verba’s work in 1963 is indispensable to the understanding of civic culture. They see it predominantly as a mixed political culture composed of many active citizens, alongside some passive subjects (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 474). Within a civic culture of a successful democracy the individual is not necessarily always a rational and active citizen; all citizen activity can be conceived of as mixed and tempered (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 487). What is more is that civic culture requires maintenance of traditional parochial roles along with the role of citizens (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 488). Although civic culture is not the only form of political culture for democratic stabilization, it is the predominant one amongst successful democracies (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 498).

In response to the problem evoked in Levinson’s work on the possible consequences of liberal political education, for civil society to work there must be a balance between two main aspects of a child’s life: his participation in decision-making at home and at school and his exposure to the necessary hierarchical patterns of authority within the family and school



(Almond and Verba 1963, pp. 498-499). The general circumstances of the nation in question are also fundamentally important: this civic culture must be a political culture of moderation, meaning that political issues and general political participation should not be intense nor violent (Almond and Verba 1963, pp. 500-501). The maintenance of a balance between governmental power and governmental responsiveness is the most important and challenging task of a democracy (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 476) after its stable transition into power. In contrast, a lack of widespread interest towards these institutions and of mass participation will lead to a “largely self-centred population, greed, graft, negativism, materialism and sensualism, that will erode the quality of civic life” (Griffith et al. 1956, pp. 106-107), where a majority of the population doesn’t take any part of the political domain of society, losing its own capability in managing an inherent political life. What is interesting for Griffith et al. is the coexistence of both cultural prerequisites (respect of fundamental human rights, of each individual, of the state) and civic society (as in the institutions), and how they sustain one another (Griffith et al. 1956, p. 115) in a democratic system.

Although civil society and civic culture are very hard to define, what is interesting for our study is how much the codes and beliefs of a population can make a difference. In order for the mechanisms of a civil society to function accurately, something more normative must also change within the population. Furthermore, the political happenings must always seek to take place in the form of peaceful play of power. Only then will the composition of a civil society be beneficial for a democratic transition.

#### **2.4. Legitimacy and Effectiveness:**

We accept the importance of the earlier observed preconditions for a peaceful and stable democratic environment, still there is one more precondition to be considered: effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. The reason for this choice is that the people need to trust the government, or at least have a history of trust, so as to be any peaceful play of power.

For Lipset, legitimacy is “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset S. 1959, p. 86). The values of this system must then fit with the primary values of the people, and as we have before stated this must comprise key traditional aspects of the society together with new liberal and civic values including respect towards human rights, the state and the civic society.

A crisis of legitimacy is usually triggered by a crisis of change, and that is exactly what comes about before initial attempts at democratic transitioning (Lipset S. 1959, p. 87). In such situations, the budding democratic regime will face many critics of being illegitimate from not only the supporters of *l’ancien regime*, but also from those whose expectations were not fulfilled by the political transition (Lipset S. 1959, p. 88). As a result, democratic transition will not be encountered at first with the approval of the masses. It will need to face many challenges and ascertain its effectiveness in responding to them so that legitimacy to be maintained. Some kind of sense of unity must be established so as for everyone to believe in common causes. Comparably to our previously analysed preconditions, the aim is that the nation and its political system become stable and pacified.

Democracy today has come to be essentially representative democracy that is why it is important to see who is representing and if they are indeed efficient. The office holder, for example the president and the ministers, have a key societal role to play. With the evolution of “technologies and the specialization” and subdivision of population groups, these individuals in power are more and more under the scrutiny of the people (Griffith et al. 1956, p. 111). Therefore the prerequisite of efficiency takes on an even bigger role in the 21st Century, significant both before democratization and after the establishment of democracy.

Another aspect in performance with efficiency and legitimacy is the total respect for the law, judicial and political processes as the means behind citizens’ security and freedom. The

people's love for freedom is linked with their respect of governmental institution, considering that there is a:

lively sense that authority is tolerable only because it gives men what they most want and value, what they, and not those in authority over them, think is good for them; and it contains within it the understanding that freedom depends on law, which is an elaborate structure created over a long period of time, a structure more easily destroyed than rebuilt. (Griffith et al. 1956, p. 120)

On the subject of our analysis on economic development and on civic society, these preconditions can be considered as means for generating universal norms and consensual understanding of citizen rights and responsibilities, and equally the state's limitations.

Griffiths states however that it is very tough for the ordinary citizen to take more than a small part in the business of government: a large state, no matter how democratic it is, will always have a small minority active in government and a large almost passive majority. The best case is that this political minority then be drawn from every class and section of community (Griffith et al. 1956, p. 122).

A state of conflict in a nation is an inherent aspect that legitimates the democratic system, and the prerequisites we have already established of such a state are those that create legitimacy in the first place: "resolving tensions one at a time contributes toward a stable political system" (Lipset S. 1959, p. 92). Moreover, the people must prefer the system to the leaders produced by it: confidence which is an essential element a democracy. The "willingness to compromise" and "tolerance" are aspects that ought to be mutually believed within a nation, by those elected, and those who elect. However tolerance comes with democracy, and does not precede it. The legitimacy and the effectiveness of the representative power is what presides it (Lipset S. 1959, pp. 90-93). Democratic transition should ideally be quick and effective. It should restore confidence in the people, and provide a common ground

for political development. Democracy is a source of legitimacy in itself and it is also quickly needed during transitional periods as well.

### **3. What about Culture?**

Efforts to use the concept of 'culture' as a variable in political science have become increasingly common. In fact, a true democracy cannot be limited to an institutional framework alone. It also needs to be materialised in a culture, a state of mind that nurtures tolerance and respect for other people, as well as pluralism, stability and dialogue between the forces that make up a society. Contrary to traditional conceptions, which are fully limited to the field of the State, the notion of democratic culture necessitates all social, financial, governmental and non-governmental participants, as well as the link which relates or divides them, to be taken into consideration.

#### **3.1. Culture as a Concept:**

According to Williams the word 'culture' "is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (1976, p. 76). 'Culture' would seem to be a classic example of an 'essentially contested concept' (Gallie, 1955/6), one that is capable of numerous definitions and with no obvious system for choosing between these as to what the term truly 'means'. Indeed, in 1952, the American anthropologists, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, critically reviewed concepts and definitions of culture, and compiled a list of 164 different definitions. So, a generalised solution to the proliferation of usages of the concept of culture has been to simply classify uses into specific types.

- In Matthew Arnolds' *Culture and Anarchy* (1867), culture referred to special intellectual or artistic endeavors or products i.e high aesthetic realisation of values.
- In Edward Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1870), culture indicated "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" it referred to a quality possessed by all people in all

social groups. In contrast to Arnold's view, all folks "have" culture, which they acquire by virtue of membership in some social group that is society.

- Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, p.181)

Each of these views of what 'culture' means opens up the possibilities for exploration through the use of a wide array of techniques. Examples of such approaches that have been used include those deriving from anthropology (as Jenks, 1993), or biography (as Inglis, 1993), or 'cultural studies' (as Finlayson and Martin, 1997). Maybe the only thing that is shared between such techniques is that they are significantly qualitative in nature and are rarely capable of providing a simple explanation for the complex phenomena that are the subject of exploration. However, a number of issues for debate specifically about the analysis of culture and politics were generated. Of key concern are the issues of structure and agency, causality and meaning. The significance of these will become obvious after considering how politics has currently tried to use culture.

### **3.2. Culture and politics:**

The appeal to culture as an explanatory variable determinant of social and political change traces back to the thinking of ancient political philosophers such as Aristotle and his "customs", but in modern and contemporary times also Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, and Weber, among others, have discussed whether a set of specific political attitudes, convictions and behaviour are a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the success of modern democracies.

The concept of political culture evolved from centuries of generalizing about power's different faces in different places. Plato's "dispositions," Montesquieu's "spirit of the laws," Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "mores," David Hume's "manners," Alexis de Tocqueville's "habits of the heart," Emile Durkheim's "collective consciousness," and Max Weber's "authority systems" were all ancestors to the concept (Gendzel, G. ,1997, p226).

Moreover, Clifford Geertz, one best known contemporary expositor of culture in the social sciences, stated "One of the things everyone knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country's politics reflect the design of its culture" (Geertz, 1973, p. 311). So, we understand that institutions cannot be separated from their cultural context as culture shapes government's decisions and their interpretations along with people's views and participation in the political life.

In fact, the modern-day use of culture in the field of politic dates back to a landmark 1956 essay by Gabriel Almond who wanted "to suggest how the application of certain sociological and anthropological concepts may facilitate systematic comparison among the major types of political systems operative in the world today" (Almond, 1956, p.391). He concluded that "Every political system is embedded a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the **political culture**" (ibid, p.396). With this, he gave an appropriate catchphrase for such conceptualized terms in comparative politics as attitudes, values, ideology, and socialization. Advocates of this approach stake the claim "that we can identify distinctive and relatively stable distributions of political values, beliefs and understandings among populations" which can work as independent clarifying variables for political behaviour (Almond, 1994, p.1). In this respect, certain cultural attributes can cause democracy to flourish, "including a level of individualism, moderation, pragmatism and mutual trust among the elite, coupled with an 'intelligent mistrust of leadership'" (ibid, p. 12).

The version of 'culture' utilized in this was concerned with the evaluations, knowledge and emotive feelings about politics and political organisations and actors that were included within populations. Political scientists use the term in a narrower sense to refer to "a people's psychological orientation, political culture being the general 'pattern of orientations' to political objects such as parties, government and the constitution, expressed in beliefs, symbols and values" (Heywood, p.96). Political culture, in this way, differs from public opinion in that it is shaped out of long-term values rather than merely people's reactions to particular issues and problems. Moreover, according to Pye political culture

is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences. (Pye, 1968, p. 218 as cited in Lane and Ersson, 2005, p.17)

### **3.3. Culture as a Prerequisite to Democracy:**

Since we are dealing with democracy as an aspired ideal in politics, we are going to narrow down the meaning of culture to studying political culture as the core cultural prerequisite for the implementation of democracy neither with denying the role of education as seen earlier nor with excluding the investigation of the role of religion and history in implementing democracy in the coming discussion since both of them are crucial parts of one's culture.

As a matter of fact, political culture research took off as a political science sub-field in 1963 with Almond and Verba publishing *The Civic Culture* -a cross-national study offering a theory of political stability and democracy that subtly celebrated Anglo-American representative government-which became work of the political culture approach. So, To trace back the first references of cultural factors of democracy, one has to go back to Almond

and Verba (1963) who stressed the importance of a “civic culture” as a prerequisite for democracy in a comparative study of five countries (Italy, Germany, the US, the UK and Mexico). In their classic work, Almond and Verba used the term “political culture” to refer to “a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system” (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 12). Their pioneer work ushered a new range of studies about the relation between political culture and political systems. Their principle argument is that it is possible to detect certain orientations in the political culture that sustain stable democracy. This argument has been vastly accepted among political scientists. Nevertheless, several aspects of their work, as Verba himself later on acknowledged, have been openly criticised (Verba, 2011, p. iv). For example, the political culture they recognized as necessary to sustain a successful democratic system does not suit the political culture of many democratic countries (Dalton and Welzel, 2014, pp.5-6). Additionally, Almond and Verba did not distinguish different kinds of support of democracy. Therefore, they did not identify how the nature of the support of democracy could affect democratization.

Furthermore, in 1988 Ronald Inglehart, dissatisfied with the popularity of rational actor models and the neglect of cultural variables wrote of a “*Renaissance of Political Culture.*”, he proposed that democracy could be linked to enduring cultural traits. The title suggested the pattern of the waxing and waning appeal of culture as a social science concept, and he declared a rebirth in cultural studies in political science.

Another work of seminal importance especially for our thesis is that of Robert Putnam (1996, 2000) on the role of social capital in social and political development. Social capital is defined as networks and social norms of trust and reciprocity that strongly connect individuals to the common interests and goals of their community. Putnam has revealed with his work on Italy and USA that social networks based on mutual trust and the desire of individuals to act



in common is decisive for the achievement of social objectives and for the development of a democratic institutional environment. Whereas in the South of Italy traditional bonds do not work towards attaining openness in public life and form part of a cycle of political abuse, corruption and governments featured by low performance, in the North a long and cumulative tradition of cooperation and mutual trust has generated higher levels of social and political participation, and permitted regional governments to perform much better. Social trust resulting from the accumulation of social capital makes citizens more co-operative, reciprocal and willing to associate and act collectively. Thus Putnam's contribution has emphasized how different objective and subjective conditions affect institutional development.

A further reference is the far-reaching work of Inglehart (1977, 1981, 1990) concerning the relevance of post-materialist values from a human development perspective, which includes the consolidation of attitudes which contribute towards democratic structures. Inglehart reviewed the theory of modernization and claimed that social and economic changes deeply influence the traditional political culture of contemporary societies in such a way that individuals leave behind, as time passes, their attachment to survival values and develop means of self-expression, which enable them to have more autonomy and independent patterns of relations with political authorities.

Of more recently and based on the six waves World Value Survey Welzel and Inglehart (2009) and Dalton and Welzel (2014) verified, on the one hand, the impact of values on the existence of effective democracies over time and, on the other, the effect of democratic institutions and the length of time a system of government with democratic values is in place. Those values give priority to tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority, gender equality over patriarchy, and participation over security (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009, p.140). According to them, results obviously prove that while values are decisive in determining the existence and duration of democratic institutions, the latter have only a weak influence over

time in creating a civic culture; actually under the impact of other variables their effects fade altogether. They claim that studies have proved some basic assumptions of theories of political culture even when other variables are included in explanations of democratization processes. Yet, Welzel and Inglehart do not offer us a clear argument on how and why emancipative values develop in some societies but not in others.

#### **4. The Dimension of Religion:**

Since the fact that culture is a group of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional characteristics of society or a social group, that encompasses, not only art and literature, but lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs, we find it of crucial importance to tackle the dimension of the relation between religion and democracy.

Towards the end of the last century scholarly attention shifted toward the so-called clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1997) and to the possible anti-democratic values of Islam and other religions that may thwart the implementation and stabilization of democracy in Muslim countries. Prior to this, Huntington concluded in his 1991 "*Democracy's Third Wave*" article that

Historically, there has been a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy. By the early 1970s, most of the Protestant countries in the world had already become democratic. The third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Beginning in Portugal and Spain, it swept through six South American and three Central American countries, moved on to the Philippines, doubled back to Mexico and Chile, and then burst through in the two Catholic countries of Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary. Roughly three quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were predominantly Catholic (p.13).

In his book *Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington demonized Islam in its entirety. As a result, and coinciding with the 9/11 attacks, every culture talk in the western world turned religious experience into a political category. “What Went Wrong with Muslim Civilization?” asks Bernard Lewis in his book of 2002. *Democracy lags in the Muslim World*, concludes a Freedom House study of political systems in the non-Western world; The UNDP’s *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, which was largely reconfirmed by the agency’s subsequent reports and which is applicable to the whole of Muslim Middle East in various degrees, notes:

There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has barely reached the Arab states. This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development. While de jure acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal codes and government pronouncements, de facto implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded. In most cases, the governance pattern is characterized by a powerful executive branch that exerts significant control over all other branches of the state, being in some cases free from institutional checks and balances. Representative democracy is not always genuine and sometimes absent. Freedoms of expression and association are frequently curtailed. Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail. (UNDP, 2002, p.2)

From what we tackled earlier in our thesis concerning the rise of modern democracy, we found that democracy bloomed as a reaction to a religious reformation and Protestantism. So, since religion is a component of one’s culture, we find it urgent to see whether Christianity

only fit perfectly with democracy or no? And is it possible that Islam as it is the principle religion in our case study “Algeria” is not compatible with democracy?

A variety of national and cross-national reasons can be cited to explain why most of the Muslim Middle Eastern countries have proved so inhospitable to anything more than procedural democratisation. At least five in the literature are worthy of particular attention. The first is the degree of incompatibility that allegedly exists between Islam and competitive pluralist democracy. It is argued that Islam, with its central principle of Tawhid (Unity of God), from which other Islamic principles flow, including those concerning earthly governance - most importantly the principles of *Shura* (consultation) and *Ijma*(consensus) - essentially provides for little more than what Mawlana Mawdudi (1903-1979) has called ‘Theo-democracy’; and is therefore a foundation for an authoritarian, not liberal, political culture. Consequently, what has historically evolved has been incremental acculturation of Muslim-dominated Middle Eastern societies to authoritarian thinking, values and practices, although with variations in their intensity and effectiveness from time to time and place to place. This phenomenon took a sharper upward turn following the closure of the gate of *ijtihad* (creative interpretation of Islam, based on independent human reasoning) in the thirteenth century.

In contrast to this, the issue of Islam and democracy, so thoughtfully explored by Khaled Abou El Fadl, counterbalanced these claims, especially his significant focus on the doctrinal-philosophical compatibility of Islam with notions of popular sovereignty. Muslim scholars like Abou El Fadl are impressive in demonstrating that the Qur’an and traditions can be understood in ways that are compatible with democracy—that God’s sovereignty does not preclude human agency. The key issue, in their view, is that God’s law involving matters of faith should not be subject to the state’s intervention that this is between God and each believer. No human being should intervene between God and a believer or pretend to judge in

God's place whether the believer is sincere or not. The Qur'an specifically states that there should be no compulsion in matters of religion. The state, however, does have a role in ordering relations among human beings so that there can be order and justice. These man-made laws should be consistent with principles of Islam, but they are understood to be products of human deliberation, hence they are fallible and therefore changeable. Nothing in Islam, according to the modernist interpretation, goes against making these laws in accordance with the notion of popular sovereignty.

Moving now towards empirical results, there are widely divergent views regarding the compatibility (Tessler 2002, 2003; Rose 2002...) or incompatibility of Islam with democracy (Karatnycky 2002; Miller 1997...). Amongst those who have analysed the political culture of Muslim citizens and its relation to democracy using quantitative data are Rose (2002) and Tessler (2002), who produced two outstanding contributions. Rose surveyed the attitudes of Muslim citizens in Central Asia and found no relation between Muslim values and democracy. He found that in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where 75 % of people declared themselves to be Muslim, "there is little difference between Muslims, the Orthodox, and nonbelievers. Even more strikingly, the most observant Muslims are almost as pro-democratic as those who are non-observant [ . . . ]". In short, he argues that ". . . neither nominal religion nor the degree of religious observance has much influence on democratic values". He finds that in Central Asia social divisions are actually the major predictor of support for "democracy as an ideal" (Rose, 2002, pp. 107–108). As he puts it: ". . . being Muslim does not make a person more likely either to reject democracy or to endorse dictatorship" (Rose 2002, p.110).

In the same vein, Tessler (2003, p.22), using survey data, also maintains that the lack of democracy in Arab societies cannot be blamed on Islamic values. In his analysis he focuses on Morocco, Egypt and Palestine. In a later work, he confirms this conclusion when he writes:

there is little evidence [. . .] to support the claims of those who assert that Islam and democracy are incompatible. The reason that democracy has not taken root in the Arab world must therefore lie somewhere else; perhaps in the domestic economic order, or perhaps in the determination of those in power to resist political change by whatever means are required”.

To conclude, any ‘culture’ whatever its religion is able to develop a democratic spirit and lead to the installation of democratic institutions.

### **5. History and Democracy:**

Since antiquity, scholars have always returned to the question of the conditions or preconditions of democracy. As we saw, a number of variables has been adopted in the past to help explain democracy's success or failure in different countries. These variables comprise levels of economic development and social mobilization, the relative concentration of resources or income, patterns of political culture or beliefs, and leadership skills and strategies.

In fact, many scholars have added patterns of historical development as a partial explanation of the relative success or failure of stable democracy. Dankwart A. Rustow claimed that it is significant to compare countries not only synchronically, but diachronically as well-to compare the way democracy was established in the first place-to fully understand its chances of survival and consolidation. Barrington Moore, in turn, suggested that a certain historical pattern of relationships among a landowning aristocracy, peasants, and the crown, as well as "a revolutionary break with the past," were conditions critical for the development of democracy (1966, p. ). In addition, Max Weber maintained that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another. To demonstrate his point, he used the analogy of a dice game in which each time the dice came up with a certain number they were increasingly loaded in

the direction of coming up with that number again(1956, pp. 182-185). To Weber, an event predisposing a country toward democracy sets a process in motion which increases the likelihood that at the next critical point in the country's history democracy will win out again. This process can only have meaning if we assume that once established, a democratic political system gathers some momentum, and creates some social supports (institutions) to ensure its continued existence. Thus a "premature" democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy. In his seminal work *Polyarchy*, Robert Dahl subsequently posited that, other things being equal, certain patterns of historical development were much more likely than others to lead to the institutionalization of stable democracy, that is, polyarchy. Specifically, Dahl contended that, when opportunities for political liberalization (the expansion of opportunities for political competition) precede inclusiveness (the expansion of the number of people participating in politics beyond a narrow elite, notably through elections), a country is more likely to introduce and sustain polyarchy. Conversely, if a previously closed hegemonic or authoritarian regime becomes inclusive prior to becoming competitive, the likelihood of polyarchy is significantly diminished. Still a third possibility, what Dahl termed a "shortcut", is also presumptively unfavorable to polyarchy; in it, a closed hegemony is abruptly transformed into a polyarchy by a sudden grant of universal suffrage along with rights of public contestation. More recently, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and their collaborators have revived interest in historical sequences as an explanatory variable in their four volume study, *Democracy in Developing Countries*. In summation of their volume on Latin America, the editors conclude: "our evidence strongly supports Robert Dahl's thesis that, historically, the most favorable path to polyarchy was one in which political competition preceded the expansion of participation.

To sum up, where does this analysis leave history as a precondition? Well, it suggests, that history is more a facilitating or intervening variable than a primary one that structural and perhaps cultural factors underlie and help to explain why countries have over the years experienced a more democratic pattern of development than others. And in the words of Dix:

... history is not destiny when it comes to the establishment of democratic government. It suggests, rather, that those countries that have recently embarked on democratic life or have resumed it following a prolonged hiatus or that seem to be edging toward it are not foredoomed to wait for generations. At the least, history does not foreclose the distinct possibility that their time may be now (1994, p.102).

**Conclusion:**

Indeed, past scholars have accurately analysed the processes of democratization in an attempt to predict the emergence of democracies as well as their possible collapse. Tessler (2002, p.20) regarded two as the most important. The first “involves political institutions and processes . . . [and the second] involves citizens’ attitudes and values, often described as political culture”. And political culture is the kernel of our thesis that attempts to verify the political culture dimension in the Algerian society and measure how much compatible is it with the possibility of implementing a robust democracy in Algeria.



# **Chapter Three: The Historical Context of the Algerian State.**

## **Introduction:**

Algeria, officially the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, lies in Northern Africa. It is bordered by Morocco and Mauritania to the West, Mali and Niger to the South, Libya and Tunisia to the East, and the Mediterranean Sea to the North. Algeria is part of the Maghreb. The capital and the largest city is Algiers. The size of Algeria is 2,382,741 km<sup>2</sup> with an estimated population of over 39.963 million in 2015 (National Office of Statistics). Of the population 99% is Arab, including circa 30% Imazighen (singular Amazigh) or Berbers, and less than 1% European. The vast majority of the population is Sunni Muslim (99% state religion); 1% is Christian and Jewish.

### **1. Colonial Algeria:**

"I returned from Africa with the distressing notion that we are now fighting far more barbarously than the Arabs themselves. For the present, it is on their side that one meets with civilization" (Tocqueville, 2001, p.70). During his first trip to Algeria in 1841, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of his surprise at the aggressive strategies enacted by the French army against the Arab and Kabyle populations. Under the leadership of the new governor-general of Algeria, Thomas Robert Bugeaud, the French military had expanded their use of violent and aggressive tactics in their pursuit of total conquest over Algeria during the 1840s. Although he lamented the brutalities of war, Tocqueville concluded that such tactics were "unfortunate necessities" for the French army to undertake in order to successfully take control of the region (ibid). Tocqueville's statement reveals the complex ideas about the rationale and epistemology of colonial violence "I have often heard men in France whom I respect, but with whom I do not agree, find it wrong that we burn harvests, that we empty silos, and finally that we seize unarmed men, women, and children" (ibid).

Saint-Arnaud described his campaigns of 1842 to his brother in extraordinarily frank and vivid terms:

We are in the middle of the mountains between Milianah and Cherchell. We hardly fire a shot, we burn everything (April 5, 1842). The country of the Beni-Menasser is superb.... We have burned everything. Oh war, oh war! How many women and children have died of cold and misery in the snows of the Atlas Mountains (April 7, 1842). My last letter was sent from the land of the Brazes, which I have burned and devastated. Here I am now on the territory of the Sindgads ... the same thing but on a larger scale. . . . Some of them came to me leading the horse that symbolizes submission. I refused them because I wanted total capitulation and so I began to burn (October 11, 1842) (Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 1858, pp. 502, 504, 565)

In fact, France realized Algeria did not exhibit a national identity, which would hinder any chance of a unified government, a government that would still be under France's influence nonetheless. To this end, Algerian-educated elites were given French-Algerian citizenship, and the children of these elites attended French schools and learned the French language (Volpi, 2003, p. 22). These elites, along with tribal chiefs and Islamic sheikhs were utilized for the development of Algeria's political institution (Ibid), one that was in cahoots with French imperialists and saw all wealth and state privileges bestowed on the elite classes. For the most part, the Algerian leaders during French colonial times were puppet governments and those that were opposed to the way of government were dealt with accordingly. For over 130 years, Algerians only knew one way of ruling a country and that was with a strong ruling elite and a weak civil society. This style of governing the local Algerian population has not seen considerable change except for the departure of colonialists after the independence war between 1954 until 1962.

## **2. The Growing of the Algerian Nationalism:**

Alistair Horne (2006) argues,

Because of Algeria's unique status as an integral part of France, which cut it off from undercurrents of Arab nationalism in the outside world more than its neighbors, one cannot easily state—as with other colonial territories—at what precise point a 'resistance movement' began (p. 38) .

So, Because of Algeria's early history as an integral part of France, the nationalist movement began during the interwar period but gained prominence after World War II. However, what is noticeable is the presence of three separate parts of Algerian nationalism: a religious movement originated by Sheikh Abdulhamid Ben Badis, the revolutionaries initiated by Messali Hadj, and the liberals of Ferhat Abbas. The clashes between these three movements effected the development of modern Algeria.

### **2.1. The Religious Movement:**

The religious movement is related with a group known as the Association des Ulema which was established by Ben Badis. The movement assumed that Algeria must return to Islam to "regenerate" (Horne, 2006, p38). Ben Badis and the Ulema resembled the Wahabi sect of Islam and were ardent Muslims who believed in the power of Islam to transform society. The Ulema was in favour of: the separation of church and state, the value of Arabic as a language, Algeria as a national entity and pan-Arabism as an ideal. According to Horne (2006), "The Ulema did more than any other body to rekindle a sense of religious and national consciousness among Algerians, but tied up in their own theological coils, they failed to find pragmatic applications" (p. 38).

### **2.2. The Revolutionaries:**

Consequently, Messali Hadj and his "revolutionaries" stepped in to provide a substitute to the Ulema. Messali became president of a political group of Algerian workers called the

Etoile Nord-Africaine, which “came to have a proletarian character superimposed over its nationalist and religious doctrines” (Horne 2006, p. 39). In effect, Messali was one of the first to bring in popular socialism to the revolutionary movement that would later influence the FLN and the socialist policies of the Ben Bella regime.

### **2.3.The liberals:**

A third constituent of Algerian nationalism is the liberal movement. Algeria’s liberals were led by Abbas and were considered the most moderate of the nationalists (Quandt 1969, p. 25). Becoming involved in politics in the 1930s, Abbas did not believe in a separate Algerian identity. Abbas and his fellow liberals,

[f]rom their early school days[,] had become concerned with equality and reforms, and these interests were reinforced and given more content as these young men became aware of the other political groups....develop[ing] further their strong commitment to modernization” (Quandt 1969, p. 33).

Abbas held that through assimilation into the French political community in Algeria social and economic equality would be gained from the French. Consequently, according to Quandt:

The Liberals . . . favored a policy whereby Algerian Muslims could become French citizens without abandoning their personal religious status. This would have led to full political rights for all Algerians and might have eventually led to total assimilation of the Muslim population into the European community. Conversely, equal rights might have led to much greater Muslim influence so that native Algerians could have pressed for some form of autonomy within a loose French commonwealth. In either case, however, complete independence was neither envisaged nor desired as an outcome of this policy (Quandt, 1969, pp. 39-40).

Despite the fact full independence may not have been anticipated, in effect, the policy of assimilation was a point of argument that historian John Ruedy has called a watershed in the nation's history, ". . . lower middle-class, working-class, and even poor rural Algerians joined alongside the elites for the first time in challenging the status quo" (Ruedy, 1992, p.139).

### **3. Pre-Independence Algeria 1936-1962:**

Under the intention of creating a unified nationalist movement, the liberals, revolutionaries, and religious movements met in Algiers in 1936 for a "Muslim Congress". At the same time, in France, the Blum-Viollette Plan was generated to offer French citizenship with full political equality to certain classes of the Muslim elite, including university graduates, elected officials, army officers, and professionals, which totalled approximately 25,000 Algerians (Toth, 1994, p. 38). This effort at unity would be short lived because although Abbas and Badis welcomed the Blum-Viollette Plan, Messali attacked the Plan as "a new instrument of colonialism aimed at dividing the Algerian people, by usual French methods of separating the elite from the masses" (Horne, 2006, p. 41). Moreover, the *Pied Noirs* took exception to the Blum-Viollette Plan. The *Pied Noirs* put up procedural opposition to block the legislation because one consequence of the plan would mean the French minority would be subject to a majority Muslim state (Toth 1994, p. 39). Finally, disillusioned by the failure of the Blum-Viollette Plan, Abbas became convinced that autonomy was preferable to assimilation for Algerian Muslims. As Quandt notes:

This conclusion was the result of the observation that the [ *pied niors*] . . . in Algeria could and would prevent liberal reforms emanating from Paris and that Paris itself might not be receptive to Muslim demands, particularly if undemocratic forces governed in France (Quandt, 1969, p. 41).

By the beginning of World War II, cooperation among the “Muslim Congress” broke apart. Toward the end of World War II, Abbas offered the French administration “The Manifesto of the Algerian People” which outlined past French colonial transgressions and demanded an Algerian constitution. Furthermore, the manifesto called for “agrarian reform, recognition of Arabic as an official language on equal terms with French, recognition of a full range of civil liberties, and the liberation of political prisoners of all parties” (Toth 1994, pp. 40-41). In response the French responded by passing a modified Blum-Viollette Plan granting 32,000 Muslims French citizenship compared with 450,000 European Algerians (Stone 1997, 35). As a result, a frustrated Abbas joined forces with Messali (who had been imprisoned) to create the “Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty” or AML. According to John Ruedy (1992), the main goals of the AML were: (1) To enlighten both Algerian and French opinion about the benefits of the Manifesto, (2) to unmask the reactionary manoeuvring of both French and native feudalist forces, (3) to propagate the idea of an Algerian nation federated with a renovated and anti-imperialist France, (4) to wage war against the privileges of the ruling class, and (5) to preach human equality and the Algerian people’s right to the pursuit of happiness and national life (pp. 147-8). The AML were supported by the reformist ulama and Messali loyalists of the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), garnering support from the middle classes, but were condemned by assimilationists and communists who were supported by the working classes (Ruedy 1992, 148). By May 1945, riots broke out among AML and PPA supporters as they marked Victory in Europe Day. The most noteworthy acts of violence occurred in Sétif and Guelma. At Sétif, Ruedy (1992) notes:

Organizers had been told they could demonstrate only if national flags and provocative placards were not displayed....Shortly after the march began, about 8:30, the forbidden flag and placards were unfurled contrary to orders, police charged to break up the demonstrations, some Muslims fought back, and others

took out after hapless European civilians or attacked buildings that stood as symbols of colonial authority. By 11:00, some forty Muslims and Europeans were dead (149). Consequently, as news of the violence spread throughout the countryside, pied noir villages were attacked and open insurrection eventually killed as many as 15,000 Muslims by the time violence was over (Stone, 1997, p.35).

The French government, in response to the violence, called in 10,000 troops to assist the police in trying to quell the violence. Bombings of Arab and Kabyle villages ensued and after a week the worst of the insurrection had subsided. Moreover, by the end of the year, 5,560 Muslims were arrested, including Abbas (Ruedy 1992, p. 149). (Ruedy 1992, p. 150).

Therefore, the nationalists were more determined than ever to push for separation. From the late 1940s to 1954, they would get their chance. After the violence in Sétif, the AML was disbanded and after his release from prison Abbas created a new party, the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), while Messali created the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD). The former called for “a free, secular, and republican Algeria loosely federated with France” while the latter was “committed to unequivocal independence” (Toth 1994, 42). Interestingly, the MTLD was supported by a clandestine organization known as the Organisation speciale (OS) and was initially headed by Hocine Aït Ahmed and later Ben Bella. In August 1947, the parties were enfranchised by the French government after the passing of the Organic Statute of Algeria, which would serve as a new constitution. An Algerian Assembly was also created with two sixty-member colleges, one for Algeria’s 1.5 million Europeans and the other for the 9 million Muslims (Stone 1997, 36). Although, as Stone (1997) notes:

....[T]he Europeans, using a combination of intimidation, vote-rigging, arrests and other illegal practices, managed to prevent the UDMA and the MTLD from



ever attaining their true electoral strength in elections for the Algerian Assembly and in local and French Assembly elections over the following six years (p.36).

The malfeasance on the part of the Europeans further incited tensions that were already simmering beneath of the surface in the PPA-MTLD coalition. One such tension occurred between the Berbers led by Ait Ahmed and Messali's MTLD. The Berbers complained the Messali and the MTLD were increasingly using too much Islamic rhetoric instead of being more secular and Marxist (Ruedy 1992, 154). Simultaneously, there were massive arrests and crackdowns forcing the MTLD to dissolve the OS. The dissolution of the OS caused the most militant of Algerian society to leave the MTLD. By late 1951 and into 1952, the weakening of the MTLD was hastened by a conflict between the Central Committee of the MTLD and Messali "who was widely accused of authoritarianism and attempting to impose the cult of his own personality" (Ruedy, 1992, p. 154). Efforts were made to reconcile their varying differences; however, these attempts were for naught as Messali continued to try and re-assert personal control. However, he was arrested and deported to France in 1952, thereby increasing the factionalism of the MTLD (Stone, 1997, p. 36). During the spring of 1954, the factionalism described above, influenced the creation of a "third force" between the two factions. This third force was the Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action (CRUA) and was created by five former MTLD members: Mohamed Boudiaf, Mohamed Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche and Rabah Bitat with Krim Belkacem, Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider and Ait Ahmed joining during the next two years (ibid). Between March and October 1954 the CRUA created plans for the rebellion against French Rule when it became clear that the MTLD was irretrievably split (Ruedy, 1992). On Nov 1954, the CRUA changed its name to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the political wing of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN), and launched the revolution leading to Algeria's independence from the French.

#### 4. Algeria's War of Independence 1954-1962:

The War of Independence—or as Algerians call it, the Revolution—was a bloody period in the Algerian history with attacks perpetrated throughout Algeria against military installations, police departments, warehouses, communication facilities, and public utilities. The FLN, as the vanguard of the revolution, called for Algerian Muslims in a national struggle for “the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam” (Toth 1994, 44). The Algerians’ war of independence was not merely a fight between colonizer and the colonized. In fact, one could argue there were multiple conflicts—*between the  *pied noirs* and Muslims, as well as internecine rivalries between Algerian Muslims. The FLN leadership recruited broadly throughout the Algerian society.*

According to Quandt, “To keep the FLN together as a broad front, the leaders kept the focus on the one thing they agreed upon—Algeria’s independence within an Arab/Islamic framework. But it was nationalism rather than any other ideology that inspired the movement” (Quandt, 1998, p.19). *The FLN operated under collective leadership and consisted of numerous committees, cliques and clans. Externally the FLN was led by Ben Bella, Khider, and Ait Ahmed in Cairo and were assisted nominally by Jamel Abdel Nasser. The external leadership worked to gain foreign support and acquire arms, supplies and money for the war effort. Internally, the FLN established a leadership committee of six led by Mohamed Boudiaf, who established six military regions, known as *wilaya*. Each *wilaya* was headed by a colonel of the ALN and supported by three assistants—political affairs, logistics, and public affairs* (Ruedy 1992, pp. 158-9). The war’s first shots were fired on November 1, 1954 and all of northern Algeria was engulfed in violence by the end of 1956. The ALN and its clandestine terrorist groups “engaged in direct attacks against the French army and security forces as well as assassinations, economic sabotage and intimidation of the FLN’s opponents within both the Muslim and European opponents” (Stone 1997, p. 37). It was the massacre of 123 civilians in

the town of Philippeville in 1955 that redefined the war. A wilaya commander for the Constantine region decided that escalation was needed, but the large number of civilian deaths struck a chord with Jacques Soustelle (France's General Governor of Algeria) who ordered government retaliation killing 1,273 FLN guerillas, according to the French government (Toth, 1994, p. 46). The FLN claimed 12,000 Muslims perished "in an orgy of bloodletting by the armed forces and police, as well as [pied noir] gangs" (Toth, 1994, p. 46). In effect, scholars (Ruedy, 1992; Stone, 1997; Stora, 2000; Toth, 1994) all claim that the Philippeville massacre was the beginning of all-out war in Algeria. By 1956, the ALN "had evolved into a well-disciplined force of some 20,000 armed men with a well-developed terrorist capability" (Stone 1997, p. 37). Also, the FLN had consolidated its power coopting all of the nationalist movements except for one—Messali Hadj. Messali's Mouvement Nationale Algerien (MNA), the successor to the MTLD, was active among Algerian immigrants in France and in the Kabilya engaging in street battles with FLN supporters (Stone 1997, p. 37). The MNA established a 500 person militia to try and counter the FLN; however, because of defeats received at the hands of the FLN and French success in co-opting smaller factions, the MNA ceased to be a major threat to the FLN (Ruedy 1992, 146). Effectively, Quandt (1998) argues, ". . . [T]he most famous figure of modern Algerian nationalism at the time of the revolution was shunted aside, treated as a traitor, and his followers were systematically eliminated" (p.19). Moreover, the rise in violence around Algeria was not limited to just the FLN. Throughout 1956 and 1957, the FLN was successful in a number of terrorist attacks against French government and *pied noir* interests. The French government under Soustelle's successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, dissolved the Algerian Assembly and ruled Algeria by decree. The French responded by placing most of northern Algeria under a state of emergency. According to Stone (1997),

Repeated French initiatives to find a compromise solution foundered on the weakness of successive coalition governments in Paris and the strength of resolve of the European colonists, who stubbornly insisted that aid from abroad, particularly Arab nationalist regimes such as that of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, was the mainstay of the FLN rebellion (p.38).

Consequently, the French army divided Algeria into sectors to try and reduce the amount of terrorism. Though, their efforts at combating the FLN were hindered with the independence of neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco where the FLN was able to maintain sanctuaries to attack into Algeria (Ruedy 1992, 165). Despite their repeated successes, the FLN was experiencing coordination problems. These problems occurred because, as Ruedy (1992) argues,

FLN efforts on the ground were weakened by interpersonal or intergroup conflicts largely irrelevant to the national struggle; they were hampered by the bewildering turnover provoked by the terrible toll of lives; French counterinsurgency tactics were increasingly effective at isolating the wilayas from each other (p.166).

To overcome French tactics and improve coordination, the FLN leadership met at Soummam Valley and drafted a forty-page platform that “clarified the objectives of the revolution, formalized the military structures that had been evolving ad-hoc, and gave the revolution for the first time a set of overall political institutions (Ruedy 1992, 166). The Soummam conference also established the *Council National de la revolution algerienne* (CNRA), which would become Algeria’s first sovereign parliament. The conference reaffirmed the principles of collegial decision-making within the FLN as well as political leadership over the military. In effect, the conference “affirmed the primacy of the internal

leadership over the external, a position which was easy to take since none of the external leaders had made it to the Soummam Valley” (Ruedy 1992, p. 166). Why had the leaders missed the conference? Ben Bella and his colleagues had waited in San Remo and then Tripoli to be escorted into Algeria for the conference. However, according to Ruedy (1992), “They [Ben Bella & the other Externals] were still waiting at Tripoli when word arrived the Congress had convened, met for twenty days, and then adjourned” (p. 166). Accusations were then made that the internals had deliberately misled the external leadership; namely, that the split between the internals and externals “contain[ed] hints of the unresolved issues separating Arabs from Kabyles that had already surfaced within the *Organisation spéciale* in 1949” (Ruedy 1992, 167). Another factor affecting events was the capture of Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, Hider, Bitat and Boudiaf—five of the nine historic chiefs of the FLN & members of the outside leadership—who were imprisoned in France for the remainder of the war (Ruedy 1992, p.38).

At this point, the French felt they were gaining an upper-hand in combating the FLN. By the fall of 1956, the French had built up their forces to over 400,000 (Ruedy 1992, 167). These forces were divided up into small units for patrol as well as implementing a resettlement policy of populations outside of regions “where the FLN was most active in order to rob the rebels of revenue, supply, and shelter—in effect, ‘taking the water away from the fish’” (Ruedy 1992, 167). Accordingly, the internal leadership sought to demonstrate its leadership over the Algerian population by calling for an eight-day general strike and to carry the battle from the countryside to major urban centres through the use of terrorism. The most famous outcome of this policy was the Battle of Algiers in September 1956. As is so accurately depicted in Gino Pontecorvo’s stunning film, *The Battle of Algiers* (1967), Saadi Yacef, the commander of the Autonomous Algiers region orchestrated bombings and killings from his hideout in the Casbah section of

Algiers aimed at the pied noir population of the city. In fact, the attacks occurred until the spring of 1957 claiming a number of innocent civilians (Ruedy, 1992, p. 168). The French responded with a military campaign to isolate the Muslim populations and their neighborhoods. French tactics included harassment and, most notably, a “widespread and systematic use of torture as an aid to interrogation” (Ruedy, 1992, p. 168). The effects of torture on the Algerians and French war efforts are well documented elsewhere (Horne, 2006; Ruedy, 1992; Stora, 2001), but suffice it to say, while the tactics used by the French had a short term goal of winning the battle, it precipitated the French losing the war.

Both the FLN and the French suffered setbacks from the Battle of Algiers. The French had effectively repressed the FLN’s terror campaign within Algiers and “[t]he overwhelming, multifaceted repression further disrupted already fragile communications and command structures” (Ruedy, 1992, p. 169). In part, the French rounded up Algerians by the thousands into settlement camps and secured the borders with neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco to cut off communication between leadership who had fled the country and those revolutionaries who were still in the country. The internal leadership was criticized for calling a general strike that failed and launching a campaign of urban terrorism that strayed from the revolutionary aim of appealing to the rural population (Horne, 2006, pp. 223-224; Ruedy, 1992, p. 169). The criticism was appearing from a number of different sources within the FLN leadership; namely, loyalists to Ben Bella, led by Ramdane Abane, the leader of the internals, and a rising class of military men known as “the colonels”, led by Abdelhafid Boussouf, “who had gradually taken over direction of the war as death, imprisonment, or demonstrated incompetence thinned the ranks of the original revolutionaries” (Ruedy 1992, 170). Abane was firmly opposed to the military dominating a political organization and publicly attacked Boussouf, stating that he and the military were robots. (Horne 2006, 225-226). The wilayas had become isolated since the Battle of Algiers from the CCE(*Comité de coordination*

*etd'exécution*, or executive cabinet). Consequently, each wilaya developed its own command style and found itself with greater autonomy and power with the lack of directives from the CCE (Horne 2006, 226). The most notable example being Wilaya 5 under Boussouf and his assistant Boumediene, who established a closely-knit, disciplined military machine. As Horne (2006) explains, Boussouf "...was held by his subordinates in considerable awe, had imposed a strong stamp of his own personality on Wilaya 5 and would henceforth assume a central role in the FLN leadership" (p. 225). As a result, a meeting of the CNRA was held in Cairo in July 1957 and reversed the Soummam Valley decisions, thereby expanding the CCE which became dominated by the five wilaya colonels. Abane continued to make disparaging comments against the colonels, stating: "You are creating a power based on the army. The maquis is one thing, politics is another and it is not conducted either by illiterates or ignoramuses!" (Horne 2006, p. 227). The conflict between Abane and the colonels came to a head with the colonels orchestrating Abane's strangulation in Morocco in December 1957 (Horne, 2006, pp. 227-230). Therefore, with the death of Abane, the colonels became the undisputed power brokers in the FLN.

By spring 1958, the FLN's leadership quarrels and French counterterrorist measures had left the FLN at a disadvantage at this point in the war. According to Ruedy, "...[T]he operational balance of the war more and more favoured the colonialists by the spring of 1958. Urban terrorism had been quelled, operational successes in the interior countryside were few and small, and the war on the frontiers had stagnated." It was at this point, however, that "France's interest in a system equitable enough to insure the long-term loyalty of the Algerian Muslims, had, for more than a century, been overridden by that of settlers determined to guarantee their own monopoly of political and economic power" (Ruedy 1992, p. 170). In other words, French citizens were beginning to question whether it was worth the money, materiel, and lives to support the pied noirs, whose overall interests were beginning to diverge

from France. In France, the 4th Republic was experiencing instability as the thirteenth government was being formed by Prime Minister Pierre Pflimin and pied noir protests were occurring in response to increasing violence (Ruedy 1992, p. 172). French army commanders “chafed at what they took to be inadequate and incompetent government support of military efforts to end the rebellion” (Toth, 1994, p. 51). Thus, the army and pied noirs pressured the French government, specifically French President René Coty to name de Gaulle as prime minister of a government of national unity. On June 1 1958, de Gaulle’s acceptance of an invitation by President Coty to form a government was approved by parliament and de Gaulle was able to rule by decree for six months (Ruedy, 1992, p. 172). Upon taking office, DeGaulle established the Fifth Republic and proposed that Algeria would be a partner with, rather than an integral part, of the Fifth Republic (Stone, 1997, p. 39). DeGaulle’s proposals included “measures for accelerating Algerian integration into France by granting universal adult suffrage, instituting a single electoral college, and assuring that a minimum of two-thirds of Algerian representatives in the Parliament of the Fifth Republic would be Muslims” (Ruedy 1992, p. 173). In response, the CNRA implemented a three-part offensive to counteract DeGaulle’s efforts. First, the revolution was brought to France to pressure the émigré community. Second, Ben Khedda appealed to China for military arms to use “East-West rivalries to Algerian advantage” and finally, a provisional government, the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* or GPRA was organized in Tunis under Ferhat Abbas as president and Ben Bella as vice-president (Ruedy 1992, p. 173). According to Ruedy (1992),

In composition, the GPRA represented the most broadly based executive yet created by the FLN....For all of its breadth, however, the main power positions remained in the hands of the militant triumvirate who had dominated the second CCE: Belkacem Krim as Vice President and Minister of War, Lahkdar Ben Tobbal as Minister of the



Interior, and Abdelhafid Boussouf as Minister of Communications (Ruedy 1992, p. 174).

In other words, the military began to exert its influence as early as 1958, several years prior to independence. The French were meeting with success in Algeria. DeGaulle forced the resignation of officers on the Committee of Public Safety and assigned governorship of Algeria to Paul Delouvrier and the army command to Maurice Challe. At this point, a number of generals were declaring the war won as Wilayas Two, Three and Four were in complete disarray (Ruedy 1992, p. 175). Despite this success, the French public was growing restless and international pressure was increasing. On September 16, 1959, de Gaulle stated publicly for the first time that Algerians had the right to 'self-determination' (Stone 1997, p. 39). This announcement was met with uneasiness in the pied noir community, who by January 1960 attempted an uprising against the colonial government. General Calle put down the insurrections, but many "highly organized and well-armed vigilante groups stepped up their terrorist activities, which were directed against both Muslims and pro-government Europeans, as the move toward negotiated settlement of war and self-determination gained momentum" (Toth 1994, p. 54). Moreover, in April 1961, important elements of the French army, with support of the Foreign Legion and the well-armed Secret Army Organization (Organisation de l'Armée—OAS) coordinated the pied noir uprisings. According to Toth, "The leaders of this 'generals' putsch' intended to seize control of Algeria as well as topple the de Gaulle regime" (Toth 1994, p. 54). While the "general's putsch" was unsuccessful, it was a turning point in France's attitude toward the Algerian war.

The pied noir uprisings as well as continued violence by the FLN resulted in de Gaulle opening secret negotiations with the FLN in January 1961 "intended to provide a new mandate to carry through his program of self-determination" (Stone 1997, p. 39). Despite repeated terrorist attacks by the OAS and guerrilla warfare by the FLN, France and the GPRA

met in Evian, France. After a number of meetings in 1961, a cease-fire was agreed to between the France and the FLN known as the Evian Accords. Ninety-one percent of French citizens approved the Evian Accords officially ending 130 years of French rule and offering pied noirs equal legal protection with Algerians over a three-year period (Stone 1997, p. 40). However, there continued to be terrorist attacks by the OAS to undermine the FLN agreement with the French. During the spring of 1962, said attacks were a “last desperate attempt to prevent the inevitable by goading the FLN to break the ceasefire....”, but ultimately failed due to a “combination of an efficient police response and internal divisions within the the OAS....” (Stone 1997, p. 40). The violence, consequently, sent large numbers of Europeans and pied noirs fleeing back to France. On July 1, 1962, Algerians voted nearly unanimously for independence and on July 3rd, De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country. After eight years of fighting estimates ranged from as low as 300,000 dead according to the FLN to Algerian government estimates, in later years, of 1.5 million dead (Toth 1994, 55). Nevertheless, eight years of conflict had produced factionalism within the FLN between the interior and exterior leadership that would come to define the development of post-war Algeria. As Ruedy (1992) explains:

By the early 1960s, thousands of Algerians who had played leadership roles of many different kinds in the revolution could lay claim to a share of political power but no mechanism had been created to adjudicate and apportion such claims. If the years 1954-56 witnessed a progressive coming together of nationalist leadership, the years 1957-1962 witnessed an ever greater segmentation of the elites. This was in contrast to the society as a whole, which, through the shared experiences of war and repression, had developed the clear sense of identity ...demonstrated so dramatically in the events of December 1960 [to demonstrate Algerian nationalism upon De Gaulle’s visit to Algeria] (p. 181).

The next section will examine the factionalism within the FLN leadership, to examine the rise to power of two important leaders in Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne.

### **5. Post-Independence Algeria and Ahmed Ben Bella 1962-1965:**

The conflict for power within the FLN involved a number of groups and individuals: The five 'historic chiefs' who had been released from detention in France on the day that the Evian Accord was signed; the provisional government (GPRA) under Benyoucef Ben Khedda; moderate Muslim politicians; the military, itself divided between 'internals' and 'externals'; the commanders of the Wilayas; the trade unions; and leaders of France-based Algerian Muslims (Stone, 1997, pp. 43-4). The most important conflict, however, was between the GPRA and the military leaders of Wilayas II, III and IV. In effect, these personality conflicts were allowing the external ALN to become the most cohesive institution in the country. The ALN's ability to accomplish this was due in no small part to the work of Boumedienne. Boumedienne, a member of the external ALN, used "ruthless efficiency" to reorganize the ALN beginning in late 1960 (Horne 2006, p. 412). His priority

was to keep the military apparatus intact, and Boumedienne saw it as his longer-term function to create a well-equipped, disciplined and trustworthy army with which any future Algerian government of the FLN could rule an independent Algeria, against all rivals, in the difficult days that might lie ahead (Horne 2006, p. 414).

His first act was to reign in the lawlessness that was occurring in various commands of the external ALN. In Tunisia, because of the boredom of inactivity certain groups of soldiers would mug local Tunisians. Boumedienne rounded up the twenty officers and soldiers and had them executed in front of the troops (Horne 2006, p. 412). Also, there was an insurrection of 100 troops in the Moroccan based ALN that was supported by the Moroccan army, which Boumedienne would ultimately put down. According to Horne (2006, p.142): "To eradicate permanently this kind of indiscipline, Boumedienne introduced his own tough deputies . . . to

weld the whole army closely under his personal control”. The ALN General Staff was remodelled along the lines of the French system to include four bureaus, which would include defectors from the French army, to oversee training programs as new weapons from the Communist bloc began to arrive. As part of this training program, Boumedienne included political indoctrination. He also worked to rebuild the interior ALN, especially in Algiers, by ordering them “...to maintain a low profile; to refuse combat in the face of continuing French [sweeps]; to break up and dissipate in small groups and, if necessary, take refuge in another Wilaya far from the current offensive” (Horne, 2006, p. 413). Essentially, Boumedienne wanted to remind his fellow countrymen, as well as the international community, that the FLN was still around despite setbacks received at the hands of the French military. With a strengthened ALN, Boumedienne believed that the FLN would be able to rule and counter any rivals that lay ahead in an independent Algeria.

Boumedienne had an ally in this endeavour in Ben Bella. Of all the groups mentioned above who were in conflict, Ben Bella was a “historic chief” of the FLN and the most prominent, mainly due to his arrest during the early years of the war. Consequently, he was able to parlay this advantage through the organization of a political bureau to counter the GPRA. The Political Bureau comprised the five historical chiefs, one wilaya leader, and only one member of the GPRA and was created in Tripoli, Libya to outmanoeuvre the GPRA (Stone 1997, p. 44). **The GPRA was established after independence in Tizi Ouzou, the capital of Kabylia**, which Stone argues was a result of the Kabyle origins of the executive members. Ben Khedda “then attempted to impose his authority over the powerful ALN by dismissing... Boumedienne” (Stone, 1997, p. 44). Accordingly, Boumedienne threw his support behind Ben Bella’s Tlemcen clan and supported Ben Bella’s candidacy over Ben Khedda’s. Joining Boumedienne in support of Ben Bella was Boumedienne’s Oujda clan, Ferhat Abbas, who

was President of the National Assembly, and Mohamed Khider, the Secretary General of the Political Bureau (Ruedy, 1992, p. 198).

The main contention in the struggle for power occurred over the drafting of a constitution, the creation of political institutions, and defining the powers of government, assembly, and party (Ruedy 1992, p.198). Abbas argued that the National Assembly was the only institution with power to draft and vote on a constitution, while Khider believed that policy making and constituent authority rested with the party. As a result, Ruedy (1992) notes, “The Assembly promptly bogged down in debating its rules and procedures so that, well into 1963, it could not pass a single statute much less deal with the fundamental law” (198). Furthermore, continues Ruedy (1992), the FLN as a party “separate from the wartime military and bureaucratic apparatus scarcely existed; institutionally, in 1962, it was the five-man Political Bureau” (198). Ben Bella, therefore, ruled by decree and was able to strengthen his power base.

Ben Bella would face repeated resistance from internal wilaya commanders of wilayas II, III, & IV. Their opposition concerned the fact that the externals would be charged with transforming the ALN into the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) “claiming that the plan contravened the spirit of the revolution” (Stone 1997, 44). Stone (1997) notes: “‘Internal’ military commanders resented Boumedienne’s ‘Army of the Exterior’ for failing to assist them during the war and were anxious to preserve their own authority and privileges that they had established during the previous seven years” (44-5). The Political Bureau attempted repeatedly to negotiate with the Internal commanders to no avail. On August 30, 1962, negotiations between the Bureau and commanders broke down and the Bureau ordered the ALN to move on Algiers from Oran. Algeria was on the precipice of civil war. Various wilayas worked to assure their autonomy, especially Wilayas III and IV who maintained their own councils, until the Political Bureau ordered the ALN and the troops of Wilayas I, II, V,

and VI to march on Algiers (Stora 2001, 127). As Stone (1997) argues, “Full scale civil war was only averted by the speed and ease of the ALN’s conquest of Algiers and by the population’s clear disgust at this new period of violence so early in the existence of the newly-independent state” (Stone 1997, 45). Consequently, with the interior military’s defeat, the Political Bureau drew up a new list of candidates for the National Assembly election and Ben Bella ordered the removal of one-third of the candidates (fifty-nine names), including Ben Khedda (Stora 2001, 128). The Political Bureau’s list of candidates won a “suspicious” 99 percent of the vote with members of the Tlemcen coalition dividing power among themselves (Stone 1997, 45; Stora 2001, 128). Ben Bella became head of government with Khider becoming secretary general of the political bureau, Boumedienne defense minister and Abbas becoming president of the National Assembly. According to Stora (2001), “For the most part, the FLN drew its legitimacy from the very recent history of the war of independence. It did not possess democratic legitimacy” (p. 132). After the election, Ben Bella, Boumedienne and Khider formed a triumvirate of the army, the party, and government to run Algeria. However, “Ben Bella’s ambitions and authoritarian tendencies were to lead the triumvirate to unravel and provoke increasing discontent among Algerians” (Toth 1994, 57).

The war of independence and the aftermath severely hurt Algeria’s society and economy. The physical destruction notwithstanding, the pied noirs returned to France thereby depriving Algeria of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled workers (Toth 1994, 57). Algeria’s Muslim population was prohibited from many of these professions as a result of French colonial policy. Moreover, homelessness was in the hundreds of thousands with almost 70 percent of the workforce unemployed (Toth, 1994, p.57). By 1963, Ben Bella issued the “March Decrees” which declared all agricultural, industrial, and commercial properties as vacated and thus property of the Algerian state. This policy became known as “Algerian socialism” and incorporated what became known as self-management.

With the departure of European owners and managers from factories, workers took control of firms and established state-owned farms and cooperatives. Each had elective boards of managers “that directed production activities, financing, and marketing in conjunction with state-appointed directors” (Toth 1994, 58). Self-management would ultimately fail due to bureaucratic incompetence, graft, and theft, as well as being a temporary conservative formula more than a fundamental political choice (Toth 1994; Stora 2001). As David and Marina Ottaway (1970) aptly posit:

The adoption of the self-management system in Algeria was largely the outcome of the chaos that reigned in the country at independence. In the confusion, a small group of intellectuals dominated by foreign Trotskyites was able to impose its ideas.

Unfortunately, these intellectuals were only interested in promoting the takeover of power by the workers in order to prevent the bureaucracy from choking the revolution, as they believed had happened in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries (p. 67).

Therefore, Ben Bella saw self-management as a popular political solution of the moment to strengthen his own position against his opponents and was not interested in the economic effects of a socialist economic policy. Nevertheless, self-management “became a key issue in the politics of independent Algeria, the rallying cry of the workers, and the indispensable slogan of two successive regimes” (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970, p. 68).

Ben Bella believed that the establishment of a presidential regime was the most effective way of ensuring his authority, marginalizing his opponents, and guaranteeing the adoption of self-management. A new constitution was drawn up under FLN supervision and Ben Bella was confirmed as the party’s choice to lead the country for a five-year term (Stone 1997, 46). The new constitution gave Ben Bella the powers of chief of state, head of government and supreme commander of the armed forces. His main supporters were the Political Bureau, the

'Tlemcen Group (Boumedienne, Khider and Abbas) and the ANP, particularly the 'Oujda clan'. Ben Bella's coalition was in a fragile state, as he was supported by those with their own ambitions (Stone, 1997, p. 46). Consequently, Ben Bella's policies would continue to meet resistance. Challenges from outside the government included supporters of Messali Hadj, the Communist Party (PCA), and the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste (PRS) led by Boudiaf. The PCA were excluded from the FLN as a party and continued to criticize Ben Bella's regime in their *Alger Républicain* newspaper. With a readership of about 80,000, it had a circulation twice that of the government-run paper *Al-Chaab*, and was considered the most influential paper in the country (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970, p. 91). Because of their influence with the Algerian people, Ben Bella never banned them from government. He did, however, go to great lengths "to make it clear that Algeria was not anti-Communist and even invited the Communists to join the FLN as individuals" (ibid). His reasoning had to do with the image he was attempting to portray of his regime. As Ottaway and Ottaway (1970) explain, "Ben Bella was apparently fearful that the banning of the PCA would tarnish his revolutionary image and impair Algeria's relations with the Soviet Union because as late as April 1963 he was still publicly offering explanations for his actions" (p. 91). Furthermore, the PRS, founded by Boudiaf as a clandestine organization in September 1962, was not taken seriously by Ben Bella. Boudiaf was considered a Marxist and "claimed to be a rigorous 'scientific socialist' and advocated immediate nationalization of key sectors of the economy, state control of foreign commerce, the organization of a truly revolutionary party, and the creation of a powerful, autonomous labor union" (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1970, p. 93). The PRS consisted of only a few hundred Algerian workers in France and disgruntled labor union officials and only distributed a limited number of propaganda leaflets against the regime. Boudiaf criticized the slowness of socialist reforms, Ben Bella's improvisations and lack of planning, for failing to purge the party and civil service, and for collaborations with opponents of



socialism— Ferhat Abbas and Teufik el-Madani (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 94). Boudiaf's arrest caused the PRS to melt away. However, resistance to Ben Bella's policies continued from within government as Ait Ahmed resigned from the National Assembly to protest the "dictatorial tendencies" of Ben Bella's regime (Toth 1994, 59). Ahmed was upset that the National Assembly would be little more than a "rubber stamp" for Ben Bella's policies. His ire would lead him to join with the Wilaya III (Kabylie) commander Mohand Ou el-Hadj to form a resistance group known as the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS). The FFS was a Kabyle movement and was dedicated to overthrowing the Ben Bella regime through force (Toth, 1994, p.59). Throughout the summer of 1963 there were periodic uprisings attributed to the FFS, which Boumedienne had no qualms about sending the army to crush when he felt they posed a threat to the state (Toth, 1994, pp.59-60).

Ben Bella also used a short border war with Morocco<sup>2</sup> to claim that Ait Ahmed was a Moroccan agent and an enemy of the Algerian revolution. A year later in Kabyle and in the southern Sahara, Ahmed helped organize an insurgent movement consisting of remnants of the FFS, the PRS, and the surviving regional military leaders. While the ANP was fighting the insurgents, Ben Bella sought to purge the FLN and the assembly of his opponents. However, when Ben Bella attempted to co-opt allies from among some of the same regionalists whom the army had been called out to suppress, tensions increased between Boumedienne and Ben Bella (Stone, 1997, pp.48-49).

By late 1964, Ben Bella's regime consisted of himself and a few supporters. According to Stone (1997), "This centralization of power in the hands of such a small group of people and the lack of any viable political base left Ben Bella dangerously exposed, particularly to the single faction over which he had so far been unable to assume control—the general staff" (p. 49). Accordingly, Ben Bella sought to further consolidate his power by turning his attention

toward Boumedienne's Oujda clan. First, Ben Bella appointed a loyalist, Tahar Zbiri as chief of staff of the ANP. Next, in April 1965, Ben Bella issued orders to local police to report directly to him rather than through normal channels in the Ministry of Interior. The minister, Ahmed Medeghri, one of Boumedienne's closest associates in the Oujda Group, resigned his portfolio in protest and was replaced by a Political Bureau loyalist. Third, Ben Bella sought to remove Abdelaziz Bouteflika, another Boumedienne confidant, as minister of foreign affairs and was believed to be planning a direct confrontation with Boumedienne to force his ouster (Toth 1994, 60; Stone 1997, pp. 49-50). The final straw "came with leaks that Ben Bella planned to revive Kabyle support for the President against Boumedienne by replacing Bouteflika with the imprisoned Ait Ahmed" (Stone, 1997, p. 50). On June 19, 1965, Boumedienne deposed Ben Bella in a swift and bloodless military coup d'état.

#### **6. Houari Boumedienne, 1965-78:**

Boumedienne has described the 1965 coup as "a 'historic rectification' of the Algerian War of Independence" (Toth 1994, 60). Boumedienne dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the 1963 constitution, disbanded the militia and abolished the Political Bureau which he considered an instrument of Ben Bella's personal rule. Until a new constitution was adopted, political power resided in the Council of the Revolution, "a predominantly military body intended to foster cooperation among various factions in the army and the party" (Toth 1994, 60). The council's original twenty-six members included former internal military leaders, former Political Bureau members, and senior officers of the ANP closely associated with Boumedienne in the coup. Boumedienne was declared President of the council and was charged with forming a new government. According to Ottaway and Ottaway (1970), "The composition of the council suggested that he had finally succeeded in reconciling the wilaya leaders and the officers of the ANP. It also suggested that he had won over two of the most prominent figures in the Ben Bella government, Mahsas and Boumaza, and thus that there

might be some continuity in the country's socialist policies, as the council promised" (193). Furthermore, the council was expected to exercise collegial responsibility for overseeing the activities of the new government with a largely civilian Council of Ministers, or cabinet, appointed by Boumedienne. The cabinet was inclusive and shared some functions with the Council of the Revolution—an Islamic leader, technical experts, FLN regulars, as well as others representing a broad range of Algerian political and institutional life (Toth 1994, 60).

Boumedienne was an ardent nationalist, deeply influenced by Islamic values, and he was reportedly one of the few prominent Algerian leaders who expressed himself better in Arabic than in French. Accordingly, the use of French was minimized and the use of Modern Standard Arabic encouraged. Ottaway and Ottaway (1970) argue, "Boumedienne's opposition to Ben Bella's policies was veiled behind a pseudo-religious argument over the compatibility of Islam and Marxist socialism" (179). He seized control of the country not to initiate military rule, but to protect the interests of the army, which he felt were threatened by Ben Bella. Boumedienne's use of religion "assumed great importance during the preparations for the party congress, when the Boumedienne faction objected to the strongly Marxist orientation of the party's new ideological charter, insisting that Islam be declared the country's fundamental doctrine" (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, p. 179). However, the dissension between Boumedienne and Ben Bella was not based primarily on ideological differences.

Boumedienne "was above all concerned about Ben Bella's rapprochement with the UGTA and the Algerian Communists because he feared that with the help of these new allies the president would eventually oust him" (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, p. 180). Boumedienne's position as head of government and of state was not secure initially, partly because of his lack of a significant power base outside of the armed forces. This situation may have accounted for his deference to collegial rule as a means of reconciling competing factions (Toth 1994, 60). One major program continued by Boumedienne was the Arabization program established

under Ben Bella. The purpose of this program was to fully transform a Maghrebi-European society into a fully Arab society. As Stone (1997) notes, “The architects of the program believed that this would transcend the enduring ethnic, tribal, clan and geographical fragmentation that traditionally inhibited the creation of a nation-state conceptualized in largely European terms” (p. 52). Boumedienne’s policies have been called “Arab-Islamic socialism” or Boumediennism” and are “a synthesis of diverse political, social and cultural influences and ideologies ranging from the teachings of Islam to the nationalisms of the *mudjahidine* [sic] and the Arab east, and the socialism and Marxism of Algerian intellectuals educated in France and later in the Soviet bloc” (Stone, 1997, p. 53). The policies to garner the most attention were both political and developmental. The first changes made were offered to deliver constitutional government and establish public participation in political life. The 1963 constitution was discarded and work began on a National Charter (a process that would ultimately not be completed until 1976). Boumedienne’s vision was “one of political institutions rebuilt through a systematic process of political education at the base supervised from above” (Ruedy 1992, p. 209). Accordingly, elections were held for the communal assemblies (*assemblees populaires communales-APCs*) in 1967 and the wilaya assemblies (*assemblees populaires des wilayat-APWs*) in 1969. Although their purpose was to implement decisions from above and to provide an avenue for political advancement at the local level, the members of these assemblies were members of and approved by the FLN (Stone 1997, 52). Second, Boumedienne’s Arabization program sought to streamline and homogenize the population to create a state “based on the interplay between the rulers and the ruled, where political education and mobilization were to be channeled from the base upwards....” (Stone, 1997, p. 54). However, in practice, Boumedienne’s policy created an increasingly influential class of bureaucrats and technocrats. Moreover, due to the haphazard and ineffective implementation of the program, two tiers of educated Algerians developed, one educated in

Arabic, the other in French. The result was the predominance of the French-speaking middle class, as industry and commerce continued to operate mostly in French with Arabic speakers denied jobs (Stone 1997, 53-4). Despite state rhetoric, the state “concentrated more on building itself and laying the foundations of a modern industrialized economy than effectively developing the country at large, and the ordinary Algerian was largely denied access to the decision-making process” (Stone 1997, 55). Additionally, Ruedy (1992) notes, “With the streamlining and homogenization of the government, the growing authority of the technocracy, the bureaucratization of the party, and the harnessing of the labor, student, youth, and women’s organizations, Algeria by the 1970s had become increasingly depoliticized” (209). The bureaucrats, technocrats, and military officers who made policy, Ruedy (1992) continues “were functioning in increased isolation from public opinion....[taking] decisions of enormous consequence, making vast commitments of human and material resources with little consultation beyond their own tight circles” (209). There was continued criticism of Boumedienne and attempted to eliminate dissent through a practice of collegiality. Their criticisms concerned his policy of self-management and the betrayal of “rigorous socialism”.

Additionally, some military officers were unsettled by what they saw as a drift away from collegiality. In 1967, there was an attempted coup against Boumedienne led by Tahar Zbiri, but Boumedienne was able to put down the coup by coming to terms with other opposition leaders through cooptation by placing them into nongovernmental posts or into governmental positions without portfolio (Ruedy 1992, 208). Many opponents, at an extreme, were imprisoned and even exiled. Boumedienne’s power was consolidated due to the Oujda clan’s control of the army.

To this end, the military was experiencing the transformation of the ALN into the professional ANP and this continued throughout the early years of the Boumedienne regime. These early

years saw the rise of professionally educated Algerian officers who had received their education in France who were not supported by clans who had taken part in the War of Independence. As a result, by the mid-1970s, “the armed forces had developed into a separate faction that perceived itself as the supreme embodiment of the spirit of the Algerian war of independence and Algerian national identity” (Stone 1997, 54). Thus, the military as one of the surviving institutions of the Algerian War of Independence, worked to transcend the divisiveness that ensued over the course of the war and in the early years of independence. As Stone (1997) argues, “The mythologization of the war carried out by the regime’s internal propaganda machine and through the channel of the educational system assured public respect for the military” (55). The military, in essence, was writing a history of the revolution “that began in June 1966, when a decision was made to establish a measure of sovereignty by ‘nationalizing’ the teaching of history via Arabization” (Stora 2001, 173). In other words, events of the War of Independence, as well as the names of certain leaders in the war were removed from school textbooks and street signs. The political pluralism present prior to 1954 in the conflict between Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas, and the religious ulema was concealed. Instead, the dead were revered and according to Stora (2001), “The traces of the terrible ‘settling of accounts’ between Algerians (which had produced thousands of victims, particularly among the émigrés) were effaced” (174). These acts contributed to a depoliticization of Algerian society that would sow the seeds of future violence.

Third, Boumedienne implemented a number of economic reforms. These reforms occurred between 1966 and 1971 and included the nationalization of the minerals, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and oil and gas industry (Stone 1997, p. 55). Essentially, a policy of rapid industrialization was imposed which resulted in industrial development that was too rapid, resulting in low productivity, a soaring foreign debt, and colossal demographic growth.

Finally, eleven years after taking power, in April 1976, Boumedienne set out in a draft document called the National Charter the principles on which the long-promised constitution would be based. After much public debate, the constitution came into effect in November 1976 with Boumedienne elected president with 95 percent of the votes (Toth 1994, 61). According to Ruedy (1992),

There were seven chapters devoted to (1) an analysis of socialism as it applied to Algeria; (2) the party, the state, and the relations between the two; (3) the main areas and themes of socialistic development; (4) national defense; (5) foreign policy; (6) the main emphases of development policy; and (7) the principal objects of development” p. (209).

Therefore, the National Charter established Algeria as an Islamic state, with a republican political system, and socialist economy. The FLN would continue to play a role in the state through the Political Bureau and Central Committee and was tasked with drawing up bills to be put before the Popular National Assembly (APN).

However, legislative power was constrained by the power of the executive. The President of Algeria would be nominated by a full congress of the FLN and then elected by popular vote. He named the cabinet and was not responsible to the legislature beyond answering questions. If so desired, he could appoint a prime minister or vice president and dismiss them at will. He was also Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and Secretary General of the FLN.

Ultimately, “the great political restructuring of 1976, trumpeted as the vehicle for readmitting the Algerian people to the political process, served to reinforce Boumedienne’s powers in the same way the constitution of 1963 and the Algiers Charter of 1964 reinforced Ben Bella’s” (Ruedy 1992, 210). Boumedienne suddenly passed away on December 27, 1978 and set off a struggle for power within the FLN to choose a successor. The two main contenders for the

presidency were Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui and Bouteflika. Yahiaoui was Coordinator of the FLN, a position he was appointed to by Boumedienne and, thus, considered a Boumedienne loyalist. His supporters were drawn from labor, leftist youth, proponents of Arabization and sections of the army. Bouteflika, who was Boumedienne's foreign minister, had support from bureaucratic and technocratic elites as well as members of the private sector (Ruedy 1992, 232). In a compromise to break a deadlock between the two candidates, the army's delegates to the FLN congress and suggested Colonel Chadli Benjedid, a relative outsider, Commander of the Oran military district, and one of the ANP's most senior and respected officers. Chadli was sworn in on February 9, 1979 after his nomination was ratified by 95 percent of the national electorate that went to the polls (Toth 1994, 61).

### **7. Chadli Benjedid, 1978-1991**

Chadli was regarded as moderate and was not identified with any particular faction or clan. He did have wide support in the military. In June 1980, he summoned an FLN Party Congress to examine the draft of the five-year development plan of 1980-84. The First Five Year plan liberalized the economy and broke up unwieldy state corporations. According to Ruedy (1992), "By adopting the theme 'Towards a Better Life,' the planners and the congress signaled a new concern with agriculture, social infrastructure, and light industry, and a relaxation of the austerity theme of the Boumedienne years" (233). Moreover, while much was made of Chadli's declaration of support for economic liberalization, in reality, Chadli's principal objective was to decentralize the system to be more responsive to capitalism and the needs of society. Corruption had become widespread in state companies, so the 66 public corporations were broken down into 474 smaller enterprises; 19 huge state industries were divided into 120 smaller ones and spread throughout the country beyond the industrial hubs of Oran, Algiers and Constantine (Ruedy 1992, 235). Algeria limited its earnings to the production and sale of oil and gas, because its oil and gas were paid in dollars and Algerian



central planners pegged the dinar at a high rate to exert pressure on the price of imports. In short, the first Five Year plan was considered a disappointment, because Algeria's economic crisis deepened in the mid-1980s, resulting in increased unemployment, a lack of consumer goods, and shortages in cooking oil, semolina, coffee and tea (Toth 1994). Additionally, women were waiting in lines for food, young men milled around in frustration unable to find work. To add insult to injury, 1986 saw a huge drop in world oil prices. Dismantling Algeria's state controlled economy seemed to Chadli the only way to improve the economy. Social unrest continued to increase in Algiers and other cities as the economy foundered from 1985-1988. The alienation and anger of the population were fanned by the widespread perception that the government had become corrupt and aloof. As Stone (1997) notes:

The government was forced to reduce subsidies on staple foodstuffs; order inefficient co-operative farms to sell off land; drastically cut back on imports; and impose a freeze on wages. All these measures provoked widespread resentment of the government's economic policies, particularly when party and state officials, who often participated in black market activities, were allowed access to special state shops (p. 66).

Moreover, there was rising unemployment and a booming birth rate in the 1970s, which resulted in 65 percent of Algerians being under 25 (Stone, 1997, p. 66). There was increasing strain placed on Algeria's education system and infrastructure. Coupling Algeria's demographics with the state's economic problems produced protests that would come to a head in October 1988. A series of strikes and walkout, in October 1988, by students and workers in Algiers degenerated into rioting by thousands of young men, who destroyed government and FLN property. The violence then spread to Annaba, Blida, Oran and throughout the countryside, necessitating a state of emergency called by the government. More than 500 people were killed and more than 3,500 were arrested.

As Toth notes, “The stringent measures used to put down the riots of ‘Black October’ engendered a ground swell of outrage” (p. 63). The most notable opponents of Chadli’s regime participating in the Black October riots were Berber university students and Islamists. Berber university students objected to Arabization measures in government and especially in education. According to Toth, “Although Benjedid reaffirmed the government’s long-term commitment to Arabization, he upgraded Berber studies at the university level and granted media access to Berber-language programs” (p.62). These concessions provoked counter protests from Islamists. Islamists in Algeria were gaining influence due to the government’s inability to keep its promises regarding economic reforms. Muslim activists first began their protests against the Algerian government in the late 1970s. These protests included harassing women whom they felt were inappropriately dressed, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and evicting official imams from their mosques (Toth 1994, 62). By 1982, there were calls for the abrogation of the National Charter and the formation of an Islamic government as violence increased on university campuses. The arrests included the prominent leaders of the movement, Shaykh Abdelatif Sultani and Shaykh Ahmed Sahnoun, which resulted in a lessening of Islamist actions for several years. According to Toth (1994):

The State viewed them [Islamists] as a threat but also with respect. For example, the government opened in Constantine one of the largest Islamic universities in the world in 1984. That same year, acceding to Islamist demands, the government changed the family status law to deprive women of freedom to act on their own by making them wards of their families before marriage and of their husbands after marriage (p.62).

Despite these concessions to the Islamists, the protests continued as unsanctioned independent organizations of lawyers, students, journalists, and physicians sprang up to demand justice and change.

In response, Chadli dismissed senior government officials and drew up a program of political reform, which in essence, was to become a second Five-Year Plan. A new constitution, approved overwhelmingly in February 1989, “dropped the word socialist from the official description of the country; guaranteed freedoms of expression, association, and meeting; and withdrew the guarantees of women’s rights that appeared in the 1976 constitution” (Toth 1994, 63). Moreover, the FLN was not mentioned and the army was discussed only in the context of national defense, reflecting a significant downgrading of its political status. Black October “...permanently altered the role of the FLN and its relationship to the regime and finally demolished the myth of the military as the honorable guarantor of the revolution” (Stone 1997, 65-6). Most notably, Chadli’s reform of the constitution was the first step to establishing a multi-party democracy in Algeria. Chadli “was particularly anxious to repair his credibility which had been severely dented in the October 1988 riots, and intended his role as ‘father of the nation’ to be that of a powerful arbiter between its various factions” (Stone 1997, 69). The constitution allowed for the creation of “political associations”, but specifically banned those based exclusively on religion, language, region, sex and race or those advocating violence (Stone 1997, 69). In other words, these associations soon attracted a large following. In February 1989, Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj founded the *Front Islamique du Salut*, or Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). According to Frederic Volpi (2003), “Benefiting fully from the novelty effect, the lack of serious religious and political competition and the public impression that the Islamic movement had forced the regime into concessions, this very first Algerian Islamic party immediately attracted a large following.... [with] the first issue of the FIS newspaper [selling] 100,000 copies” (46).

Although the constitution prohibited outright religious parties, the FIS was able to form due to the government's choice to interpret the association clause as "allowing organizations 'inspired by Islamic values'" (Stone 1997, 69). Unlike other parties, a national congress did not run the day-to-day operations of the FIS. Instead, the party was run by a Majlis Shura consisting of approximately thirty-five members and headed by a four-man executive body called the National Executive consisting of Abassi, Belhadj, Benazouz Zebda and Hachemi Sahnouni (Willis 1997, 149). According to Michael Willis (1997), "The precise structure and organization of the FIS remained largely obscure during the first eighteen months of its political life" (p. 149). The FIS established a top-down administrative structure. Executives of the party were established at the wilaya and communal level and were the second and third tier of leadership located just under the National Executive. These three levels dealt with issues of organization, coordination, education, social affairs, planning and programming, and information (Willis, 1997, p.192). In local and provincial elections held in June 1990, the FIS handily defeated the FLN in part because most secular parties boycotted the elections. Although, Chadli also encouraged the FIS "in an effort to prevent a victory by (and thus damage his opponents within) the FLN...." (Willis, 1997, p.157). Chadli had underestimated the popular support for the FIS, but was confident that he could prevent the FIS from threatening his power base. In fact, one of the main reasons for this optimism was Chadli's belief that "the FIS would struggle to maintain its level of popular support once it took control of the majority of local authorities it had won.... [and] prove incapable of fulfilling the frequently ambitious promises it had made during the election campaign and would consequently suffer increasing popular disillusionment" (Willis 1997, 158). The FIS, however, won control over Local Councils in all three urban centers—Algiers, Oran, and Constantine—thereby providing relatively efficient social services by improving costeffectiveness (Volpi 2003, 49). Nevertheless, the FLN and Chadli, were going to do all

they could to undermine the FIS. The first attempt by the FLN occurred prior to the parliamentary elections of December 1991. The FLN's response was to adopt a new electoral law that openly aided the FLN. The FLN "thought it would be a good tactical move to redraw the constituencies' boundaries so as to favour their own candidates" (Volpi 2003, 50). The new electoral law increased the number of seats in the assembly from the current 295 to 542. This drew criticism from the smaller democratic opposition parties and the FIS, because the seats were allocated disproportionately to the south of Algeria where the FLN had preformed well in the 1990 local elections (Willis, 1997, p.172). The FIS, in turn, called a general strike, organized demonstrations, and occupied public places. Parliament, backed by Chadli, indicated that it would not reconsider its decision, because the FLN was afraid of complete rout at the polls (Volpi, 2003, p.50). Consequently, the FIS leadership "branded the new electoral law 'high treason' and Abbasi Madani, for the first time attacking the President in person, accused Chadli of betraying the agreement he had struck with the FIS in which he had promised to conduct the electoral process openly and fairly" (Willis, 1997, p.173).

There were two reasons to call for the general strike. As Willis (1997) notes:

First and foremost, Abassi [Madani] saw a general strike, or the threat of one, as one of the only means of persuading the government to abandon its attempt to electorally hobble the FIS through the election laws. He considered the other two possible options open to the party, that of acceptance of the changes and that of a boycott of the forthcoming elections as being equally damaging. The first of these alternatives would have led to defeat and humiliation for the party, whilst the second risked charges of being unwilling to play the democratic game and may even have led to the sidelining of the party politically (174-5). A second motivation behind a general strike for Abassi was the fact that the strike would allow Abassi to distance himself from the rest of the FIS leadership. In effect, providing a means to distract attention from the internal battles that were occurring within the FLN leadership.

Abbasi's opponents within the Majlis Shura frequently voiced their unhappiness with the independence of Abbasi's leadership and sought to work in closer alliance with other Islamist parties, with the hope of continuing to build on the gains already made (Willis 1997, 175-6).

In short, "[f]or many on the FIS's ruling council, the electoral law was not the crucial issue that Abbasi perceived it to be" (Willis 1997, 176).

On May 23, 1991, the Majlis Shura met to discuss "the wisdom and efficacy" of a general strike (Willis 1997, 176). Abbasi threatened to resign if he did not get his way and eventually persuaded the Majlis Shura to support the general strike by promising that the strike would last only three days (Willis 1997, 176). The strike began on May 25, 1991, however the strike elicited a weak response: "Shops and cafes stayed open, schools and universities continued giving classes, buses and trains ran on, and the wheels of industry failed to grind to a halt" (Willis 1997, 177). According to Volpi (2003), "...[B]ecause of the Islamic party's lack of support within the trade unions, the FIS 'general strike' never took off and the party cadres had quickly to organize a series of demonstrations in Algiers to show their strength to the government" (50). Tensions began to rise as marchers and demonstrators continued to protest as the strike moved into its fourth and fifth days. While the protesters initially showed restraint against the police, sporadic gunfire broke out as the FIS spread out throughout four districts in Algiers to demonstrate "its 'strike' could paralyze the capital by asking its supporters to continue occupying all the public places in central Algiers" (Volpi 2003, p.50). As violence continued to mount, the police declared that they were unable to cope with the disturbances in Algiers, thus necessitating military intervention. President Chadli approved the intervention of the ALN "to evacuate the 'striking' FIS protesters from the centre of Algiers" (ibid). As the army rolled into Algiers they were met with continued resistance by protestors and Chadli declared a "state of siege" for a period of three months on June 5, 1991, but he also asked his minister of foreign affairs, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, to form a new

government of national reconciliation. Although the FIS seemed satisfied with Ghazali's appointment and his attempts to clean up the electoral law it continued to protest, leading the army to arrest Belhadj, Madani, and hundreds of others (Willis 1997, 179). Interestingly, just prior to their arrests, Belhadj and Madani negotiated concessions from the government in return for calling off the general strike and protest campaign. Consequently, as Madani would state in a interview:

The talks which have taken place between us and the regime have resulted in the agreement on holding early presidential as well as legislative elections within these (next) six months, God willing. Mr. Ghazali has been appointed Prime Minister of a government which will supervise free, legitimate elections devoid of any suspicions of rigging. We tell all workers to go back to work tomorrow' (quoted in Willis 1997, pp. 179-80).

In short, Chadli chose to postpone the elections to allow some time for a cooling-off period. Chadli hoped the extra time would allow the chance for him to raise the appeal of the FLN vis-à-vis the FIS. Although "[t]he comprehensive nature of the regime's crackdown against the FIS which went some way beyond measures needed to end Islamist agitation on the streets and the activities of the party's militant fringes, indicated that there had been a shift in official attitudes towards the FIS" (Willis, 1997, p. 182).

One of the most important institutions of note regarding official attitudes was the ANP. The army viewed the FIS as a direct challenge to the Algerian state. As Willis notes, "Largely trained abroad in secular states such as the Soviet Union and France, most of Algeria's senior military figures were essentially hostile to the ideas of Islamism, which were seen as a threat to the foundations of the Algerian state as well as to their [the army's] own positions, should it achieve political power" (Willis, 1997, p. 183). At the time, the chief of the military, General Mustafa Chelloufi, was critical of both the FIS and of the Chadli regime's tolerance

of actions leading up to the local elections of 1990. He spoke in *El Djeich*, a journal of the ANP about “the army’s intention to ‘defend the Constitution’ against elements which ‘want to exploit democracy’, statements which were rightly taken as implicit warnings to the FIS” (Willis 1997, 183). Moreover, Willis continues, “This mutual hostility persisted even following the replacement of Chelloufi with a figure, Khaled Nezzar, who was generally perceived to be far less fundamentally hostile to Islamism” (Willis, 1997, p. 184). Similar to his predecessor, “he confirmed the army’s willingness to “... respond to any organized excesses that might jeopardize the national unity of the country... [and] would not hesitate to intervene and to re-establish order and unity so that force remains in the hands of the law” (ibid).

In October 1991, despite the ever-present threat of military intervention hanging in the air, the FIS began preparations for the December 1991 parliamentary elections. The new, provisional leader of the FIS, Abdelkader Hachani, “succeeded in imposing his views on a strict electoral strategy and legalistic line, with the backing of the FIS mayors who were elected in 1990” (Volpi 2003, 51). On December 26, 1991, the parliamentary elections garnered the FIS nearly half of the parliamentary seats in the first round—winning 188 out of 430 seats in a straight majority vote (Volpi 2003, 52). In other words, the party took nearly 44% of the total votes cast with no other party winning more than 10% of the vote, far ahead of the FLN’s fifteen seats (Willis 1997, 231). At this point, Algeria looked as if it would be the first country to elect an Islamic fundamentalist regime. According to FIS leader Mohammed Said, ““The people must be prepared to change their clothing and eating habits”” (Hermida 1992, 14). As a fundamentalist regime, the FIS wanted to impose shari’a law on Algerian society. The possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime “sent shockwaves through Algerian society”, so much so that 40% of the electorate, approximately 5 million people, did not vote (Hermida 1992, 14). Essentially, “[m]ost Algerians were disillusioned after 30 years of [the] FLN’s ....



mixture of Marxist economic doctrine and nationalism [that] had left the country in a mess, with raging inflation, few jobs, and widespread poverty” (Hermida 1992, 14). Protests became widespread from women’s groups, intellectuals, trade unions, and smaller parties. Despite the protests, Chadli firmly believed he could keep the FIS in check by relying on a provision in the Algerian constitution which states that the head of state has the right to reform the constitution. In effect, Chadli was considering a government of cohabitation (Willis 1997, 244; Hermida 1992, 14).

### **7.1. January 11, 1992 Coup:**

While Chadli was willing to consider sharing power with fundamentalists to keep the democratic experiment alive, some members of Chadli’s cabinet, fearing a complete FIS takeover, forced the president to dissolve parliament and to resign on January 11, 1992.

Leaders of the coup included Ghozali, and generals Khaled Nezzar (minister of defense) and Larbi Belkheir (minister of interior). The ANP “was carefully staged to avoid the appearance of a military takeover” (Hermida 1992, 14). However, as journalist Alfred Hermida (1992) notes, “Prime Minister Ghozali appeared on television to assure people he was in charge and not the generals. But with tanks and heavily armored troops surrounding key government buildings in the capital, Algiers, Ghozali was unconvincing” (15). After the ANP declared the elections void, the takeover leaders and Mohamed Boudiaf formed the High Security Council (HCS) to rule the country. The HCS is the body which officially issued an edict that “it would be impossible to pursue the electoral process in such circumstances and suspended the second round of parliamentary elections” (Volpi 2003, 56). On January 14, 1992, the HCS handed power over to a newly created institution called the *Haut Comite d’Etat*, or HCE. The HCE was an institution created as the provisional government until new presidential and parliamentary elections could be held and was headed by Boudiaf, the former leader during the War of Independence; He was assisted by four other members, most notably, Nezzar, the

Defense Minister (Volpi 2003, 57). Having Boudiaf as leader was done “to give the new regime a semblance of historical legitimacy. But there is little doubt that ... Nezzar is the strongman of the Council” (Hermida 1992, 15). Nevertheless, Nezzar was able to build a coalition of support in the high command of the ANP among the generals: “General ‘Abd al-Malik Guenaizia, a longtime supporter who, like Nezzar, began his career in the French army; General Muhammad Lamari, commander of ground forces and leader of the faction of the army most vehemently opposed to the Islamists; General Muhammad Touati, chief of military operations, considered the army’s leading intellectual for his analyses in *Al-Jaysh*, the official organ of the ANP; General Muhammad Mediene, director of the long-geared military internal security bureau; General ‘Abbas Gheziel, commander of the gendarmerie; and the head of the navy, Inspector-General ‘Abd al-Majid Taright” (Mortimer 1996, 22).

The generals spoke of the need to safeguard national security and public order, but their real motivation was clear: “Having snatched power from the fundamentalists, the military backed authorities went on the offensive to stamp out the movement” (Hermida 1992, 15). As Willis notes, “For many senior figures in the military, a FIS government would spell disaster, economically and politically for the Algeria they had pledged to defend” (Willis 1997, 245). In particular, the generals were worried about Algeria’s colossal debt of approximately \$25 billion in December 1991, and stood to lose money and investment from foreign oil and gas companies’ exploitation of Algeria’s oil and gas resources (Willis 1997, 245). Politically, the ANP was concerned about the possibility of both internal and external conflict. The ethnically distinct areas of Kabylia and Mزاب had decisively rejected the FIS candidates in the 1990 and 1991 elections and the military senior leadership did not want to rule out the possibility that civil war could pit Berbers v. Arabs or, even, the FIS provoking one of Algeria’s neighbors (Willis 1997, p.246). Most importantly for the military were fears of the survival and integrity

the military and the Algerian state. Both senior & junior officers were concerned with the FIS achieving a majority in the National Assembly. Therefore, Willis (1997) argues:

There was considerable concern amongst the senior figures in the army that once in power the Islamists would waste no time in seeking to use their new political powers to attempt to neutralize their traditional foes, and only truly powerful enemies, the general staff of the military. Such fears were also shared by more junior officers who also saw themselves as the potential targets of the rumoured 'popular tribunals' and who, having often had a secular and frequently foreign military training were similarly anxious for the survival of a modern and secular state (p. 246).

In short, the ANP was highly suspicious of Chadli and believed he would negotiate with the FIS to prolong his rule in some sort of cohabitation arrangement (Willis 1997, 246). Thus, Nezzar built a coalition around supporters of the military. The FIS and the FLN clamored for a return to the electoral process, but police and troops countered with massive arrests, most notably of two newspaper editors. There were clashes even within the FLN between supporters who favored an alliance with the FIS and more conservative elements who supported the HCE and the military (Volpi 2003, 58). In February 1992, violent demonstrations broke out in many cities between policemen and youths led by Imams. On February 9, 1992 the government declared a one-year state of emergency and the next month banned the FIS (Toth 1994). According to Volpi (2003), "The regime justified its change of policy by arguing that these political parties had themselves changed their stance, and that the state authorities were only responding to these developments. (Hence, the Imams' preaching became 'vindictive', necessitating prompt recession) the press became 'uncontrolled' and needed censorship, the Islamic associations were judged to be 'substituting themselves for the state' and needed to be chastised...." (61). The end of FLN rule over Algeria opened a period

of uncertain transition. Widespread discontent with the party stemmed from many roots. People were frustrated and angry because they had no voice in their own affairs, had few or no prospects for employment, and had a deteriorating standard of living. In addition, the poor and the middle class grew outraged over the privileges enjoyed by party members, and many Algerians became alienated by what they felt was unwelcome encroachment of secular, or Western, values (Toth 1994; Volpi 2003). Democracy unleashed these feelings and Islam continued to serve as an alternative to the corrupt, socialist, authoritarian regimes since independence. In June 1992, Boudiaf was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, a member of the army's Special Forces. According to Volpi (2003), "Although the exact circumstances were never fully brought to light—an isolated act by a supporter of Islamic fundamentalists infiltrating the army, a military plot to eliminate someone with too great political ambitions, and so on—in the public eye Boudiaf appeared to be the victim of the military officers' behind-the-scenes struggles" (63-4). The military elite in the HCE, first and foremost, wanted to contain the threat posed by Islamic guerrillas. This was taken seriously due to members of the army defecting to support the Islamists (Volpi 2003, 64). In response, the military began to impose laws banning the use of religion for political purposes. As part of this policy, two FIS leaders, Madani and Belhadj, were sentenced by military tribunal to twelve years in prison. Moreover, new "antiterrorist" laws were passed to give more coverage of actions of the security forces. Violence continued to increase across the country culminating in February 1993 with the HCE announcing it would extend the state of emergency for one more year "to create 'favorable conditions' for a new democratic transition" (Volpi, 2003, pp.64-5).

## **7.2. Algerian Civil War 1993-1998:**

Social and political protest reached its zenith from 1993-1998, as military repression failed to halt Islamic insurrection against political, economic, and social conditions within Algeria. This climate "hastened a reshuffle of the military leadership and of the government

in the summer of 1993” (Volpi 2003, p. 65). In addition, the dissolution of the FIS engendered a debate within the Islamist movement of how to counter the state. To better understand the conflict polarizing the nation during this time—military vs. Islamism—this section will detail the conflict between “eradicators” and “conciliators” in the ANP and between “radicals” and “moderates” inside the FIS. The outcome of these two conflicts, and ultimately the civil war, would define the relationship between the military and political elites to this day. The “eradicators” and “conciliators” were concerned with how to restore civil order in Algeria. After the death of Boudiaf, General Nezzar declined the role of president of the HCE, instead entrusting it to a civilian, ‘Ali Kafi, who along with another civilian, former diplomat Ridha Malik, were charged by Nezzar with the responsibility of rebuilding Algeria’s political system. In effect, “[t]he army... continued to make policy behind the ‘veil’ of the HCE after the death of Boudiaf” (Mortimer 1996, p. 28). On one hand, there were the officers who were aligned with General Lamari, as the leader of the “eradicators”, and not willing to share power with the Islamists, instead favoring all-out repression in dealing with political Islam (Roberts 1995, 251). In July 1993, General Lamari became Chief of Staff. On the other hand, the “conciliators” argued against repression and that a political solution based on a compromise with the Islamists was necessary (Roberts 1995, 251). This faction was led by a retired general named Liamine Zeroual, who was chosen by Nezzar to succeed him as defense minister, because his retirement in 1989 gave him a “clean” record for not being involved in decisions during the last four years (Mortimer 1996, 29). Therefore, Robert Moritmer argues, “He [Nezzar] was ... careful to maintain a balance between options within the top military leadership, thereby maintaining his own role as the ultimate arbiter” (Mortimer 1996, 29). Similar to the conflict within the military, the Islamists were of differing opinions regarding how to deal with the state. The Moderates, headed by Abbassi Madani and Abdelkader Hachani argued that “their political participation in the ruling institutions ought to be dictated

by pragmatic considerations, such as its consequences for the Islamicisation [*sic*] of society” (Volpi 2003, 67). While the Radicals, on the other hand, led by Ali Belhadj and Qamreddine Kerbane, “had pointed out that this political involvement was a means of ensuring that the state repressive apparatus could not be utilized against the Islamic movement” (Volpi 2003, 67). Essentially, the Radicals led by Kerbane and Mohammed Said (after the arrest of Madani and Belhadj) argued that the state would continue to repress them and this justified the development of military capabilities by the FIS. The Moderates “retorted that these tactics were counterproductive and that, besides handing over the moral high ground to the regime, they would endanger the very institutions that the party wanted to utilize for the propagation of Islamic reform” (Volpi 2003, 67). Nevertheless, repression destroyed the organizational capabilities of the FIS by severing links between the party leadership and the base.

Consequently, the Islamist movement was left without a party and to fill the void more radical Islamic fundamentalist groups emerged to recruit disgruntled FIS members and sympathizers who had been repressed by police and military brutality (Volpi 2003, 67-8). Examples of these radical fundamentalist groups include *Mouvement Islamique Armé*, or Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) and the *Groupe Islamique Armé*, or Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The MIA was led by Abdelkader Cheboui and established after the banishment of the FIS. In fact it is a revival of a group led by Mustapha Bouyali between 1982 and 1987, (Roberts 1994, 24). Its members consist of former Bouyalists and FIS militants who felt guerrilla activity was the only viable alternative to challenge the state after the dissolution of the FIS. Although, as political scientist Hugh Roberts (1994) contends, “It is not clear that the MIA has ever seriously envisaged a revolutionary seizure of power. It has never attempted to mobilize popular support on a large scale, or to provoke collapse of the state by targeting senior power holders” (24). Instead, MIA strategy is one of applying pressure to “make the regime regret its decision to ban the FIS, and to induce the government to readmit the

substance of radical Islamism to the political process” (Roberts 1994, 24). The divergence in views of the MIA and GIA caused a number of defections of MIA members to the GIA. This convinced the FLN to establish its own militia to give “an explicit political content to its violence, giving it the aim of the re-legalization of the FIS” (Martinez 2000, 201). The *Armée Islamique du Salut*, or Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) was established to counter the GIA and with its guerrilla tactics pushed for the relegalization of the FIS (Roberts 1995, 254). The GIA developed to present an alternative by “subsum[ing] various elements which were never part of the FIS and always opposed the FIS’s constitutionalist strategy, including the ‘Afghans’—Algerian veterans of the Afghanistan war—and ...appear to be more or less autonomous but share a refusal to negotiate with the state and a penchant for ferocious and savage attacks” (Roberts 1994, 25). The GIA distinguished itself through a series of attacks against civil servants and members of the government to show that the state could not protect its own, let alone, the population. Attacks intensified, as politicians, journalists and intellectuals supportive of the regime were targeted (Volpi 2003, 69). Like the MIA before it, the GIA “relied principally upon newly “Islamicised’ urban youths with little supervision from established Islamic fundamentalist leaders” (Volpi 2003, 69). This support occurred due to urban youths’ acting out to the suffering received at the hands of the military, either through police brutality or indirectly through economic consequences (Volpi, 2003; Martinez, 2000). Throughout 1993, the HCE’s task was to engineer its “demise”; namely, returning the state toward some semblance of an electoral process. According to Mortimer (1996), “[T]he key question was whether or not the FIS should be associated in these talks on Algeria’s future political institutions” (30). For the HCE, political parties had to renounce the use of violence, but the FLN contended that requiring the renunciation of violence necessitated the recognition of Islamist parties. In mid 1993, the HCE issued a document entitled “A Platform for Democracy” calling for a national conference. Participation in the conference would

hopefully lead to a solution that would work for Islamists, the FLN, and the legal parties or “peaceful opposition” to the regime. As Mortimer (1996) notes, “Most of the legal parties insisted on the inclusion of the FIS in any such conference, arguing that this was the only course that could restore security. Certain parties, like the RCD and Ittahadi, opposed any such gesture of inclusion, as did a segment of the press and the most militantly anti-Islamist associations” (p. 31).

During this period, marred with increasing violence, one saw precarious conditions within the ALN. Nezzar, who had recently become quite ill, engendered a debate between the eradicators and conciliators regarding his succession. The nomination of an eradicationist prime minister, Ridha Malik, and the return of defense minister Zeroual would ensure a continued struggle over how to deal with the Islamists. In fact, efforts to negotiate with the FIS occurred behind the scenes, with the FIS demanding the release of their leaders for the party to agree to participate in the national conference. According to Mortimer (1996), “...Defense Minister Zeroual, at this point, took the further initiative of a secret meeting with the imprisoned politicians in order to see whether they would accept two conditions set by the army for their release: the renunciation of violence, and a declaration of respect for a secular form of government with alternation of power” (p. 32). Both Madani and Bel Hadj demanded their unconditional release, but the army was not willing to accede to their demands.

Therefore, in 1994, the HCE came to an end as the national conference was convened in January. Unfortunately, for the military, “as the non-Islamist opposition had consistently argued that such a conference would be pointless without the participation of the Islamists, not a single political party agreed to attend” (Mortimer 1996, p.32). Instead, the military established an institution called the High Security Council (HSC), which appointed Zeroual as Algeria’s new president. On balance, the relationship between the conciliators and eradicators shifted toward the conciliators with the accession of Zeroual.



In what became known as the “Zeroual Initiative”, President Zeroual attempted once again to reach out to the FIS to forestall a continuing rise in violence. Two of FIS leader Madani’s associates were released by Zeroual with the hope that they would take steps to reduce the violence as a good faith effort to work with the regime. With the continued violence engulfing the nation, Zeroual “had little room for maneuver in his own camp because the intensity of the hostilities served the arguments of the hardliners” (Mortimer, 1996, p.33). Essentially, the army, Islamists, and democrats constrained their own actions resulting in a continuing cycle of violence: The army insisted that the first concession come from the opposing camp. On the Islamist side, the political leaders of the FIS could ill afford to give an order that the armed insurgents would ignore; the defection of a major FIS personality, Muhammad Sa’id, to the GIA illustrated this difficulty....In the third camp, even the advocates of negotiation among the non-Islamist opposition were wary of a military-Islamist deal that would exclude them and snuff out the democratic opening as well (Mortimer, 1996, p.34). Zeroual reached out for a second time to the FIS. However, the GIA responded by issuing a statement refusing ““any reconciliation, any truce, and any dialogue with the illegal government”; at the same time, various anti-Islamist groups criticized the government for a ‘unilateral concession’” (ibid). As Mortimer notes, “In the place of the hoped-for truce, Zeroual found himself confronted by an unprecedented escalation of terrorism: car bombs, another wave of assassinations, and attacks on schools and factories” (ibid). Consequently, the level of violence constricted the chance for a settlement between the regime and the FIS, because neither side was willing to find common ground to begin negotiations often resulting in the extremists “outflank[ing] those who might have been tentatively disposed to negotiation” (ibid, p.35).

The continued violence and the regime and FIS’ intransigence occasioned opposition parties to meet in Rome, Italy at the behest of the Sant’Egidio community of Catholic laymen to attempt to reach an agreement on a platform of reconciliation. The Sant’Egidio Platform

was designed to serve as the basis for negotiation with the regime and the way forward to return to multi-party elections and included six principles: 1) Respect for human rights, support for contested elections, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the constitution of 1989; 2) Rejection of violence as a way of gaining or maintaining power; opposition to dictatorship of any kind; and the return of the army to the barracks; 3) Recognition that the Algerian personality is made up of Arabism, Islam, and ‘amazighite’ (Berber cultural identity) and that both Arabic and Berber are national languages that should be promoted; 4) Before negotiations begin, the FIS leaders should be released and all political parties should resume their activities; 5) Press freedom should be restored; torture should cease, along with extrajudicial killings; and all political prisoners should be released; 6) Attacks on civilians and foreigners should be condemned (Quandt, 1998, pp. 70-1). Zeroual and his regime rejected the platform stating that “it had been worked out under foreign auspices and therefore was unacceptable from the outset” (Quandt 1998, p71). Interestingly, many of the points in the platform “actually mirrored the regime’s own language—the support for elections, for ‘alternance,’ or the change of government by elections, condemnation of violence, respect for the constitution, and so forth” (ibid).

Despite renouncing the Sant’Egidio Platform, Zeroual still wanted to maintain political momentum generated from the talks. Therefore, he declared that presidential elections would be held in December 1995. As Volpi notes, “Zeroual’s attempt at circumventing the FIS by appealing directly to the people was implicitly aimed at drawing a line under the legitimacy crisis that had beset the regime since 1992” (Volpi 2003, p.73). Zeroual received support from the moderate Islamic party led by Mahfoud Nannah, Hamas, and the secular, democratic and Berberist party led by Said Sadi, the RCD. However, the FIS, the FFS, GIA and FLN boycotted the elections. Nevertheless, state-sponsored television officially declared Zeroual President-elect with more than 60 percent of the vote and a turnout of 75 percent (Volpi 2003,

74-5). This blatantly fraudulent election result highlighted the opposition's claim that "the participation rate and Zeroual's share of the votes had been artificially increased to show massive popular involvement and to have the president endorsed by more than half of the electorate" (Volpi, 2003, p.75). Although President Zeroual was able to gain support of Hamas and the RCD, their partnership soon became viewed as "...the same authoritarian, nepotistic, and kleptocratic tendencies as their predecessors" (Volpi 2003, 76). With his regime's popularity waning, Zeroual, as is the norm in authoritarian regimes, reformed the political institutions through a rewriting of the constitution. The draft constitution was a document written after consultation granting large discretionary power to the President. More specifically, he would have emergency powers to name and replace the head of government. Also, there would be presidential term limits of two, five year terms, parliament would be selected using proportional representation instead of previous winner-take-all majority system, and the Constitutional Council would rule on constitutionality of laws (Quandt 1998, 74). Moreover, the constitution gave the president the power to nominate one-third of the Senate and any law voted on by the parliament had to be ratified by three-quarters of the senators to become law (Volpi 2003, 76). Thus, the president's nominees always had a de facto veto over any law passed by parliament. In November 1996, the constitution was put before the people in a referendum and passed with 80% of the vote in favor. According to Quandt,

Supposedly more people voted in the referendum than in the presidential election of the previous year—some 80 percent—and of those about 80 percent voted in favor of the of the new constitution. Suffice it to say that few Algerian commentators believed the figures" (1998, 74).

In addition to rewriting the constitution, parliamentary elections were held in 1997. The Zeroual regime was counting on these elections to provide legitimacy and did not want a

repeat of 1991-2. Consequently, “[o]ne step toward assuring an outcome acceptable to the regime was the banning of the FIS and obliging Hamas and Nahda to drop the word ‘Islam’ from their names” (Quandt, 1998, p.76). The regime also backed its own party the *Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie*, or National Rally for Democracy, which was established only three months before the parliamentary elections to counter the influence of the FLN and FFS. As Volpi notes, “The RND was an ill-assorted assemblage of former civil servants and FLN cadres close to the President that was to provide Zeroual with reliable partners in Parliament” (Volpi, 2003, pp.76-7).

The results of the election saw the MSP (formerly Hamas) come in second with 69 seats and the FLN came in third with 62 seats (Quandt 1998, 77). The RND, MSP, and FLN formed a coalition, but protests erupted and were repressed by security forces. The blatant rigging of the election and the protests “undermined rather than consolidated the position of the regime . . . . These rigging tactics showed crudely that electoral contests were primarily designed to provide the ruling elite with a façade of political legitimacy and not to elect representative political institutions” (Volpi, 2003, p.77). After the June 1997 elections, the opposition parties continued to protest the election results. As a result of pressure from his peers (officers within the ANP), Volpi (2003) argues, “Zeroual followed the example of Chadli and in September 1998 announced that he was stepping down from the Presidency and called for an early presidential election in 1999” (pp.78-9).

### **7.3. Bouteflika 1999-2014:**

The 1999 presidential election was a hotly contested election with eleven candidates: Bouteflika, Taleb Ibrahim, Ait Ahmed, Hamrouche, Djaballah, Sifi, Khatib, Ghozali, Boukrouh, Hanoune and Nannah. Of the eleven candidates, Bouteflika was the unofficial candidate of the regime (Volpi 2003, 79). Ghozali, Boukrouh and Hanoune were disqualified for not receiving enough endorsements from elected representatives, while Nannah failed to

provide a certificate from the National Association of Mujahidin certifying his participation in the War of Independence (Volpi, 2003, p.79).

As would be uncovered later, Nannah's inability to meet this constitutional requirement for the Presidency was "...engineered by the regime to prevent the moderate Islamic leader from joining forces with the rest of the opposition after the election" (ibid). Subsequently, Bouteflika would receive the support of two-pro regime parties, the FLN and RND. His main challenger was Ibrahimi, who was a well-known pro-Islamic candidate from a religious family; his father was the president of the Islamic reform movement prior to Algerian independence. Ibrahimi's campaign platform of "national reconciliation" and inclusion of the "ex"-FIS in the political process received support from the executive committee of the FIS abroad; however, on election day, after convening a joint meeting, all the presidential candidates withdrew their names from the ballot (Volpi 2003, 80). Consequently, protests erupted in the Kabylia region and in Algiers and Oran in support of the opposition candidates and the fraudulent election result of Bouteflika winning 70 percent of the vote with independent media reporting a turn-out of 20 percent and the regime reporting a 60 percent turnout (Volpi 2003, 80).

Bouteflika, with support of the military, worked behind the scenes to build a coalition with the RND, FLN and Islamic parties. However, despite their opposition to Bouteflika, the opposition had very little in common with each other and this led to an inability of projecting a unified front vis-à-vis the military.

During this period prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections, the "eradicator" faction under Lamari began to dominate the debate. One result of this outcome was that between a two year period, 1995-1997, changes were occurring within the military hierarchy, especially within middle-ranking officers. In addition, regional commanders were being replaced by younger officers who had only been in command of army units since the

beginning of the civil war. Accordingly, Volpi (2003) notes, “These newcomers had fewer connections with the clans of the war of independence and owed much of their authority to the senior officers nominating them” (p. 85). Moreover, the political, economic, and military autonomy of the clans in each military region was diminished as regional commands were left to languish in favor of more elite forces, particularly the anti-terrorist *gendarmerie*. These elite forces were better trained and better paid than the regular army of conscripts and were equipped with modern military weaponry (Volpi, 2003, p. 85). The distribution of military hardware was used to strengthen certain units and officers as part of specific patronage networks (86). In the ANP, “the chain of command was organized in such a way that local commanders needed a direct authorization from the regional commander or the High Command before ordering any movement of troops” (Volpi 2003, 86). Interestingly, in 1998, Lamari’s control of the political process came into sharp relief.

Following Zeroual’s announcement calling for new presidential elections, Lamari

vaunted the merits of the new ‘Algerian democracy’ in a speech intended for the armed forces. After applauding the choices of the President...[h]e concluded with a warning that ‘accession to power and alternation of power by means of elections must be, from now on, irreversible practices and the foundations on which rest democracy, the state of law and social justice’ (Volpi 2003, 86-7).

In short, Lamari was paying lip service to democracy while simultaneously justifying a role for the military in Algerian politics, specifically the control of the state’s political institutions.

As Volpi (2003) argues:

When he [Lamari] indicated that the military would certainly not contest the winner of an electoral process, he implied that the successful candidate would have to reach an agreement with the military before the elections.

Furthermore, when he pointed out that this 'electoral' system would be the only mode of accession to power, he also warned the population and the political opposition that any popular protest, boycott or political agreement against this 'official' process of legitimization would not be tolerated by the military (p. 87).

An example occurred after the 1999 presidential election. To buttress the Bouteflika presidency, the High Command backed an agreement between the FIS-AIS and the government as they did after the 1997 elections (Volpi 2003, 81). The military commander of the AIS, Mezrag wrote a communiqué to Bouteflika stating that he was willing to formalize a truce that was first declared in 1997. Bouteflika responded by "giving a legal framework to this initiative" and two days later, Mezrag answered signaling the intention of the AIS to renounce all military action and place the organization under state control (Volpi 2003, 81). Although a deal with the AIS was worked out, the agreement was not recognized by Hachani, Belhadj Ibrahimi, and Ait Ahmed, who were "concerned by the fact that this agreement did not address the issue of the relegalization of the Islamic party, the problem of the 'disappeared' and the ending of the state of emergency (in place since 1992)" (Volpi 2003, 82). Subsequently, Bouteflika decided to release Madani and Belhadj with the condition that they retire from public life and held a referendum called the "law on civil concord" on his agreement with the guerrillas and on the associated general amnesty (Volpi 2003, 82). Thus, with an approval of 98.6 percent and a turnout of 85 percent, the civil war had "ended". The stark reality, however, showed, according to Volpi (2003), "...[T]hese short-term solutions to the problem of political violence strengthened the hold of the military establishment on the political system and marginalized the role of the electoral process in selecting the country's leadership" (p.82). President Bouteflika's agenda focused initially on restoring security and stability to the country. Following his inauguration, he proposed an official amnesty for those

who fought against the government during the 1990s with the exception of those who had engaged in "blood crimes," such as rape or murder. This "Civil Concord" policy was widely approved in a nationwide referendum in September 2000. Government officials estimate that 80% of those fighting the regime during the 1990s have accepted the civil concord offer and have attempted to reintegrate into Algerian society. Bouteflika also launched national commissions to study education and judicial reform, as well as restructuring of the state bureaucracy.

In 2001, Berber activists in the Kabylie region of the country, reacting to the death of a youth in gendarme custody, unleashed a resistance campaign against what they saw as government repression. Strikes and demonstrations in the Kabylie region were commonplace as a result, and some spread to the capital. Chief among Berber demands was recognition of Tamazight (a general term for Berber languages) as an official language, official recognition and financial compensation for the deaths of Kabyles killed in demonstrations, an economic development plan for the area and greater control over their own regional affairs. In October 2001, the Tamazight language was recognized as a national language, but the issue remains contentious as Tamazight has not been elevated to an official language.

The April 8, 2004, presidential election was the first election since independence in which several candidates competed. Besides incumbent President Bouteflika, five other candidates, including one woman, competed in the election. Opposition candidates complained of some discrepancies in the voting list; irregularities on polling day, particularly in Kabylie; and of unfair media coverage during the campaign as Bouteflika, by virtue of his office, appeared on state-owned television daily. Bouteflika was re-elected in the first round of the election with 84.99% of the vote. Just over 58% of those Algerians eligible to vote participated in the election. President Bouteflika implemented the Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation on March 1, 2006, as one way to bring closure. Thus far, it has successfully gained the



surrender of a number of moderate Islamists but, paradoxically, has emboldened the more hard-core elements, in particular the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which merged with al-Qaida in September 2006, and changed its name in January 2007 to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected to a third term on April 9, 2009. Election observers from the Arab League, African Union, and Organization of the Islamic Conference stated in a press conference that the 09 April 2009 election was fair and transparent. Interior Minister Nouredine Yazid Zerhouni announced in a press conference on April 10 that a record 74.54 percent of over 20 million eligible voters participated in the election, with Bouteflika receiving 90.24 percent of the votes. Opposition parties and defeated candidates have placed actual turnout figures at between 18 and 55 percent, while informal US Embassy observations indicated that the vast majority of polling stations were empty across the capital, with actual turnout at 25-30 percent at most. As many observers here predicted before the election, the official turnout figure has stirred more controversy than the election result itself. Two hours after the polls closed on election day, Zerhouni put turnout at 74.11 percent, revising the number slightly upward the next day. State-run television (ENTV) and the pages of the regime newspaper El Moudjahid ran images depicting crowds of voters queuing outside Algiers polling stations. But anecdotal reports of voter activity suggested Zerhouni's figure to be greatly exaggerated. The crowds of voters on state media appeared dressed for cold weather, while April 9 was generally warm and sunny, suggesting that officials used archive footage from previous elections. The opposition Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) charged that at several polling stations, the Interior Ministry bussed in loyal voters such as plainclothes police to create an optic that matched the desired turnout result.

Some international experts commented that observers monitored only election-day procedures and were not on the ground to evaluate preelection activities. Others noted that the complexity

of some election procedures created room for fraud and government influence. Two opposition parties, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), boycotted the election, arguing that restrictions on freedom of association disadvantaged potential challengers and made the outcome of the election a foregone conclusion.

In fact, Bouteflika has managed to stay in office now for 13 years (if we count from 2014 elections which he will win and stay in authority up till the moment of writing this thesis i.e. 2017). He continued to receive support from the FLN and the institutional Islamist party MSP-Hamas, What explains this longevity? His longevity can be explained by the support of the military (discussed above), international support, specifically in the form of economic assistance, and a continued presence of Islamist terrorism. After the 1992 coup, Volpi (2003) notes, "...[T]o secure the cash incomes of the state (and of the army) became a top priority of the new military rulers of the country. The financial situation of the Algerian state had never been very bright from the mid-1980s onwards..." (p. 110). If one recalls the earlier discussion of the socialist period of the 1970s, Algeria attempted to break away state-sponsored socialism by re-investing oil profits to ensure autonomous economic development after the rise in oil prices following the 1991 Gulf War (Schmid, 2009). However, by the end of 1992, the Algerian economy "was beginning to feel the strain of the idiosyncratic 'socialist' policies, as well as the costs of the civil conflict" (Volpi, 2003, p. 112). To cope with its increasingly dire financial situation Algeria renegotiated with the IMF an "extended-facilities" loan guaranteeing \$1.8 billion a year over a three-year period. In addition, Algeria was able to access \$15 billion in debt re-schedulings and loans from foreign governments, banks, and international financial organizations (Volpi 2003, p.113). In response, Algeria was required to reduce their budget deficit, reduce inflation, cease subsidizing retail goods, and open their market to foreign investment and private enterprise. Unfortunately, in 1995, the

Algerian government spent DA 148 billion to pay off the debts of state-owned enterprises before privatization, resulting in a budget deficit of DA 168 billion (Volpi 2003, pp. 113-4). Moreover, Volpi (2003) argues,

For political and geostrategic reasons the United States and the Europeans prefer to keep afloat the dubious system of governance devised by Algeria's military rulers through a system of direct and indirect (IMF and Paris Club) aid rather than pressuring for genuine and thorough political and economic reforms (p.116).

One area where the Bouteflika regime has benefited is from the rise of oil and natural gas prices between 1999-2009. As journalist Bernard Schmid notes, "Bouteflika has . . . benefited hugely from the price of oil. A barrel of crude cost less than US \$10 on the world market when he first took office; at the height of its price-inflation, a year and a half ago, it rose to US \$175; it has since returned to around US \$40" (Schmid, 2009). This rise in oil prices has filled the state coffers to the point that its currency reserves are said to be worth around US \$140 billion. Consequently, Algeria's debt has been paid off (Schmid, 2009). Although, as Volpi (2003) notes, "Today more than ever, the fluctuations in the price of oil and gas commodities on the world market and the changing priorities of the international community constitute an endemic cause of instability for the country" (p.115). Thus, the endurance of authoritarianism in Algeria is partly based off the oil prices siphoned off by the regime. The siphoning off of profits by the Bouteflika regime only served to reinforce the population's distrust of government. As a result, popular discontent "fuels the ambition of the Islamic fundamentalists to reform (or topple) the secularist ruling elite and indirectly contributes to the overall instability of the country" (Volpi, 2003, p.116).

## **Conclusion**

A state forged in the throes of violence has continued to come to grips with its identity as it has tried to transition from authoritarianism to “democracy”. In fact, Algeria detailed a strongly egalitarian, nationalist people who, after achieving independence, were swept up in clan politics that grew to define its political system. The ALN, FLN and FIS each became subsumed in the inter-clan rivalry and it was these relationships that influenced the course of Algerian politics—from the rivalries within the FLN during the war of independence to the conflicts within the ANP since 1965. Intervention occurred during periods of intense conflict within the military between members of the Military High Command and the generals who would lead the country at various times through its history—Boumedienne, Chadli, Nezzar, Zeroual, and Lamari—as well as during periods of intense conflict with Algerian political elites (Ben Bella and Boudiaf) and Islamists (GIA, MIA, FIS, and presently AQMI). Military withdrawals in Algeria, however, have been few and far between. After the 1965 coup, Boumedienne ruled until his death in 1978, whereby the ANP High Command put forward Chadli as a compromise candidate for the presidency. With their man in office, the military withdrew until events, such as Black October, forced Chadli to call for the military’s assistance. At this point, the combination of violence, a deteriorating economy, and the emergence of the Islamists forced the ANP back onto the political stage in 1992 after the FIS won the second round of parliamentary elections. Thus, the “democratic experiment” ended and the ANP retained control of government as Algeria comes to grip with how to wrestle with contending forces in Algerian society—nationalist, regional, Islamist, democratic and military (Quandt 1998, p. 162). With the 13 years of Bouteflika in office, there is a general feeling in Algeria that real political change will only take place once Bouteflika leaves office, either through incapacitation or death. His departure would end an era of legitimacy based on leaders of the Algerian war of independence and the transition to a new generation whose

legitimacy is a vision for the future. With approximately 70 percent of the population under 30, a high unemployment rate in excess of 20 percent and without real reform to open the political space, Algeria could witness the sort of popular uprisings that took place in the neighborhood.


**Chapter Four: The Dimensions of  
Democracy, Democratisation and the  
Cultural Prerequisite in the Algerian  
Experience**

## **Introduction:**

As how we set the dimensions of democracy in the first chapter by concocting a definition for the sake of our thesis that assumes democracy as a system of rule which undertakes the representation of the interests and views of people through the free and fair elections of representatives who belong to multiple political parties within applying the rule of law equally to all citizens and guaranteeing the human rights of all citizens who need to actively participate in political and civic life. And how we fixed the cultural prerequisites of democracy in chapter three, we are going to single out the democratic dimensions in light of the Algerian experience by going through any attempt to democratise the country through its constitutions, along with portraying how free and fair election are, how the rule of law and human rights are granted by taking statistics from various major democracy indices; V-Dem, Polity IV and Freedom House, Rule of law Index and the Liberal component index.

### **1. Constitutional Attempts:**

Figure 1 illustrates the electoral democracy score of Algeria on V-Dem in comparison with two major democracy indices, Polity IV and Freedom House.<sup>2</sup> These three indices capture the general trends in Algeria similarly, yet there are differences among them. Since Freedom House starts from 1972, its scores for the colonial period and first ten years after the Algerian independence are not displayed. Also, Polity IV does not score colonies; hence there is no polity score available for Algeria before 1962. On the other hand, V-Dem covers regime trends of Algeria even under French colonial rule and this graph shows the Algerian regime score going back to 1900. For this time period, the correlation of V-Dem electoral democracy index with Polity IV is 0.75 and with Freedom House is 0.62, while the correlation between Polity IV and Freedom House is only 0.54.



**Figure 1 . Algerian political regime on V-Dem, Polity IV and Freedom House**

In each of three indices, there is a peak in 1988-1992 that corresponds with the constitutional reform and elections in Algeria. Later, in all indices, there is decline in democracy score by the 1992 coup d'état. While Freedom House defines this decline as a radical one, for the other two indices it was a more modest decline. All of three indices indicate a restoration in democracy scores of Algeria in the mid-1990s, when the army allowed regular civilian politics. Unlike V-Dem and Freedom House, Polity IV records a significant progress in Algerian political regime in 2004 that corresponds to the presidential elections of that year. As a result, Polity IV describes Algerian political system much closer to democracy today in comparison to V-Dem and Freedom House. In the following element, we will explain these changes by studying the Algerian constitutions.



### **1. 1. 1963 Constitution:**

Since independence in 1962, Algeria has had three constitutions. The first was authorized in August 1963 by a constitutional referendum, only after prior revisions and ratifications by the FLN. Intended as a means of legitimizing Ben Bella's new regime, the constitution also established Algeria as a republic committed to socialism and to the preservation of Algeria's Arab and Islamic culture. The constitution lasted only two years, however, and was suspended upon Colonel Boumediene's military coup in June 1965. For the next ten years, Algeria was ruled without a constitution, although representative local and provincial institutions were created in the late 1960s in Boumediene's attempt to decentralize political authority.

### **1.2. 1976 Constitution**

In 1976 the National Charter and a new constitution were drafted, debated, and eventually passed by national referenda. Together, these documents shaped the national constitution and led to the Second Algerian Republic. The new constitution reiterated the commitment to socialism and the revolutionary tradition of the nation, and founded new government institutions, including the APN. The 1986 revisions persisted on the conservative nature of the preceding constitutions but lifted the role of the private sector and reduced the socialist commitment.

Under the 1976 Constitution (as reformed in 1979 and amended in 1988, 1989, 1996, and 2008), Algeria is a multi-party state. The Ministry of the Interior must approve all political parties. According to the Constitution, no political association may be formed "based on differences in religion, language, race, gender or region." Algeria has universal suffrage at the age of 18.

The head of state and of government is the president of the republic. The president, elected to a five-year term, is the head of the Council of Ministers and of the High Security Council. He

assigns the prime minister along with one-third of the upper house of parliament which is referred to as the Council of the Nation.

### **1. 3. 1989 Constitution**

The revised constitution of February 1989 altered the configuration of the state and allowed political parties to compete, opening the way for liberal democracy. The new constitution got rid of the commitment to socialism expressed in both the National Charter and the constitution of 1976 and its 1986 amendment. The references to the unique and historic character of the FLN and the military's role as "guardian of the revolution" were eliminated. The provisions for a unicameral legislature remained.

In what was thought an extensive mandate of support for the liberalization efforts of Benjedid, a referendum on the 1989 constitution passed February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1989, with a 75% approval and a 78% participation rate. The changes held in the constitution were not entirely accepted, however. After the ratification of the new constitution, several prominent senior military officers resigned from the FLN Central Committee in order to protest the revisions within a month. The most divisive matters included the separation of the religious institution and the state; the abandonment of the commitment to socialism; and the liberalization of political life, allowing independent political parties.

### **1. 4. 1996 Constitution**

The constitution of 1996 created a system divided between a strong President, a Prime Minister and Cabinet, a bicameral Parliament, and a judicial system headed by a Supreme Court and Constitutional Council.

### **1.5. 2016 Constitution**

Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal said 09 March 2016 that the Constitution amended and adopted on February 7, by Parliament, paved the way for institutional and democratic renewal in Algeria. The Constitution establishes definitively and irreversibly the republican nature of

the Algerian State, separation of powers, democratic principles and consolidates unity and national identity.

For a candid transition to a new political order, it is essential that checks and balances exists - not only in the constitution, but also in actions-between the powers of the executive branch and those of the legislature. Besides, the extreme concentration of power in the hands of the state at the expense of municipal and county (wilaya) governments should be replaced by a true decentralization and devolution of power. This would indeed help find local solutions to the many problems faced by people in several town, cities and wilayates of the country. Moreover, the judiciary, which is now subservient to the executive branch, requires an indispensable independence.

President Bouteflika had vowed that the amendments would offer more democracy in the country, after he was re-elected President for a fourth term in 2014. In June 2014 the Presidency held consultation on the constitutional reforms with 52 political parties, a number of civil society organizations and associations, as well as professors and the head of the Upper House of Parliament.

Consultations on the constitution's future content, which required an update after being last amended in 2008, began in mid-2014 and ended two months later (June-August). It was approved in late December 2015 by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The Algerian government introduced the draft constitutional reforms on January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2016, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika having sanctioned them a week earlier.

On 07 February 2016, the Algerian parliament assumed a reformed constitution submitted by a waning Bouteflika administration excited to organise the circumstances of the upcoming power transition. The new constitution limits the number of successive Presidential terms to two.

The reforms introduce important modifications and provide significant novelties both societal and political. In the societal sphere, the Amazigh language spoken by the 13 million indigenous Berber population will be recognised as official alongside Arabic, Other changes address the access of young people and women to the job market.

Freedom of written and audiovisual press is guaranteed. Any form of prior censorship does not restrict it. Aimed at ending the country's long suffering from corruption, it was decided to "create a national body for prevention and fighting against corruption — an independent administrative authority under the president of the republic."

## **2. Executive Branch Attempts:**

The 1989 constitution established a "state of law," accentuating the role of the executive and, specifically, the president, at the expense of the FLN. The president, possessing the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister at will, and preserving singular authority over military affairs, arose as the prevailing force. The FLN became but one of several political parties. The responsibilities of the army were restricted to defense and external security. Furthermore, the army was forced to become less perceptible for of its role in suppressing the October 1988 uprisings.

The 2016 constitution annulled the 2008 change of the constitution that allowed the lifting of presidential limits, the president is re-elected for one five-year term only once.

Under the draft reforms, a President had to have a Parliamentary majority to appoint a Prime Ministers. The 2016 amendments required the president to nominate a prime minister from the largest party in parliament and established the existence of an electoral commission which is expected to be independent.

## **3. Legislative Attempts:**

The pre-1989 electoral system permitted for various candidates that drawn from an FLN list for local and national elections. Districts were distributed based on a proportional

representation system. The legalization of competitive political parties in 1989 faced the FLN with candidates chosen from other party lists. To reserve the FLN's political domination, the National People's Assembly, in which the FLN dominated, made modifications to the electoral districts. These redistributions involved heavy overrepresentation of the rural and less populated regions, traditional strongholds of the FLN, and drew heavy criticism from all political parties.

In the new system of proportional representation, all seats in the local and national assemblies are granted to the party winning a majority of the popular vote. In the absence of a total majority, the party with a plurality of votes obtains 51 % of the seats and the rest of the seats are proportionally allocated among all other parties receiving at least 7 % of the total popular vote. This new electoral system actually served to undermine the FLN when the FIS emerged as the most popular party in the June 1990 local elections and again in the first round of national elections in December 1991. In May 1991 and again in October 1991, the National People's Assembly approved new electoral codes adding extra seats, so that the total number of seats came to 430, up from 261 in 1976.

The Algerian parliament is bicameral, consisting of a lower chamber, the National People's Assembly (APN), with 389 members and an upper chamber, the Council of the Nation, with 144 members. The APN is elected every five years. Legislative elections for the APN were held in May 2007. Two-thirds of the Council of the Nation is voted by regional and municipal authorities; the remaining third is appointed by the president. The Council of the Nation has a six-year term with one-half of the seats up for election or reappointment every three years.

Either the president or one of the parliamentary chambers may introduce legislation.

Legislation must be carried before both chambers before it becomes law, but this cannot happen without the backup of the presidency. If the APN vetoes legislation must technically be dissolved. Sessions of the APN are televised.

According to the constitution, the Algerian parliament has many prerogatives that could permit it to debate a long list of concerns, make laws and oppose the government whenever necessary by voting down executive bills or by way of a no-confidence vote against the prime minister. However, presidential powers are so extensive that the president can by-pass parliament and enact the policies he wishes. If parliament were to truly exercise its constitutional powers, it may be able to check those of the executive branch, but it has not done so since parliamentary life returned in 1997. The pro-government coalition (FLN-RND-MSP), which tremendously dominates parliament, typically supports governmental initiatives particularly as every side finds an interest in this organization. Also, in the name of restoring political stability and foiling the ambitions of radical Islamists and radical Berberists, dissent is strongly discouraged.

The 2016 reform enlarged parliament's powers and set up an independent body to supervise elections, headed by a non-aligned public figure. But the opposition is unconvinced. The reforms may be meant too at helping a stable transition.

#### **4. Political Parties:**

The legalization of political parties, further enunciated in the Law Relative to Political Associations of July 1989, was one of the major achievements of the revised constitution. More than thirty political parties emerged as a result of these reforms by the time of the first multiparty local and regional elections in June 1990; nearly sixty existed by the time of the first national multiparty elections in December 1991. Granting the right to form "associations of a political character," the constitution recognized the existence of opposition parties. Earlier, such parties were precluded because the FLN had a national mandate as a front, eliminating the political necessity of competitive political parties. Other political associations had also been limited because trade unions and other civil associations fell under FLN direction and had little autonomy. The new constitution recognized all political associations

and mandated only a commitment to national unity and sovereignty. The July law further clarified the guidelines for the establishment and participation of political parties.

The law prohibited associations formed exclusively on regional, ethnic, or religious grounds. Ironically, however, the two parties that profited most in the 1990 and 1991 elections were the FIS and the FFS from the Kabylie region. That these parties were among the first legalized in 1989 has given credence to those who maintain that Benjedid's liberalization was based more on tactical personal considerations than genuine democratic ambitions. They argue that these parties had the means and appeal to challenge the monopoly of the FLN. The FLN became the main antagonist to the liberalization program of Benjedid and his then prime minister, Hamrouche. By the time of the military coup, the FLN had completely broken with the government.

The December 1991 elections and the programmed second-round runoffs in January 1992 provided the first national test for the new multiparty system. The elections were open to all registered parties--parties had to register before the campaign period began--and were contested by almost fifty parties. Voting was by universal and secret ballot and assembly seats were awarded based on a proportional representation system. Only 231 of the 430 seats were decided in the first round of elections in which 59 percent of eligible voters participated, but an Islamist victory seemed assured by the Islamist command of 80 percent of the contested seats. The second round of elections was canceled by the military coup of January 11, 1992. Since 1997, when parliamentary life resumed after its suspension in 1992, several parties have had seats in parliament and have participated in government. The main parties today are:

1. Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN), which was the sole legal party from 1962 to 1989. After a series of electoral defeats, it made a big comeback in the 2002 parliamentary elections. It is led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem, former Foreign Minister. It is nationalist and conservative.

2. Harakat Mujtama's al-Silm (Movement of Society for Peace, MSP), formerly known as Hamas, was born in 1989. The current leader is Bouguerra Soltani (it founder and former leader Mahfoud Nahnah, a moderate Islamist, died in 2004). The party's aim is to establish Islamic regimes in all Muslim countries. It is close to Egypt's Muslim Brothers.
3. Front des Forces Socialistes (Front of Socialist Forces, FFS) was born in the 1960s and was illegal until 1989. It is led by Hocine Ait-Ahmed, a hero of the anti-colonial war. It is relatively liberal and a vocal opponent to the current regime. Its constituency is limited to ethnic Berberophones in a small region west of Algiers (Kabylie),
4. Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democracy (Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) was born in 1989 as an essentially ethnic party which focuses on the Berber language and culture. It is relatively conservative and has supported the government in its fight against the Islamist rebellion. Its leader is Said Saadi.
5. Harakah al-Nahda (Renaissance Movement, or MN, known as Ennahda) was created by Abdallah Djaballah, who was ousted from it in 1998. The movement subsequently came under the control of Lahbib Adami. It is a relatively conservative Islamist party that is willing to work within the existing system.
6. Harakat al-Islah al-Watani (Movement of National Reform, or MRN, known as Islah) is led by Abdallah Djaballah, who created it in 1998 after his ouster from Ennahda. It is a relatively conservative Islamist party that competes with MSP.
7. al-Jabha al-Islamiyya lil-inqadh (Islamic Front of Salvation, FIS) was created in 1989 and banned in 1992; its two leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj were jailed from 1991 to 2003. The party has lost its structure and much of its social basis. It intended to establish an Islamic state and resorted to wide-scale violence in 1992 after it was denied its electoral victory.




In 1997, parliamentary election reinstated parliamentary life-which was suspended in 1992- and allowed two moderate Islamist parties, the Harakat Mujtam'a al-Silm (Movement of Society for Peace, MSP) and Harakat al-Nahda, known as Ennahda, to win respectively 69 and 34 seats out of 380 and to control seven ministerial posts in the government. In a paradoxical turn of events, the MSP of Mahfoud Nahnah ended up being part of a coalition government that included the conservative FLN and the new pro-establishment party, the National Democratic Rally (RND), which was created a few months earlier to lend support to President Liamine Zeroual. This alliance of convenience became known as "the islamo-conservative" alliance.

All in all, opposition parties are new in Algeria; they became legal only in 1989. Before then, and since independence from France in 1962, Algeria had only one party, the National Liberation Front. There are today many parties, but only a few of them have some relevance. **Many people see them as out of touch with society at large and not useful in the aggregation and articulation of people's interests and grievances.**

## **5. Rule of Law:**

The index for Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence where a score of -2.5 is weak and of 2.5 is strong. For this indicator, The World Bank provides data for Algeria from 1996 to 2017. The average value for Algeria during that period was -0.82 points with a *minimum of -1.22 points in 1996* and a *maximum of -0.59 points in 2003*.




Source: TheGlobalEconomy.com, The World Bank

**Figure 2. Rule of law index in Algeria.**

## **6. Human Rights:**

Liberal component index indicates that Algeria has had very low performance on civil liberties. This means that the regime lacked in liberal principle of democracy which emphasizes the importance of individual and minority rights, rule of law and effective checks and balances. Although there is a minor development in the mid-1970s, at the end of Boumédiène rule, the constitutional reform in 1989 did not provide any significant development in civil liberties. Coup period and unlawful acts of the army during that time caused a decline in liberal democracy score and the score remained constantly low in the post-coup era.



**Figure 3. Liberal component index**

### **7. Elements of identity and Algerian nationalism:**

It is a well-known fact that Algeria was a gateway linking Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia for centuries, which caused six major invasions before 1830: the Phoenician-Carthaginian invasion from 1100 to 147 BC B.E , the Roman from 146 to 432 C.E; the Vandal from 432 to 533; the Byzantine from 533 to 633; the Arabic from 755 to 1516; and the Turk from 1516 to 1830 (Bouhouch, 1997). For our purposes, however, the most important invasion that influenced the Algerian identity and nationalism was that of the French in 1830. Algeria's relationship with France would last 132 years and would serve as a point of reference for all citizens of the modern republic: nationalists and Islamists, modernists and traditionalists, Arabs and Berbers. The history, or perhaps more often, the mythology of this period is the basis of consciousness to model the unconscious of the country's vast youth. (Stone 1997, p. 30)

Thus, before discussing more about the French influence over Algeria, it is important to ask ourselves: who are the Algerians?

#### **a. Nation and National Identity:**

Before tackling the Algerian identity, I feel a need for putting the concepts of “nation” and “national identity” into perspective so we avoid any possible confusion. The word “nation”

can have many meanings ranging from the basic definition, “all the people in a country” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary) to the widely intricate one, claiming to be “a country considered as a group of people with the same language, culture and history, who live in a particular area under one government” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary). In fact, it is since antiquity and the concept “nation” is established. Herodotus, in his *Histories*, book VIII, provides us with a comprehensive definition of national identity, in a scene in which the Athenians when resisting the Persian invasion explain to a messenger from Sparta why the Spartans should side with them and not the Persians:

For there are many great reasons why we should not do this, even if we so desired; first and chiefest, the burning and destruction of the adornments and temples of our gods, whom we are constrained to avenge to the uttermost rather than make covenants with the doer of these things, and next the kinship of all Greeks in blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common, and the likeness of our way of life (VIII, 144.2)

Here we find four criteria for being a Greek: *common religion, common blood, common language, and common customs*. In the same way, Anthony D. Smith, one of the founders of the interdisciplinary field of national studies, defines nation as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991, p.14). All features mentioned in Smith’s definition are at the same time the fundamental features of national identity (Smith, p. 14). Moreover, Smith states that “nations must have a measure of common culture and civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas that bind the population together in their homeland” (Smith, p.11). In addition, this statement is so universal that it contains everything which could be more or less connected to a nation, starting

with the language or national symbols and ending with a way of life and common consciousness. Furthermore, Smith states that “nationalism creates national identity” (Smith, p.71) and he provides the definition of the term ‘nationalism’ as “an ideology, a sentiment, a form of culture, or a social movement that focuses on the nation” (Smith, p.72).

Thus, it is on these bases of blood, religion language and customs that we are going to trace the Algerian identity.

#### **b. Religion:**

It was the Arabs who carried the Islam, East and West, and so North Africa was invaded by Islamic troops in the 8th century. Not surprisingly, the Berbers, or rather the self-name **Amazigh**, who were the original inhabitants of Algeria and named Berber by the Romans along with the Greeks who referred to every people they could not speak their languages (Bouhouch, 1962) whether they were in the East or the West, resisted the new invasion. The Amazigh mounted the most violent and longest opposition to the Arab conquerors of the 8th century met anywhere in the world. The Arabs, fortified with Islam lastly occupied the area and imbued it with their culture, above all with Islam. Yet, the Amazigh were Islamicized, but not Arabized as they preserved their language and reserved their customs. So, co-existence between the Arabs and Berbers was grounded on a shared religion. Furthermore, Islamic teachings reduced the cultural distinction between the Arabs and the Berbers. In other words, despite the dissimilarity of the Arab and Berber language, there is no evidence of any Berber-Arab dichotomy. Consequently, “the Berber sees himself as a member of this or that tribe within an Islamically - conceived and permeated world - and not as a linguistically defined ethnic group” (Gellner and Miraud, 1976, p.13). The incorporation of Algeria with the Islamic empire supported Islamic power in North Africa. Algeria turned into a door for Islamic explorations and conquests. Muslim armies took over

most of Portugal and Spain then called, "Andalusia", and they moved deep into Europe to the borders of France. By the time Islamic power declined, things had changed greatly. Muslims were expelled from Spain, as it was re-conquered by the Christians. Many exiled Muslims had found refuge in Algeria in the 15th century. With the rise of the Ottoman Islamic empire, Algeria as well as other North African countries came under the control of the Turkish empire. The Algerian people acknowledged the Ottoman regency for the next three hundred years due to the fact that Algeria needed help state against the European states.

In short, Islam has been part of Algeria since the seventh century. Although there are small Christian and Jewish communities in Algiers and other cities in the north, almost all Algerians are Muslims. Furthermore, Algeria is a young society, since 75% of the population is under 30 (Stone 1997, p.7). According to Martin Stone (1997), "Under the domination of the Arabs, the local Berber kingdoms and later the Turks, the inhabitants of what is now Algeria merge their pre-Islamic beliefs with the Sunni ritual to create their own particular brand of Islam" (p.12). In independence, the influence of Islam was relatively weak in cities, but more widespread in the countryside. With the massive migration of rural populations in the 1960s and 1970s in cities, tensions developed between conservatives, the poorest newcomers and the liberal elite. At the same time, the government tried to use Islam for its own purposes to mobilize the population against its enemies. This, in fact, helped to stimulate the emergence of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s.

### **c. The Tribe:**

The following element of the Algerian identity is the tribe. In the Arab areas, the main component was the family where its members united under clans; the clans "are a collection of lineages descended from an even more remote common ancestor, the clans united to form tribes based on common ancestors or for their mutual benefit" (Stone 1997, p.14). Before independence, the tribes worked independently, but in times of war, invasion or threat they

did not hesitate to form larger confederations. However, after independence, the traditional dynamics of relatives against relatives has been abandoned in favour of promoting a common situation: in this case, the revolution. The military elite used the revolutionary war to get the public together to its cause to form a strong Algerian state free of the French. As a result, William Zartman (1973) argues:

Those who participated in the war expected that things would improve after the end: in a series of typically ambiguous feelings, they hoped to get rid of the disquieting and humiliating alien to return to their lives without disturbance, but also to benefit from social change and economic improvement. In addition, they expected an immediate inheritance of the visible goods of modern life in Algeria and accession to the newly vacated positions of power, prestige, and employment” (P.211)

**d. Language:**

A further influence on the Algerian identity that cannot be overstated is language. As Stone (1997) points out, “Language is a primary political, ideological, social and psychological issue in Algeria . . . connected with the country’s search for its identity and is a unifying force in a land of enormous regional and ethnic diversity” (p.18). In 1962, in all the northern cities, French and Maghrebi Arabic were spoken, whereas in the rural parts of the Sahara, Maghrebi Arabic was used. The French and Berber dialects were spoken in the Kabylia region (Stone 1997, p.18). The conflicts that have developed have been directly associated with the government's efforts in Algerianisation and Arabisation during the Ben Bella and Boumedienne regimes. With 90% of an illiterate population at that time, Ben Bella promised education for everyone. As a result, thousands of "third-class and less enthusiastic" teachers were brought from Egypt, Iraq and Syria confusing "a bewildered population by teaching their local version of modern Arab standard in an idiom almost incomprehensible to

the local population and with foreign cultural references" (Stone 1997, p.19). Ultimately, the policy of Ben Bella has alienated the young population of previous generations who had been educated in French. In the 1970s, Boumedienne quickened the effect of Arabisation by assigning Arabic to be spoken in local government, the courts, and central government. However, by the 1990s, Stone (1997) notes, "Within the central government only the justice and religious affairs ministries continue[d] to operate entirely in Arabic. . . ." (p. 20). In many respects, a large proportion of Algerians remained francophone, because to many it was used with pride as a sign of education. The impact of France in the Algerian identity was summed up wisely by former Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahim,

We are Mediterranean people in an Arab context. It revealed just how complex is the Algerian identity. Yet, even though Algeria is an Arab nation, the legacy of the past is such that no amount of calculated 'arabisation' will erase completely the 130 years of links with France (Horne, 2006, p. 561).

### **Conclusion:**

Algeria has now been independent for more than 50 years. Leaving behind the French rule, Algerian people fell into a one-party rule under the nationalist and socialist FLN with a strong military backing. After the 27 years of one-party rule, the government allowed opposition to operate in the political system by the constitutional reform; yet the process of democratization was ended by the coup d'état in 1992, in the 30th year of the independence. After this failed attempt of democratization and the civil war that left a very tragic memory in the society, people are living under the order and limited representation of Bouteflika's rule without real democracy.

For the same reasons, Algeria has experienced the period of Arab uprisings relatively mildly. Both the tragic memory of backlash and the relative openness under the current authoritarian regime played an important role to prevent the protests from growing too much



in Algeria .Yet, even though Algerian political system is more open today than its history of one-party rule, there is still too much room to make reforms and even bring a democratic transition in the future.

**Chapter Five: Methodology of the Study:  
Projecting the Cultural Prerequisite on the  
Algerian Society**

## **1. Methodology of the Study:**

We discuss the research design used to collect and analyse the empirical data presented in chapter five of the thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the prerequisite cultural changes for the implementation of democracy in Algeria. It seeks to understand how the existing theories on culture and specifically political culture are able to account for the implementation of democracy in Algeria. All of which were deduced from the second chapter where we tackled the theoretical aspect of our study by embarking on the available literature on the cultural, specifically political culture, prerequisite for the implementation of democracy in our country in order to answer our research questions which are as follow:

- Do Algerians fully understand democracy?
- Does our culture permit a robust implementation of democracy?
- What can we change in our culture to achieve democracy?
- What are the cultural factors associated with Algerian conception of democracy?
- Has Algerian democratic participation changed over time?
- Is Algeria going to achieve what other Western countries had achieved with the ideals of democracy?

So, here is a frame of the dimensions of political culture that are tested in our study in order to put together the boundaries of the cultural preconditions needed by Algeria for implementing democracy along with bearing in mind the preconditions of education, economic development, civil society and legitimacy and effectiveness. Thus, in particular, the elements of political culture that will be the focus of the empirical findings of this thesis which are based on the studies of Almond and Verba (1963) and Inglehart (1990) and they are as follow:

- Trust in institutions;
- participation in election;
- psychological involvement ;

- Meaning of democracy,
- Democratic legitimacy and preference for democracy
- Quality of governance and regime evaluation.

### **1.1 Almond and Verba:**

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba reopened the debate about culture and democracy in the 1960s with their book *The Civic Culture*. Although they recognized the importance of economic development for democracy, they believed that only a “civic culture” could provide the “psychological basis of democratization” and that without this, the prospects for democratic survival were slim (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 9). Almond and Verba claimed that there were three basic types of political culture in the world—parochial, subject, and participant/civic. According to them, the civic culture was the only culture compatible with democracy. In contrast, parochial cultures were compatible with the traditional political systems of African tribes, and subject cultures were compatible with centralized authoritarian institutions like those seen in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe (Almond and Verba, 1963, p.20).

A political culture, for Almond and Verba, was something that captured how individuals think and feel about the political system. They believed that it was possible to study culture by conducting surveys and asking individuals about their feelings toward political institutions, actors, and processes. The idea was that the distribution of responses to these survey questions would identify a nation’s political culture. In this conceptualization, a political culture simply refers to a relatively coherent cluster of attitudes in society. According to Almond and Verba, a civic culture reflects a particular cluster of attitudes that includes (a) the belief on the part of individuals that they can influence political decisions, (b) positive feelings toward the political system, (c) high levels of interpersonal trust, and (d) preferences for gradual societal change. In contrast, parochial and subject political cultures reflect different clusters of

attitudes on these same issues. Applying their methodology to the study of Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Almond and Verba found that the United States and the United Kingdom were not only the most stable democracies in their sample but also the countries that most closely resembled their ideal civic culture. As a result, they concluded that a *civic culture* was necessary for democratic stability. In fact, Almond and Verba (1963) construct three ideal-typical political cultures on the basis of the prior building blocks: parochial cultures, subject cultures, and participant cultures.

In *parochial cultures*, exemplified by African tribal societies, citizens have low cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation towards the four types of political objects. In these simpler traditional societies, there are no specialized political roles and little expectation for political change (pp.17, 20). Here, “the individual thinks of his family’s advantage as the only goal to pursue, or conceives of his role in the political system in familistic terms” (p. 120).

In *subject cultures*, there is a high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation towards the political system and policy outputs, but orientations towards input objects (like political parties) and the self as an active participant are minimal. Thus orientation towards the system and its outputs is channeled via a relatively detached, passive relationship on the part of the citizen (p. 17). Subject cultures are most compatible with centralized, authoritarian political structures (pp. 17, 20). Indeed, for the subject “the law is something he obeys, not something he helps shape” (p. 118).

In *participant cultures*, members of society have high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation to the political system, the input objects, the policy outputs, and recognize the self as an active participant in the polity. Social actors tend to be activist and mobilized (p. 18). In general, participant cultures are most compatible with democratic political structures (p. 20). Here, the citizen is expected to have “the virtues of the subject – to obey the law, to be loyal – but he is also expected to take some part in the formation of decisions” (p. 118).

Almond and Verba note that political cultures rarely conform to the foregoing ideal-types; rather, they tend to be *mixed cultures* (p. 22). Further, political culture does not always map onto functional political structures: political systems may be characterized by *high congruence* between culture and structure (which engenders allegiance), *weak congruence* (which engenders apathy), and *incongruence* (which engenders alienation).

## **2.2 Inglehart:**

Inglehart (1990) reached a similar conclusion after studying survey responses from 25 industrial nations in the 1980s. Like Almond and Verba (1963), he believed that different societies are characterized to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and that they can have major political consequences, one being that they are closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions” (Inglehart 1990, p.15).

According to Inglehart, political culture is determined by, among other things, the levels of overall life satisfaction, the levels of interpersonal trust, and the support for gradual societal change among the individuals of a nation. Clearly, these determinants of political culture are very similar to those proposed by Almond and Verba. In his analysis, Inglehart (1990, p.43) found that countries in which levels of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for gradual societal change were high were more likely to be stable democracies. In other words, he found that some kind of civic culture is required for stable democracy too.

## **2. Research tools:**

For the sake of measuring the attitudes of our sample, we designed an email survey inspired generally from the World Values survey of 2014. It contains 35 multiple choice questions.

A survey is a method of gathering information from a number of individuals, known as a sample, in order to learn something about the larger population from which the sample is drawn. Although surveys come in many forms, and serve a variety of purposes, they do share certain characteristics. In order for the objectives of a survey to be met, the results must reliably project on the larger public, from which the sample is drawn. We utilized Google forms which are usually used to create surveys easily and quickly since they allow us to plan events, ask questions and collect diverse type of information in a simple and efficient way. Google forms also allow us to include different types of questions such as short answers, paragraphs, multiple selection, verification boxes, pull-down, linear scale, grid of several options, among others. In addition, it is a free online tool that enabled us to get unlimited questions and answers at no cost by sending the form by email, integrate it into a website or send the link via social networks or any other means. Then, it stores the feedback received so we can analyze it in detail and the forms are integrated with Google spreadsheets therefore we can access to a spread sheet view of the collected data. Moreover, the general configuration of forms or surveys allows us to collect the recipient's email address and limit the answers.

We initiated the survey on the 7<sup>th</sup> of April 2017 and closed it on the 25<sup>th</sup> of the same month.


### **3. Sample:**

We chose to use a Simple random sampling (also called random sampling) which is the most wholesome and direct probability sampling strategy. It is the most common way for selecting a sample among a population for a wide range of purposes too. In simple random sampling each member of population is equally likely to be selected as part of the sample. It has been indicated that “the logic behind simple random sampling is that it removes bias from the selection procedure and should result in representative samples” (Gravetter and Forzano, 2011, p.146). Ideally, the sample size of more than a few hundred is required in order to be

able to apply simple random sampling in an appropriate manner (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). It can be said that simple random sampling is easy to understand in theory, but demanding to perform in practice. This is since working with a large sample size is not easy and it can be challenging to get a realistic sampling structure.

After calculating the fit sample for our survey using a margin error of 5% and a confidence level of 90% and taking in consideration the number of voters in the 2014 elections as the whole populations which was 23 million (exactly 22,880,678 according to the Interior Ministry), we found out that the appropriate number of our sample is 271. So we ended up with the following sample aged 18 years and older:

Gender	Age			Total (N)
	18-23	23-35	Older than 35	
Male	35	80	29	144
Female	25	69	33	127




**Figure 4. Gender and age of participants**

Where 40% of it got a tertiary education and only 1% had a level of primary education,




Educational Level	
primary education	3
secondary education	101
tertiary education	109
elementary education	26
post graduate education	32
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>271</b>



**Figure 5. Educational level of participants**


And 28% are employed compared to 46% who are jobless:

Job	Age			Total	Percentage
	18 to 23	23 to 35	older than 35		
Employee	9	48	19	76	28%
Free businesses	6	40	25	71	26%
Jobess	45	61	18	124	46%
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>100%</b>




**Figure 6. -a- : Employment of the participants according to age**

Job	Gender		
	Female	Male	Total
Employees	28	48	76
Free businesses	22	49	71
Jobless	77	47	124
<b>Total</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>271</b>



**Figure 6. -b- : Employment of the participants according to gender**

In addition, they are distributed in 36 wilayas according to the following bar chart:



**Figure 7. Distribution of the sample according to their addresses**

#### **4. Discussion and Analysis of the Results:**

The primary data collected via the questionnaire of this study were quantified and analysed to obtain the necessary information to address our objectives of the study along with answering our research questions. The multiple choice items were evaluated on the base of frequency and percentile values. Then, they were presented in the form of frequency and percentile tabulation and followed by pie charts (used to display the contribution of each value to a total) or clustered columns (used to compare values across categories). And in what follows is a lay out of the results of our survey.


##### **Item 6 and 7:**

When they were asked about their satisfaction about the economic situation of the country and their family, the results came as follow:

The majority of respondents were pessimistic about economic conditions in Algeria which can be explained due to the rise in inflation and high unemployment. As the table shows, 58% of

respondents described economic conditions as “bad”. A parallel negative sense was felt for the family, although at a slightly lower level. In fact, almost none of Algerians felt that economic conditions were “good.”

	General Economic situation in today's Algeria		General Economic situation in your family today	
good	13	5%	41	15%
very good	1	0%	3	1%
bad	156	58%	11	4%
very bad	37	14%	93	34%
neither good nor bad	64	25%	123	45%




**Figure 8. Comparison between country and family economic situation**

**Item 8:**


In order to see whether the participants understand the meaning of democracy because many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy, they were asked to choose only one as the most essential characteristics of a democracy from each four sets of statements.

Set 01	Percentage
Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor.	9%
People choose the government leaders in free and fair election.	43%
Government does not waste any public money.	14%
People are free to express their political views openly.	34%




**Figure 9 : First set of characteristics**

Set 02	Percentage
The legislature has oversight over the government.	7%
Basic necessities, like food, clothes and shelter, are provided for all.	18%
People are free to organize political groups.	64%
Government provides people with quality public services.	11%




**Figure 10. Second set of characteristics**

Set 03	Percentage
Government ensures law and order.	10%
Media is free to criticize the things government does.	57%
Government ensures job opportunities for all.	15%
Multiple parties compete fairly in the election.	17%



**Figure 11. Third set of characteristics**

Set 04	Percentage
People have the freedom to take part in protests and demonstrations.	42%
Politics is clean and free of corruption.	30%
The court protects the ordinary people from the abuse of government power.	18%
People receive state aid if they are unemployed.	11%




**Figure 12 : Fourth set of characteristics**

Interestingly, most of the participants were able to put finger of the most important characteristics of democracy; 43% chose free and fair elections, 64% opted for freedom to organize political groups, 57% chose freedom of media and 42% freedom to take part in protests and demonstrations. Though, we must remark that there is a tendency of using the terms “freedom” and “democracy” interchangeably, however, the two are not synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise, and thereby, ultimately, protect freedom and the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights. In addition, it assumes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism.

**Item 9:**

In order to assess participants’ trust in a number of institutions that play a crucial role in any democracy, they were asked to tell how much trust they had in them (**great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all**)

<b>The democratic institutions</b>	<b>great deal of trust</b>	<b>quite a lot of trust</b>	<b>not very much trust</b>	<b>none at all</b>
President	13	95	128	35
The courts	2	60	162	47
The national government [in capital city]	1	24	177	69
Political parties [not any specific party]	1	11	144	115
Parliament	1	13	136	121
Civil service	4	34	168	65
The military(or armed forces)	29	96	118	28
The police	13	91	134	33
Local government	3	21	158	89
Newspapers	0	24	141	106
Television	1	23	135	112
The election commission	0	14	138	119
Non-governmental organizations	3	36	144	88



**Figure 13 . Trust in institutions**

The negative outlook on the economy extended to Algerians' assessments of the performance of political institutions. Across the board, Algerians revealed low level of trust in political institutions. As the results of item 9 show, a majority of Algerians do not trust the governing institutions, with almost half of them opted for "not very much trust" for all the institutions and the highest mistrust was placed on the parliament with 45%. 46% trust the military. The military in Algeria has assumed political power and had had a crucial role in turning the discourse of democratisation in Algeria during the 1990s. Trust in the President was almost as low. 40% trust the president. Collectively, the respondents showed low trust in the governing institutions tied to the executive control. Two governing institutions, the police and the Electoral Commission, however, did not have quite the same high level of trust. This reflects the considerable public criticism both institutions have faced for performance in the



past few years. The other branches of government, the parliament/state assembly and judiciary were deeply lower in support. Algerians recorded the least trust in parliament and the political parties which shows a weak faith in politicians.

The mistrust in institutions extended beyond political institutions and actors, when participants showed a low degree of faith in television, NGOs and newspapers, approximately a half of respondents recorded low levels of trust of the media – newspapers and television.

**Item 10 and 11:**

In order to assess participants’ participation in elections, they were asked the following questions:

10) Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2014?

11) Thinking about the national election in 2014, did you ...

a- attend a campaign meeting or rally?

b- try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?


c- do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate running in the election?

d- On the whole, how free and fair would you say the last national election was?

- Completely free and fair
- Free and fair, but with minor problems
- Free and fair, with major problems
- Not free or fair


The results came as follow:

<b>Participation in the last presidential elections of 2014</b>	
No	144
Yes	127
<b>Total</b>	<b>271</b>




**Figure 14 . Participation in the last presidential elections of 2014**

	attended a campaign meeting or rally	persuaded others to vote for a certain candidate or party	did anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate running in the election
Yes	41	54	35
No	230	217	236



**Figure 15 . Contribution to the last national elections in 2014**

	Completely free and fair	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Free and fair, with major problems	Not free or fair
Frequency	14	56	110	91
Percentage	5%	21%	41%	34%




**Figure 16 . How fair and free the last elections were**

With a minority (5%) believing that the 2014 presidential elections were free and fair and 34% holding the idea of fraud, the results of this question are proves a compatibility with the lack of trust participants showed in the Algerian democratic institutions of the previous question.

**Item 13, 14 and 15:**


To see how much psychologically involved, participants were asked 3 questions.

	<b>Very interested</b>	<b>Somewhat interested</b>	<b>Not very interested</b>	<b>Not at all interested</b>
Frequency	11	47	156	57
Percentage	4%	17%	58%	21%




**Figure 17 . Interest in politics**

	Everyday	Several times a week	Once or twice a week	Not even once a week	Practically never
Frequency	14	25	91	100	41
Percentage	5%	9%	34%	37%	15%



**Figure 18 . Frequency of following news about politics and government**

	Frequently	Occasionally	Never
Frequency	31	186	54
Percentage	11%	69%	20%



**Figure 19 . Frequency of discussing political matters with their families and friends**

58% of the participants showed a lack of interest in politics and this result is correlated with answers of item 14 on how often they followed news about politics and government when 100 participants opted for “not even once a week” and 69% who opted for “occasionally” when asked on how often they followed news about politics and government. These attitudes can be explained by the passive relationship on the part of the citizens. As a matter of fact, talking politics is an active form of political participation that implies a sense of safety in political communication. So, the degree of openness of political communication suggest that Algerians feel restricted and even afraid of safely discussing politics with each others because of the historical background of violence and revolution during the 1990s, and this can explain why a lot of people refused to undertake my questionnaire.

**Item 16:**

When the participants were asked to name three national political parties they knew, 12% of the participants (33participants) didn’t answer the question, one participant gave a

senseless answer, one participant said that he/she doesn't want to know them, 4% (10 participants) said that they don't know any, 31 participants (11%) mentioned only one, 50 participants (18%) named two parties and 130 participants (48%) listed three parties.


Among the mentioned parties the following parties were named:

Parties	Frequency	Parties	Frequency
FLN	185	ISLAH	5
RND	112	G,ALGERIA	2
PT	60	NAHDA	18
JIL	3	RDV	1
ADALA	7	PJ	1
TAJ	19	FIS	1
FES	39	FM	1
RCD	23	FNA	1
HAMAS	22	MPA	1

The FLN came as the most famous party among the Algerians for its long domination in the political life, then followed by RND which is an ally to authority and then the labour party (PT) though an opposition party, but not so trusted. And not naming 3 parties can be translated either by the mistrust placed in the political parties expressed earlier by the participants or by their lack of knowledge of the politics of the country and in fact both of the interpretations ascertain Algerians' lack of political cognition.

**Item 17:**

When asked about whether they prefer that government leaders implement what voters want or government leaders do what they think is best for the people, 62% of the participants opted for the first choice and 38% opted for the second. Choosing a government that implement what voters wants relates to the understanding of the concept of democracy by the participants.




**Figure 20 . The type of government participants prefer**

**Item 18:**

Moreover, to clearly grasp the kind of government participants would like to have in Algeria, we set 9 groups of statements which the participants had the choice of *strongly agrees or just agrees* with:

	The media should have the right to publish news and ideas without government control	The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that might be politically destabilizing.	People should look after themselves and be primarily responsible for their own success in life.	The government should bear the main responsibility for taking care of the wellbeing of the people.	Political leaders are chosen by the people through open and competitive elections.	Political leaders are chosen on the basis on their virtue and capability even without election.	Multiple parties compete to represent political interests.	One party represents the interests of all the people.	A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves the people's support.
Strongly agree	163	35	183	171	182	159	151	16	31
Just agree	108	236	88	100	89	112	120	255	240



**Figure 21 . Regime Preferences**


Again, this question was designed for the purpose of testing participants’ understanding of democracy. Though here, most of them fell in the trap of the opposing ideas used in the question when the 67% who chose free and fair election when appointing political leader were opposed by 59% who opted for the idea of choosing political leaders on the basis on their virtue and capability even without election and this proves a somewhat confused conceptualization of democracy.

**Item 19:**

To see how much satisfied participants are about the democratic work of the government that we have in our country, they were asked to choose from.

	very satisfied	satisfied to some extent	not very satisfied	not satisfied at all
Frequency	0	35	172	64
percentage	0%	13%	63%	24%






**Figure 22 . Satisfaction about the current democratic government**

How people feel about their political systems in an important component of political culture. The state of feeling a political emotion in a country is perhaps the most important test of the legitimacy of its political system. It is also the most important measure of political alienation. For dissatisfaction can directly lead to getting alienated from your government.

**Item 20:**


On this level, participants were asked about their opinion about how much democratic is Algeria, answers came as follow:

	very democratic	democratic, but with minor issues	democratic, with major issues	not democratic
Frequency	3	44	151	73
Percentage	1%	16%	56%	27%



**Figure 23 . How democratic is Algeria**

Colonel	Primary education	Elementary education	Secondary education	Tertiary education	Post graduate education
very democratic	0	0	2	1	0
democratic, but with minor issues	1	12	59	68	11
democratic, with major issues	0	7	24	11	2
not democratic	2	7	16	29	19




Correlating the level of education with saying how democratic is Algeria shows that the most educated participants are the least optimistic they are about democracy in Algeria.

### Item 21:

To see how satisfied participants are with our government and democracy, they were given a scale of 1 to 10 (1 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic) and asked where they would place our country under the present government. The results showed as follow:


	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Frequency	40	27	56	55	76	11	5	1	0	0



**Figure 24 . How much satisfied with the present government and democracy**

Then, they were asked where they would place it 10 years ago and the results were like this:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Undemocratic										
completely democratic										
Frequency	59	115	50	20	14	6	6	1	0	0




**Figure 25 : Level of satisfaction with the government and democracy 10 years ago.**

In keeping with the high levels of mistrust in political institutions, most Algerians were dissatisfied on how democracy worked in the country. None of the respondents expressed the view that Algeria was a “full democracy”, with 56% believing that democracy in Algeria had major problems and 13% were satisfied to some extent about the democratic work of the government that we have in our country.

**Item 23:**

In a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our Algeria (“1” means that democracy is completely unsuitable for the country today and “10” means that it is completely suitable), participants were also asked where they would place our country today.



**Figure 26 . Suitability of democracy for Algeria**

A quarter of the respondents felt that democracy was suitable for Algeria today, with a median of 5 (following a 1-10 scale) on the suitability scale.


**Item 24, 25, 26, and 27:**

In order to assess the quality of governance, participants were asked four questions.

**Item 24:**

Participants were asked to choose between “Always, Most of the time, Sometimes, or Rarely) to say how often they thought government leaders break the law or abuse their power.

	Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely
Frequency	65	127	65	14
Percentage	24%	47%	24%	5%




**Figure 27 . Frequency of thinking that government leaders break the law or abuse their power.**

Again mistrust in government is obvious with almost 50% of the participants saying that leaders break the law most of the time.

**Item 25:**

Then they were asked how often they thought our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates

	Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely
Frequency	4	24	156	87
Percentage	1%	9%	58%	32%




**Figure 28 : Frequency of thinking that elections offered the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates**

**Item 26:**

Here participants were asked to say to what extent the legislature was capable of keeping government leaders in check

	Very capable	Capable	Not capable	Not at all capable
Frequency	8	32	175	56
Percentage	3%	12%	65%	21%




**Figure 29 . To what extent the legislature was capable of keeping government leaders in check**

**Item 27:**

How well do you think the government responds to what people want? The answers came as follow:

	Very responsive	Largely responsive	Not very responsive	Not responsive at all
Frequency	2	12	197	60
Percentage	1%	4%	73%	22%




**Figure 30 . How well do you think the government responds to what people want**

**Item 28:**

In your neighborhood or community, do people voice their interests and concerns in local affairs?

	Most people	Quite a lot of people	Some people	Few people
Frequency	14	42	108	107
Percentage	5%	15%	40%	39%



**Figure 31 . Do people voice their interests and concerns in local affairs**


The majority of the participants showed a lack of interest in voicing their concerns and interests due to their disappointments at all the ongoing unfulfilled promises of the elected

offices. This is crystallised in the answers of the 29th item when 40% said that they greatly feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think.

**Item 29:**

How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?

	A good deal	Quite a lot	Not much	Not at all
Frequency	108	56	78	29
Percentage	40%	21%	29%	11%




**Figure 32 . How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?**

**Item 30:**

How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?

	Almost everyone is corrupt	Most officials are corrupt	Not a lot of officials are corrupt	Hardly anyone is involved
Frequency	68	180	20	3
Percentage	25%	66%	7%	1%






**Figure 33 . How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?**

66% of the participants opted that most officials are corrupt and 25% opting for almost everyone is corrupt. In fact, this shows the extent to which Algerians do not trust their government.

**Item 31:**

To assess the participants' preference for democracy and democratic legitimacy, they were asked to choose among three statements that came closest to their own opinion.

	Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government	Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one	For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime
Frequency	125	88	58
Percentage	46%	32%	21%




**Figure 34 . Preference for democracy**

**Item 32:**

Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?

- Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society.
- Democracy cannot solve our society's problems.

	Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society	Democracy cannot solve our society's problems
Frequency	116	155
Percentage	43%	57%




**Figure 35 . Democracy Solves problems ?**

**Item 33:**

If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?

- Economic development is definitely more important
- Economic development is somewhat more important
- Democracy is somewhat more important
- Democracy is definitely more important

	Economic development is definitely more important	Economic development is somewhat more important	Democracy is somewhat more important	Democracy is definitely more important
Frequency	176	40	27	28
Percentage	65%	15%	10%	10%



**Figure 36 . Preference for democracy over economic development**


65% prefer economic development over democracy and this is mainly correlated with the answers of their dissatisfaction with their bad family economic situation. In spite of this, 57% declared that democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society and 46% said that Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government

**Item 34:**

If you had to choose between reducing economic inequality and protecting political freedom, which would you say is more important?

- Reducing economic inequality is definitely more important
- Reducing economic inequality is somewhat more important
- Protecting political freedom is somewhat more important
- Protecting political freedom is definitely more important

	Reducing economic inequality is definitely more important	Reducing economic inequality is somewhat more important	Protecting political freedom is somewhat more important	Protecting political freedom is definitely more important
Frequency	174	35	38	24
Percentage	64%	13%	14%	9%



**Figure 37 . Preference for democracy over economic equality**


From these two questions, 33 and 34, it is clear that Algerians would prefer economic developments over democracy and this is reflected by the current situation when they elected the president Bouteflika for a fourth term owing to the relative prosperity that was witnessed thanks to the high prices of oil.

**Item 35:**

As a check for the previous sections of our questionnaire item 35 was set.

The four first statements were fixed in order to reassess preference for democracy and democratic legitimacy. Interestingly, 47% opted for the idea of getting rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader who decides things and this can be interpreted by, again, the mistrust placed on the political arena in Algeria especially on the parliamentarians who tend to promise people during campaigns and do not fulfil their promises after succeeding and this is also proved in question 29 when participants were asked to say whether they feel that having elections made the government pay attention to what the people think and more than half of the sample responded positively.

	We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decides things.	Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office.	The army (military) should come in to govern the country.	We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.
<b>strongly approve</b>	46 <b>(17%)</b>	3 <b>(1%)</b>	5 <b>(2%)</b>	28 <b>(10%)</b>
<b>approve</b>	110 <b>(41%)</b>	16 <b>(6%)</b>	19 <b>(7%)</b>	85 <b>(31%)</b>
<b>disapprove</b>	76 <b>(28%)</b>	114 <b>(42%)</b>	141 <b>(52%)</b>	106 <b>(39%)</b>
<b>strongly disapprove</b>	39 <b>(14%)</b>	138 <b>(51%)</b>	138 <b>(39%)</b>	52 <b>(19%)</b>




**Figure 38 . Reassessing preference for democracy and democratic legitimacy**

The five following statements were set to assess citizens' empowerment and political support.

	strongly approve	approve	disapprove	strongly disapprove
<b>1-I think I have the ability to participate in politics.</b>	11	147	61	52
<b>2-Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.</b>	20	134	78	39
<b>3-People like me don't have any influence over what the government does.</b>	49	111	80	31
<b>4-You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.</b>	4	18	103	146

5-A citizen should always remain loyal only to his country, no matter how imperfect it is or what wrong it has done.	58	122	68	23
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This set of five notions was designed to verify beliefs on the part of individuals that they can influence political decisions. There are minimal orientations towards the self as an active participant (49% approved that -Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on and 41% People like me don't have any influence over what the government does). Thus orientation towards the system and its outputs is channelled via a relatively detached, passive relationship on the part of the citizen which also interprets the lack of turn out in the 2014 presidential elections according to the participants' answers in questions 10 and 11.



**Figure 39 . Citizens' empowerment and political support**

And the last 8 statements were held in order to test authoritarian vs. democratic values.

	1- The government should consult religious authorities when interpreting the laws.	2- Women should not be involved in politics as much as men.	3- People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.	4- Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.	5- The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.	6- If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.	7- If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.	8- When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.
strongly approve	169	37	11	5	13	54	11	26
approve	36	91	102	44	30	127	56	66
disapprove	41	98	111	150	140	59	133	120
strongly disapprove	25	45	47	72	88	31	71	59

The participants showed that they highly hold the place of religion when interpreting the law and this is reflected in reality by refusing to have a secular state when religion is separated from the state. Concerning, gender equality the participants were almost equally divided whether women should participate in political life, however, there is a law in women contribution to politics in Algeria and this is backed up by the law as it states that a quota of about 30 to 50% of elected seats must be granted to women and that a quota of 33% must be met in each election list.

This set of items also shows that the participants have a sense of tolerance towards the different ways of thinking however they do not tolerate illiteracy as 111 participants disapproved that people with little or no education should have as much say in politics as



highly-educated people. All in all, the participants tend to display authoritarian tendencies towards the political life.




Figure 40 . Authoritarian vs. democratic values

## **Conclusion:**

Bearing in mind our main research questions on whether Algerians fully understand democracy, whether our culture permits a robust implementation of it and if not what should be changed in it, our results show the following:

Algerians tend to use the terms “freedom” and “democracy” interchangeably in spite of the fact that they are not synonymous. As we saw in the first chapter, democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and insure freedom along with other fundamental characteristics that include a government that is established on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of human rights and assumption of equality before the law. In addition, participants presented vague conceptualizations of democracy when they choose between some authoritarian aspects of governments and democratic ones.

Concerning the cultural prerequisite of democracy in Algeria, first, we already ruled out the incompatibility of religion and language with democracy in the third chapter, so the Islamic majority of our nation doesn't hinder the implementation of democracy. Second, we suggested that history is more a facilitating or intervening variable than a primary one. Indeed, the structural and perhaps cultural factors underlie and help to explain why countries have over the years experienced a more democratic pattern than others, inasmuch as we are left with political culture as the main cultural prerequisite of democracy. Consequently, our findings must be reflected on Almond and Verba's classification of the three types of political cultures. To recapitulate, a *participant* is assumed to “be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects”, a *subject* tends to be “cognitively oriented primarily to the output side of government” (executive, bureaucracy and judiciary), *the parochial* tends to be “unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects” (Almond and Verba, 1963, p45).

So, our survey results show that Algerians exhibit a subject culture where there is high cognitive (knowledge and beliefs about the political system), affective (judgments and opinions about the system), and evaluative (judgments and opinions about the system) orientation towards the political system and policy outputs, however, orientations towards input objects (like political parties) and the self as an active participant are minimal. This is explained by the low trust placed in the political institutions starting from the head of the country, to parliament and political parties, to local governments and non-governmental organizations. Thus orientation towards the system and its outputs is channelled via a relatively detached, passive relationship on the part of the citizen. We can say that Algerians are lacking the attitudes and behaviours that are supportive to democracy and democratic processes even when they root for it.

What should be changed then ? In their book, Almond and Verba found that democracy can flourish in a balance or mixture of these three cultures. What should change is the trust factor ; for trust is an important prerequisite of the capacity to join with others to effect political goals and Algerians have a history of mistrust which was stressed during the 1990s. Along with this a clear cut must be drawn between what they envisage what as true democracyis, for democracy is not freedom only.

## **General Conclusion:**

This research investigates the cultural precondition needed for the implementation of democracy in Algeria. It was undertaken to answer the following questions:

- Do Algerians fully understand democracy?
- Does our culture permit a robust implementation of democracy?
- What can we change in our culture to achieve democracy?
- What are the cultural factors associated with Algerian conception of democracy?

Thus, the aim of this study is to understand the current cultural practices in Algeria and what influences and informs its method of reflecting the notion of democracy. Secondly it examines any changes in democratic ideas over time by entering into a historical overview of Algerian democratization. Thirdly, it seeks to understand how the existing theories on culture and civic culture are able to account for the implementation of democracy in Algeria.

To reach these aims, we worked on setting a clear concept of democracy ending up by framing the definition of democracy as a system of rule which undertakes the representation of the interests and views of people through the free and fair elections of representatives who belong to multiple political parties within applying the rule of law equally to all citizens and guaranteeing the human rights of all citizens who need to actively participate in political and civic life. Then we moved towards setting the different preconditions of democracy and we found that economic development, education, civil society and legitimacy are primordial requirements for democracy in combination with culture, specifically a political culture, that favours a democratic atmosphere through a mix of attitudes towards the political system and with excluding the idea that religion and language influence the implementation of democracy. Next, we furthered the study on the democratic experience in Algeria and we concluded that Algeria started a democratisation process in the nineties however it aborted due to a military intervention leaving the country in a pseudo democracy where there is a

clear pluralism via the various political parties however a supposedly free press, fair elections and human rights.

Finally to set records straight about what should change in the Algerian culture for implementing democracy, we relied on randomly choosing a sample of 271 Algerian participants and designing an email survey that tried to measure their political culture basing the methodology on the works of Almond and Verba and Inglehart who believed that (a) the belief on the part of individuals that they can influence political decisions, (b) positive feelings toward the political system, (c) high levels of interpersonal trust, and (d) preferences for gradual societal change are the main attitudes that affect the cultural traits that contribute in implementing democracy.

Applying their methodology to our study we found out that Algerians have a somewhat vague idea about democracy as they sometimes focused more on the freedom feature of democracy and leaving some of the authoritarian ideas of the society on gender equality ruled their answers of the survey along with choosing economic development over democracy. In addition, we found that Algeria exhibits a *subject cultures* where there is high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation towards the political system and policy outputs, but orientations towards input objects (like political parties) and the self as an active participant are minimal. This is explained by the low trust placed in the political institutions starting from the head of the country, to parliament and political parties, to local governments and non-governmental organizations. Thus orientation towards the system and its outputs is channelled via a relatively detached, passive relationship on the part of the citizen.

So, to conclude and in order to implement democracy in our society, what must be changed is people's attitude towards politics consequently owning what Almond and Verba called a *participant cultures*, where members of society have high cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation to the political system, the input objects, the policy outputs, and

recognize the self as an active participant in the polity as social actors tend to be activist and mobilized combined with the existence of trust in an effective and legitimate government, of an ideal economic development and of an education constituted of civic values and a civil society so as to be any peaceful and democratic play of power.

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## Appendix 1:

# استبيان حول مدى فهم المجتمع الجزائري لمصطلح الديمقراطية

الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية وزارة التعليم العالي و البحث العلمي  
جامعة 20 أوت 1955 - سكيكدة-  
كلية الآداب واللغات قسم الآداب واللغات الأجنبية

عزيزي/عزيزتي نضع بين ايديكم هذا الاستبيان لمعرفة آرائكم حول مدى فهم المجتمع الجزائري لمصطلح الديمقراطية و واقعها في الجزائر راجين منكم الإجابة عن كامل الاسئلة بكل صدق وسوف تستخدم المعلومات الواردة لغرض انجاز اطروحة دكتوراة. نرجو الضغط على الاجابة التي ترشحونها وتجدونها صحيحة حسب رأيكم .

### 1- الجنس

ذكر

انثى

### 2-العمر؟

من 18-23

من 23-35

من 35 فما فوق

### 3-المستوى العلمي ؟

المرحلة الابتدائية

المرحلة المتوسطة

المرحلة الثانوية

المرحلة الجامعية

ما بعد الجامعة

### 4- العمل؟

اجير

اعمال حرة

بطل

5 - اسم الولاية التي تعيش فيها

6- كيف يمكنك تقييم الوضع الاقتصادي بشكل عام في بلادنا اليوم؟

- جيد جدا  
 جيد  
 لدرجة ما (ليست جيدة أو سيئة)  
 سيئ  
 سيئ جدا

7- أما بالنسبة لعائلتك، كيف تقيم الوضع الاقتصادي لأسرتك اليوم؟

- جيد جدا  
 جيد  
 لدرجة (ليست جيدة أو سيئة)  
 سيئة  
 سيئ جدا

8- الأفكار التالية هي من الأمور المرغوب فيها لتحقيق الديمقراطية و لكن ليست جميعها من خصائصها الأساسية. اختر فكرة واحدة من كل مجموعة. المجموعة الاولى:

1. الحكومة تضيق الفجوة بين الأغنياء والفقراء.  
 2. يختار الناس قادة الحكومة في انتخابات حرة ونزيهة.  
 3. الحكومة لا تضيق المال العام.  
 4. الناس أحرار في التعبير عن آرائهم السياسية علانية

المجموعة الثانية

1. الحكومة مراقبة من طرف السلطة التشريعية.  
 2. الضروريات الأساسية، مثل الغذاء والكساء والمأوى، تقدم للجميع.  
 3. الناس أحرار في تنظيم الجماعات السياسية.  
 4. توفر الحكومة للشعب جودة الخدمات العامة

المجموعة الثالثة

1. الحكومة تضمن القانون والنظام.  
 2. وسائل الإعلام حرة في انتقاد افعال الحكومة  
 3. تضمن الحكومة فرص عمل للجميع.  
 4. تتنافس أطراف متعددة في الانتخابات بشكل عادل.

المجموعة الرابعة

1. الناس لديهم الحرية للمشاركة في الاحتجاجات والمظاهرات.  
 2. يجب ان تكون السياسة نظيفة وخالية من الفساد.  
 3. المحكمة تحمي الناس العاديين من سوء استخدام السلطة الحكومية  
 4. يتلقى الناس مساعدات الدولة إذا كانوا عاطلين عن العمل



9- ما مدى ثقتك في المؤسسات التالية ؟

قدر كبير من الثقة ثقة لا بأس بها ليس قدرا كبيرا من الثقة لا ثقة على الإطلاق

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الرئيس
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	المحاكم
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الحكومة الوطنية [في العاصمة]
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الأحزاب السياسية [ليس أي حزب
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	معين] البرلمان
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الخدمة المدنية
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الجيش (أو القوات المسلحة)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الشرطة
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الحكومة المحلية
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الصحف
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	التلفزيون لجنة
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	الانتخابات
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	المنظمات غير الحكومية

10 هل شاركت في الانتخابات الرئاسية الأخيرة التي عقدت في 2014؟

نعم

لا

11- بالتفكير في الانتخابات الوطنية في 2014، هل

(أ) حضرت في اجتماع حملة أو تجمع؟

نعم

لا

(ب) هل حاولت إقناع الآخرين بالتصويت لصالح مرشح أو حزب معين؟

نعم

لا

(ج) هل قمت بأي عمل لصالح حزب أو مرشح في الانتخابات؟

نعم

لا

(د) على العموم، إلى أي مدى يمكنك القول ان الانتخابات الاخيرة كانت حرة ونزيهة ؟

حرة ونزيهة تماما

حرة ونزيهة، ولكن مع بعض المشاكل الصغيرة

حرة ونزيهة، مع مشاكل كبيرة

غير حرة أو نزيهة

12- بشكل عام، كيف يمكنك تقييم الامن في هذه المدينة / البلدة / القرية التي تعيش فيها ؟

- امنة جدا  
 أمنة  
 غير أمنة  
 غير أمنة على الإطلاق

13-ما مدى اهتمامك بالسياسة؟

- مهتم جدا  
 مهتم إلى حد ما  
 لست مهتما جدا  
 لست مهتما على الإطلاق

14-ما مدى تتبعك للأخبار حول السياسة والحكومة؟

- كل يوم  
 عدة مرات في الأسبوع  
 مرة واحدة أو مرتين في الأسبوع  
 ولا حتى مرة واحدة في الأسبوع  
 أبدا

15-عندما تجتمع مع أفراد عائلتك أو أصدقائك، كم مرة تتم فيها مناقشة المسائل السياسية؟

- في كثير من الأحيان  
 من حين الى اخر  
 أبدا

16-من بين الأحزاب السياسية الموجودة في بلدنا، اذكر ثلاث احزاب تعرفها

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17-ما هو نوع الحكومة الذي تفضله؟

- حكومة تنفذ ما يريده الناخبون.  
 حكومة تفعل ما تعتقد ه أفضل للشعب.

18- هل توافق بشدة أو توافق فقط مع ما يلي؟

وافق بشدة	وافق فقط	
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	يجب لوسائل الإعلام أن يكون لها الحق في نشر الأخبار والأفكار دون سيطرة الحكومة
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	للحكومة الحق في منع وسائل الإعلام من نشر الأشياء التي قد تكون مزعومة للاستقرار السياسي
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	يجب على الفرد ان يكون المسؤول الأول عن نجاحه في الحياة
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	يجب على الحكومة أن تتحمل المسؤولية الرئيسية عن رعاية رفاهية الشعب
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	يتم اختيار القادة السياسيين من قبل الشعب من خلال انتخابات مفتوحة وتنافسية
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	يتم اختيار القادة السياسيين على أساس أخلاقهم ومؤهلاتهم حتى من دون انتخابات
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	تتنافس أطراف متعددة لتمثيل مصالح سياسية
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	طرف واحد يمثل مصالح جميع الناس
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	نظام مثل بلدنا، حتى لو كان يعمل في المشاكل، يستحق تأييد الشعب

19- على العموم، ما مدى رضاك أو استيائك بطريقة عمل الديمقراطية في بلدنا

- راض جدا
- راض إلى حد ما
- غير راض جدا
- لست راضيا على الإطلاق

20- في رأيك ما مدى ديمقراطية بلدنا؟

- ديمقراطية جدا
- ديمقراطية، ولكن مع بعض المشاكل الصغيرة
- ديمقراطية، مع مشاكل كبيرة
- ليست ديمقراطية

21- أين تضع بلدنا في ظل الحكومة الحالية؟ ("1" يعني أنها ليست ديمقراطية و "10" ديمقراطية كاملة)

	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	"1" يعني أنها ليست ديمقراطية
"10" ديمقراطية كاملة	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	

22- أين تضع بلدنا منذ عشر سنوات؟

	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	"1" يعني ليست ديمقراطية
"10" يعني ديمقراطية كاملة	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	

23-ما مدى اعتقادك ان الديمقراطية مناسبة لبلدنا هنا( "1" يعني أن الديمقراطية غير مناسبة و "10" يعني أنها مناسبة)

	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	
"10" يعني أنها مناسبة	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	"1" يعني أن الديمقراطية غير مناسبة

24-كم مرة تعتقد أن قادة الحكومة يخرقون القانون أو يسبون استخدام سلطتهم؟

- دائما
- معظم الوقت
- بعض الأحيان
- نادرا

25-كم مرة تعتقد أن انتخاباتنا توفر للناخبين خيارا حقيقيا بين مختلف الأحزاب / المرشحين؟

- دائما
- معظم الوقت
- بعض الأحيان
- نادرا

26-إلى أي مدى تستطيع الهيئة التشريعية التحقق من زعماء الحكومة؟

- قادرة جدا
- قادرة
- ليست قادرة
- غير قادرة على الإطلاق

27-إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن الحكومة تستجيب لما يريده الناس؟

- تستجيب دائما
- تستجيب بشكل كبير لا
- تستجيب دائما لاتستجيب
- على الإطلاق

28-في منطقتكم أو مجتمعكم، هل يعبر الناس عن اهتماماتهم وشواغلهم بالشؤون المحلية؟

- معظم الناس
- الكثير من الناس
- بعض الناس
- القليل من الناس

29- ما مدى شعورك بأن وقت الانتخابات يجعل الحكومة تولي اهتماما لما يعتقد الناس؟

كثير جدا

كثيرا نوعا ما

ليس كثيرا

على الإطلاق

30- ما مدى انتشار الفساد والرشوة في حكومتكم المحلية / البلدية؟

لا يوجد

ليس الكثير من المسؤولين فاسدين

معظم المسؤولين فاسدين

الجميع تقريبا فاسد

31- أي من العبارات التالية أقرب إلى رأيك؟

الديمقراطية هي دائما الأفضل لأي نوع من الحكومات

في ظل بعض الظروف، يمكن أن تكون الحكومة الاستبدادية أفضل من حكومة ديمقراطية

بالنسبة للأشخاص مثلي، لا يهم ما إذا كان لدينا نظام ديمقراطي أو غير ديمقراطي

32- أي من العبارات التالية أقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

إن الديمقراطية قادرة على حل مشاكل مجتمعنا

الديمقراطية لا يمكن أن تحل مشاكل مجتمعنا

33- إذا كان عليك أن تختار بين الديمقراطية والتنمية الاقتصادية، ماذا ستختار كأكثر أهمية؟

التنمية الاقتصادية هي بالتأكيد أكثر أهمية

التنمية الاقتصادية أكثر أهمية إلى حد ما

الديمقراطية أكثر أهمية إلى حد ما

الديمقراطية هي بالتأكيد أكثر أهمية

34- إذا كان عليك أن تختار بين الحد من عدم المساواة الاقتصادية وحماية الحرية السياسية، ماذا ستختار كأكثر أهمية؟

الحد من التفاوت الاقتصادي هو بالتأكيد أكثر أهمية

الحد من التفاوت الاقتصادي هو أكثر أهمية إلى حد ما

حماية الحرية السياسية أكثر أهمية إلى حد ما

حماية الحرية السياسية هي بالتأكيد أكثر أهمية

35-لدي هنا بعض البيانات. لكل عبارة، هل تقول إنك توافق بشدة، أو توافق نوعا ما، أو لا توافق إلى حد ما، أو لا توافق بشدة؟

اوافق بشدة	اوافق نوعا ما	لا اوافق إلى حد ما لا اوافق بشدة		
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*يجب أن نتخلص من البرلمان والانتخابات وأن يكون لدينا زعيم قوي يقرر الأمور.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*ينبغي السماح لحزب سياسي واحد فقط بالانتخاب والترشح للمناصب.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*يجب على الجيش أن يحكم البلاد. *ينبغي أن نتخلص من الانتخابات والبرلمانات وأن يتخذ الخبراء القرارات نيابة عن الشعب.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*أعتقد أن لدي القدرة على المشاركة في السياسة.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*في بعض الأحيان تبدو السياسة والحكومة معقدة بحيث لا يستطيع شخص مثلي فهم ما يجري.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*الناس مثلي ليس لديهم أي تأثير على ما تفعله الحكومة.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*يمكنك عموما الوثوق بالناس الذين يديرون حكومتنا للقيام بما هو صحيح.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*ينبغي للمواطن أن يظل دائما مخلصا لبلده، بغض النظر عن مدى قصوره أو ما ارتكبه من خطأ.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*يجب على الحكومة استشارة السلطات الدينية عند تفسير القوانين
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*ينبغي ألا تشارك المرأة في السياسة بقدر الرجل.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*لا بد أن يكون للأشخاص الذين لديهم تعليم قليل أو معدوم نفس القدر من الاهتمام في السياسة مقارنة بالأشخاص الذين يتمتعون بتعليم عالي.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*قادة الحكومة هم مثل رب الأسرة؛ ينبغي لنا جميعا أن نحترم قراراتهم.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*على الحكومة أن تقرر ما إذا كان ينبغي السماح بمناقشة افكار معينة في المجتمع.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*إذا كان لدينا قادة سياسيون أخلاقيون ، يمكننا أن نتركهم يقررون كل شيء.
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*إذا كان لدى الناس الكثير من طرق التفكير المختلفة، فإن المجتمع سيكون فوضويا
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	*عندما يواجه البلد وضعاً صعباً، لا بأس أن تتجاهل الحكومة القانون من أجل معالجة الوضع

## Appendix 2:

### دستور 1963

المقدمة  
المبادئ و الأهداف الأساسية  
الحقوق الأساسية  
جبهة التحرير الوطني  
ممارسة السيادة - المجلس الوطني  
السلطة التنفيذية  
العدالة  
المجلس الدستوري  
المجلس الأعلى  
تعديل الدستور  
أحكام إنتقالية

#### المقدمة

ما فتى الشعب الجزائري منذ ما ينيف على المائة سنة، يواصل كفاحا مسلحا و كفاحا أخرا خلقيا و سياسيا ضد الغزو الإستعماري في جميع أشكال، اضطره، و ذلك عقب عدوان سنة 1830 على الدولة الجزائرية و احتلال القوات الإستعمارية الفرنسية للبلاد. و في غرة نوفمبر عام 1954، استنفرت جبهة التحرير الوطني تعبئة جميع طاقات الأمة، ذلك أن النضال من أجل تحقيق الإستقلال قد بلغ مرحلته النهائية.

فاحتدمت حرب الإبادة التي شنها الإستعمار الفرنسي، وسقط ضحيتها في ميدان الشرف أكثر من مليون شهيد، اشتروا بحياتهم حبهم للوطن و الحرية.

و في شهر مارس عام 1962، خرج الشعب الجزائري منتصرا من هذه المعركة، التي اصطلح حرها سبع سنوات و نصف، بقيادة جبهة التحرير الوطني.

ثم شرعت الجزائر تجدد لنفسها أنظمة سياسية قومية، بعد استرجاعها لسيادتها، اثر مائة و اثننتين و ثلاثين سنة (132) من السيطرة الإستعمارية، و النظام الإقطاعي.

فمضت الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية توجه منحى نشاطها الى طريق تشييد البلاد، و فاء منها للميثاق الذي أقره المجلس القومي للثورة الجزائرية في طرابلس، و طبقا للمبادئ الاشتراكية و الممارسة الفعلية للسلطة من طرف الشعب الذي يشكل طليعته الفلاحون، و الجماهير الكادحة، و المثقفون الثوريون.

ان الشعب الجزائري لمواصل زحفه في طريق ثورة ديمقراطية شعبية، بعد أن حقق هدف الإستقلال الوطني الذي استهدفته جبهة التحرير الوطني في غرة نوفمبر 1954.

هذه الثورة المتجسمة في :

- الشروع في انجاز الإصلاح الزراعي، و انشاء اقتصاد وطني ينهض العمال بتسييره.  
- و انتهاج سياسة اجتماعية لفائدة الجماهير كي يرتفع مستوى معيشة العمال، و التعجيل بترقية المرأة قصد اشتراكها في تدبير الشؤون العامة، و تطوير البلاد، و محو الأمية، و تنمية الثقافة القومية، و تحسين السكن، و الحالة الصحية العامة.  
- و توخي سياسة دولية قائمة على قاعدة من الإستقلال، و التعاون الدولي، و مناهضة الإستعمار، و الموازنة الفعلية للحركات النضالية في العالم من أجل التحرير الوطني و الإستقلال.

- ان الاسلام و اللغة العربية قد كانا و لا يزال كل منهما قوة فعالة في الصمود ضد المحاولة التي قام بها النظام الإستعماري لتجريد الجزائريين من شخصيتهم. فيتعين على الجزائر التأكيد بأن اللغة العربية هي اللغة القومية الرسمية لها، و أنها تستمد طاقتها الروحية الأساسية من دين الاسلام، بيد أن الجمهورية تضمن حرية ممارسة الأديان لكل فرد و احترام آرائه و معتقداته.

ان الجيش الوطني الشعبي الذي كان بالأمس جيش التحرير الوطني هو بمثابة سنان الرمح في نضال التحرير القومي، من ثمة سيظل هذا الجيش مسهما في خدمة الشعب، ساهرا على النشاط السياسي داخل إطار الحزب، عاملا على تشييد الانظمة الجديدة الاقتصادية منها و الاجتماعية للبلاد.

من الأهداف الأساسية للجمهورية، الوفاء لتقاليد أمتنا الفلسفية و الاخلاقية و السياسية، و المطابقة للإتجاه السياسي الدولي، الذي اختاره الشعب الجزائري.

كما أن الحقوق السياسية المعترف بها لكل مواطن بالجمهورية تمكنه من المساهمة بطريقة كلية و فعالة في فريضة تشييد البلاد، و تخول له النمو، و تعده لمعرفة نفسه بصورة منسجمة في نطاق المجموعة طبقا لمصالح البلاد، و اختيارات الشعب.

ان ضرورة قيام حزب الطليعة الواحد، و دوره المرجح في اعداد و مراقبة سياسة الأمة، هما المبدأان الجوهران اللذان حملا على اختيار شتى الحلول لمعالجة المشاكل الدستورية التي تواجه الدولة الجزائرية و بذلك يتم ضمان السير المنسجم و الفعال للنظم السياسية المقررة في الدستور عن طريق جبهة التحرير الوطني التي :

- تعي و تنظم الجماهير الشعبية، و تهذبها لتحقيق الاشتراكية.

- و تدرك و تتشخص مطامح الجماهير الشعبية بالاتصال الدائم بها.

- و تعد و تحدد سياسة الأمة و تراقب تنفيذها.

و يتم اعداد هذه السياسة و تنشيطها و توجيهها من طرف أشد العناصر الثورية و عيا و نشاطا.

- كما تقيم جبهة التحرير الوطني تنظيمها و قواعدها على مبدأ المركزية الديمقراطية.

ان الحزب وحده باعتباره الجهاز المحرك الدافع الذي يستمد قوته من الشعب، هو الذي يستطيع أن يحطم أجهزة الماضي الاقتصادية، و يقيم مقامها نظما اقتصادية يمارسها الفلاحون العاملون، و الجماهير الكادحة بصورة ديمقراطية.

كما أنه على الشعب أن يسهر على استقرار الأنظمة السياسية للبلاد، هذا الإستقرار الذي هو ضرورة حيوية بالنسبة لمهام التشييد الاشتراكي التي تواجهها الجمهورية.

أما النظام الرئاسي و النظام البرلماني التقليديان للحكم، فلا يمكن لهما أن يضمنا هذا الإستقرار المنشود، بينما النظام القائم على قاعدة هيمنة الشعب صاحب السيادة، و على الحزب الطلائعي الواحد، فإنه يمكنه أن يضم ذلك الإستقرار بصورة فعالة.

ان جبهة التحرير الوطني التي تمثل القوة الثورة للأمة، تسهر هلى هذا الإستقرار، كما أنها ستكون خير ضمان لتجاوب سياسة البلاد مع المطامح العميقة للشعب.

#### المبادئ و الأهداف الأساسي

المادة الأولى : الجزائر جمهورية ديمقراطية شعبية.

المادة 2 : و هي جزء لا يتجزأ من المغرب العربي و العالم العربي و افريقيا.

المادة 3 : شعارها "الثورة من الشعب و للشعب".  
المادة 4: الإسلام دين الدولة و تضمن الجمهورية لكل فرد احترام أرائه و معتقداته و حرية ممارسة الأديان.  
المادة 5 : اللغة العربية هي اللغة القومية و الرسمية للدولة.  
المادة 6 : علم الدولة أخضر و أبيض يتوسطه هلال و نجم أحمران.  
المادة 7 : عاصمة البلاد الجزائرية هي مدينة الجزائر، مقر المجلس الوطني و الحكومة.  
المادة 8 : الجيش الوطني جيش شعبي، و هو في خدمة الشعب و تحت تصرف الحكومة بحكم وفائه لتقاليد الكفاح من أجل التحرير الوطني.  
- و هو يتولى الدفاع عن أراضي الجمهورية و يسهم في مناحي النشاط السياسي و الاقتصادي و الاجتماعي للبلاد في نطاق الحزب.

المادة 9 : تتكون الجمهورية من مجموعات ادارية يتولى القانون تحديد مداها و اختصاصها.  
تعتبر البلدية أساسا للمجموعة الترابية و الاقتصادية و الاجتماعية.  
المادة 10 : تتمثل الأهداف الأساسية للجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية في :  
- صيانة الاستقلال الوطني و سلامة الأراضي الوطنية و الوحدة الوطنية.  
- ممارسة السلطة من طرف الشعب الذي يؤلف طليعته فلاحون و عمال و متقنون ثوريون.  
- تشييد ديمقراطية اشتراكية، و مقاومة استغلال الإنسان في جميع أشكاله، و ضمان حق العمل و مجانية التعليم، و تصفية جميع بقايا الاستعمار.  
- الدفاع عن الحرية و احترام كرامة الإنسان.  
- مقاومة كل نوع من التمييز و خاصة التمييز العنصري و الديني.  
-السلام في العالم.  
- استنكار التعذيب و كل مساس حسي أو معنوي بكيان الإنسان.  
المادة 11 : توافق الجمهورية على الاعلان العالمي لحقوق الإنسان و تنضم الى كل منظمة دولية تستجيب لمطامح الشعب الجزائري و ذلك اقتناعا منها بضرورة التعاون الدولي

### الحقوق الأساسية

المادة 12 : لكل المواطنين من الجنسين نفس الحقوق و نفس الواجبات.  
المادة 13 : لكل مواطن استكمل 19 عاما من عمره حق التصويت.  
المادة 14 : لا يجوز الإعتداء على حرمة السكن، و يضمن حفظ سر المراسلة لجميع المواطنين.  
المادة 15 : لا يمكن إيقاف أي شخص و لا متابعته الا في الأحوال المنصوص عليها في القانون و أمام القضاة المعيّنين بمقتضاه و طبقا للإجراءات المقررة بموجبه.  
المادة 16 : تعترف الجمهورية بحق كل فرد في حياة لائقة و في توزيع عادل للدخل القومي.  
المادة 17 : تحمي الدولة الأسرة باعتبارها الخلية الأساسية للمجتمع.  
المادة 18 : التعليم اجباري، و الثقافة في متناول الجميع بدون تمييز الا ما كان ناشئا عن استعدادات كل فرد و حاجيات الجماعة.  
المادة 19 : تضمن الجمهورية حرية الصحافة، و حرية وسائل الاعلام الأخرى، و حرية تأسيس الجمعيات، و حرية التعبير، و مخاطبة الجمهور و حرية الإجماع.  
المادة 20 : الحق النقابي، و حق الاضراب، و مشاركة العمال في تدبير المؤسسات معترف بها جميعا، و تمارس هذه الحقوق في نطاق القانون.  
المادة 21 : تضمن الجمهورية الجزائرية حق الإلتجاء لكل من يكافح في سبيل الحرية.  
المادة 22 : لا يجوز لأي كان أن يستعمل الحقوق و الحريات السالفة الذكر في المساس باستقلال الأمة و سلامة الأراضي الوطنية و الوحدة الوطنية و مؤسسات الجمهورية و مطامح الشعب الاشتراكية، و مبدأ وحدانية جبهة التحرير الوطني.

### جبهة التحرير الوطني

المادة 23 : جبهة التحرير الوطني هي حزب الطليعة الواحد في الجزائر.  
المادة 24 : جبهة التحرير الوطني تحدد سياسة الأمة، و توجي بعمل الدولة و تراقب عمل المجلس الوطني و الحكومة.  
المادة 25 : جبهة التحرير الوطني تشخص المطامح العميقة للجماهير و تهذبها و تنظمها و هي رائدها في تحقيق مطامحها.  
المادة 26 : جبهة التحرير الوطني تنجز أهداف الثورة الديمقراطية الشعبية، و تشييد الاشتراكية في الجزائر.

### ممارسة السيادة - المجلس الوطني

المادة 27 : السيادة الوطنية للشعب يمارسها بواسطة ممثلين له في مجلس وطني، ترشحهم جبهة التحرير الوطني، و ينتخبون باقتراع عام مباشر و سرى لمدة خمسة سنين.  
المادة 28 : يعبر المجلس الوطني عن الارادة الشعبية، و يتولى التصويت على القوانين، و يراقب النشاط الحكومي.  
المادة 29 : يحدد القانون طريقة انتخاب النواب في المجلس الوطني و عددهم، و شروط صلاحية انتخابهم، و نظام ما يتناهى و النيابة.  
و في حالة النزاع حول قانونية انتخاب النائب، تتولى "لجنة مراجعة السلط و تصحيح النيابة" المنصوص عليها في النظام الداخلي للمجلس، الفصل في الموضوع طبقا للشروط المحددة.  
المادة 30 : لا يمكن للمجلس الوطني الاعلان عن اسقاط النائب الا بأغلبية ثلثي أعضائه و باقتراح من الهيئة العليا لجبهة التحرير الوطني.  
المادة 31 : يتمتع النائب بالحصانة البرلمانية خلال مدة نيابته.  
المادة 32 : لا يجوز إيقاف أي نائب، أو متابعته فيما يتعلق بالقضايا الجنائية دون اذن المجلس الوطني الا في حالة التلبس بالجريمة، و يوقف حبس أو متابعة النائب بطلب من المجلس الوطني.  
و في حالة التلبس بالجريمة يقدم فوراً اخطار المتابعة أو الإجراءات المتخذة ضد النائب الى مكتب المجلس الذي يمكنه ان يطالب بموجب سلطة القانون اتخاذ التدابير الضرورية لاحترام مبدأ الحصانة البرلمانية.  
و لا تجوز متابعة أي عضو من أعضاء المجلس الوطني، أو إيقافه أو حبسه، أو محاكمته بسبب ما يدلي به من آراء أو تصويت خلال ممارسة نيابته.

المادة 33 : يجتمع المجلس الوطني وجوبا قبل اليوم الخامس عشر الموالي لانتخاب أعضائه و يعتمد الى تصحيح نيابتهم.  
و ينتخب فوراً رئيسه و مكتبه و لجانته.

المادة 34 : رئيس المجلس الوطني هو الشخصية الثانية في الدولة.  
المادة 35 : يحدد المجلس الوطني في قانونه الداخلي قواعد تنظيمه و تسييره.  
المادة 36 : لرئيس الجمهورية و للنواب حق المبادرة بتقديم القوانين.  
توضع مشاريع و اقتراحات و تصميمات القوانين على مكتب المجلس الذي يحيلها على اللجان البرلمانية المختصة لدراستها.  
المادة 37 : لأعضاء الحكومة حق حضور جلسات المجلس الوطني و المشاركة في مناقشة اللجان.  
المادة 38 : يمارس المجلس الوطني مراقبته للنشاط الحكومي بواسطة :

- الاستماع الى الوزراء داخل اللجان

- السؤال الكتابي.

- السؤال الشفوي مع المناقشة أو بدونها.



## السلطة التنفيذية

- المادة 39 : تسند السلطة التنفيذية الى رئيس الدولة الذي يحمل لقب رئيس الجمهورية.  
و هو ينتخب لمدة خمس سنوات عن طريق الإقتراع العام المباشر و السري بعد تعيينه من طرف الحزب.  
يمكن لكل مسلم جزائري الأصل بلغ عمره 35 سنة على الأقل و متمتع بحقوقه المدنية و السياسية أن ينتخب رئيسا للجمهورية.
- المادة 40 : يؤدي رئيس الجمهورية قبل مباشرته لمهام وظيفته القسم أمام المجلس الوطني بالعبارات التالية : (وفاء لمبادئ ثورتنا و لأرواح شهدائنا، أقسم بالله العظيم ان أحترم الدستور و أدافع عليه و أحافظ على سلامة الوطن و استقلال البلاد و وحدتها، و أن أبذل كل جهدي لرعاية مصالح الشعب و الجمهورية الديمقراطية الشعبية).
- المادة 41 : يعتمد لدى رئيس الجمهورية السفراء الأجانب و المبعوثون فوق العادة.  
و يعين السفراء و المبعوثون فوق العادة باقتراح من طرف وزير الشؤون الخارجية.
- المادة 42 : يوقع رئيس الجمهورية بعد استشارة المجلس الوطني و يصادق على المعاهدات و الإتفاقيات و الموائيق الدولية و يسهر على تنفيذها
- المادة 43 : و هو القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة للجمهورية.
- المادة 44 : يعلن رئيس الجمهورية الحرب و يبرم السلم بموافقة المجلس الوطني.
- المادة 45 : يتأسس رئيس الجمهورية المجلس الأعلى للدفاع و المجلس الأعلى للقضاء.
- المادة 46 : يمارس رئيس الجمهورية حق العفو بعد إستشارة المجلس الأعلى للقضاء.
- المادة 47 : رئيس الجمهورية هو المسؤول الوحيد أمام المجلس الوطني، يعين الوزراء الذين يجب أن يختار الثلثي 2/3 منهم على الأقل من بين النواب و يقدمهم الى المجلس.
- المادة 48 : يتولى رئيس الجمهورية تحديد سياسة الحكومة و توجيهها، كما يقوم بتسيير و تنسيق السياسة الداخلية و الخارجية للبلاد طبقا لإرادة الشعب التي يجسمها الحزب، و يعبر عنها المجلس الوطني.
- المادة 49 : يكلف رئيس الجمهورية باصدار القوانين و نشرها.  
يصدر القوانين خلال الأيام العشرة الموالية لإحالتها عليه من طرف المجلس الوطني، و يوقع مرسومات التطبيق. و يمكن التخفيض من أجل الأيام العشرة عندما يطلب المجلس الوطني الاستعجال.
- المادة 50 : يجوز لرئيس الجمهورية أن يطلب من المجلس الوطني برسالة مبينة الأسباب خلال الأجل المحدد لاصدار القوانين، للتداول في شأنها مرة ثانية، و لايمكن رفض طلبه هذا.
- المادة 51 : اذا لم يصدر رئيس الجمهورية القوانين في الأجل المنصوص عليها فإن رئيس المجلس الوطني يتولى إصدارها.
- المادة 52 : يتولى رئيس الجمهورية تنفيذ القوانين.
- المادة 53 : تمارس السلطة النظامية من رئيس الجمهورية.
- المادة 54 : يعين رئيس الجمهورية الموظفين في جميع المناصب المدنية و العسكرية.
- المادة 55 : يطعن المجلس الوطني في مسؤولية رئيس الجمهورية بإيداع لائحة سحب الثقة، يتعين توقيعها من طرف ثلث النواب الذين يتكون منهم المجلس.
- المادة 56 : التصويت على لائحة سحب الثقة بالأغلبية المطلقة لنواب المجلس الوطني يوجب استقالة رئيس الجمهورية و الحل التلقائي للمجلس.  
و لا يجوز الإلتجاء الى هذا التصويت العلني إلا بعد مضي أجل خمسة أيام كاملة على إيداع اللائحة.
- المادة 57 : في حالة استقالة رئيس الجمهورية أو وفاته أو عجزه النهائي أو سحب الثقة من الحكومة، يمارس المجلس الوطني مهام رئيس الجمهورية، و يساعده فيها رؤساء اللجان في المجلس الوطني.  
و مهمته الأساسية تصريف الشؤون العادية، وإعداد الانتخابات في ظرف شهرين لتعيين رئيس الجمهورية و أعضاء المجلس الوطني في حالة حله.
- المادة 58 : يجوز لرئيس الجمهورية أن يطلب من المجلس الوطني التفويض له لمدة محدودة حق اتخاذ تدابير ذات صبغة تشريعية عن طريق أوامر تشريعية تتخذ في نطاق مجلس الوزراء أو تعرض على مصادقة المجلس في أجل ثلاثة أشهر.
- المادة 59 : في حالة الخطر الوشيك الوقوع يمكن لرئيس الجمهورية اتخاذ تدابير استثنائية لحماية استقلال الأمة و مؤسسات الجمهورية. و يجتمع المجلس الوطني وجوبا.

## العدالة

- المادة 60 : يقضى باسم الشعب الجزائري طبقا للشروط التي يحددها قانون التنظيم القضائي.
- المادة 61 : يعترف بحق الدفاع و يكون مضمونا في الجنايات.
- المادة 62 : لا يخضع القضاة في ممارستهم لوظائفهم إلا للقانون و لمصالح الثورة الاشتراكية.  
إستقلالهم مضمون بالقانون و بوجود المجلس الأعلى للقضاء.
- المجلس الدستوري**
- المادة 63 : يتألف المجلس الدستوري من الرئيس الأول للمحكمة العليا، و رئيسي الحجرتين المدنية و الإدارية في المحكمة العليا و ثلاثة نواب يعينهم المجلس الوطني و عضو يعينه رئيس الجمهورية.
- ينتخب أعضاء المجلس الدستوري رئيسهم الذي ليس له صوت مرجح.
- المادة 64 : يفصل المجلس الدستوري في دستورية القوانين و الأوامر التشريعية بطلب من رئيس الجمهورية أو رئيس المجلس الوطني.

## المجلس الأعلى

- المادة 65 : المجلس الأعلى للقضاء : يتألف المجلس الأعلى للقضاء من رئيس الجمهورية و وزير العدل، و الرئيس الأول للمحكمة العليا، و وكيل الدولة العام لديها، و محام لدى المحكمة العليا، و إثنين من رجال القضاء أحدهما من قضاة الصلح، ينتخبان من طرف زملائهم على المستوى الوطني و ستة أعضاء تنتخبهم لجنة العدل الدائمة في المجلس الوطني من بين أعضائها.
- المادة 66 : اختصاصات المجلس الأعلى للقضاء و قواعد سيره تحدد بقانون.
- المادة 67 : المجلس الأعلى للدفاع : يتألف المجلس الأعلى للدفاع من رئيس الجمهورية و وزير الدفاع الوطني، و وزير الداخلية، و وزير الشؤون الخارجية، و رئيس لجنة الدفاع الوطني في المجلس، و عضوين يعينهما رئيس الجمهورية.
- المادة 68 : يستشار المجلس في جميع المسائل العسكرية.
- المادة 69 : المجلس الأعلى الإقتصادي و الإجتماعي :
- يتألف المجلس الأعلى الإقتصادي و الإجتماعي من خمسة نواب يعينهم المجلس الوطني، و مدير التصميم، و حاكم البنك المركزي للجزائر و المسؤولون عن المنظمات القومية و ممثلين للنواحي الرئيسية من النشاط القومي الإقتصادي و الإجتماعي يعينهم رئيس الجمهورية.
- ينتخب المجلس الأعلى الإقتصادي و الإجتماعي رئيسه.
- المادة 70 : يستشار المجلس الأعلى الإقتصادي و الإجتماعي في جميع مشروعات و مقترحات القانون ذات الطابع الإقتصادي و الإجتماعي، و يمكنه الإستماع الى أعضاء الحكومة.

## تعديل الدستور

- المادة 71 : ترجع المبادرة بتعديل الدستور الى كل من رئيس الجمهورية و الأغلبية المطلقة لأعضاء المجلس الوطني معا.

المادة 72 : يتضمن إجراء تعديل الدستور، تلاوتين و تصويتين بالأغلبية المطلقة لأعضاء المجلس الوطني يفصل بينهما أجل شهرين.  
المادة 73 : يعرض مشروع قانون التعديل على مصادقة الشعب عن طريق الإستفتاء.  
المادة 74 : في حالة مصادقة الشعب على مشروع تعديل الدستور يتم إصداره من طرف رئيس الجمهورية باعتباره قانونا دستوريا خلال الأيام الثمانية الموالية لتاريخ الإستفتاء.

#### أحكام إنتقالية

المادة 75 : النشيد الوطني مؤقتا هو "قسما"، و سيتولى قانون غير دستوري تحديد النشيد الوطني في المستقبل.  
المادة 76 : يجب تحقيق تعميم اللغة العربية في أقرب وقت ممكن في كامل أراضي الجمهورية. بيد أنه، خلافا لأحكام هذا القانون، سوف يجوز استعمال اللغة الفرنسية مؤقتا الى جانب اللغة العربية.  
المادة 77 : يمدد أجل النيابة التشريعية لأعضاء المجلس الوطني التأسيسي المنتخب بتاريخ 20 سبتمبر 1962، حتى تاريخ 20 سبتمبر 1964.  
و تجرى قبل هذا التاريخ انتخابات المجلس الوطني طبقا للدستور، و لمدة أربع سنوات.  
و يواصل رئيس الحكومة أداء مهامه الراهنة حتى يتم انتخاب رئيس الجمهورية الذي يتعين أن يجرى خلال أجل أقصاه شهر بعد المصادقة على الدستور عن طريق الإستفتاء.

المادة 78: يصدر رئيس الجمهورية مشروع الدستور في ظرف ثمانية أيام بعد مصادقة الشعب عليه.

## Appendix 3:

### دستور 1989

#### الباب الأول المبادئ العامة التي تحكم المجتمع الجزائري

الفصل الأول الجزائر

الفصل الثاني الشعب

الفصل الثالث الدولة

الفصل الرابع الحقوق والحريات

الفصل الخامس الواجبات

#### الباب الثاني تنظيم السلطات

الفصل الأول السلطة التنفيذية

الفصل الثاني السلطة التشريعية

الفصل الثالث السلطة القضائية

#### الباب الثالث الرقابة والمؤسسات الاستشارية

الفصل الأول الرقابة

الفصل الثاني المؤسسات الاستشارية

#### الباب الرابع التعديل الدستوري

#### تمهيد

الشعب الجزائري شعب حر ، ومصمم على البقاء حرا .  
فتاريخه الطويل سلسلة متصلة الحلقات من الكفاح والجهاد ، جعلت الجزائر دائما منبت الحرية ، وأرض العزة والكرامة .  
لقد عرفت الجزائر في أعز اللحظات الحاسمة التي عاشها البحر الأبيض المتوسط ، كيف تجد في أبنائها ، منذ العهد النوميدي ، والفتح الإسلامي ، حتى الحروب التحريرية من الاستعمار ، روادا للحرية ، والوحدة والرفي ، وبناء دول ديمقراطية مزدهرة ، طوال فترات المجد والسلام .

وكان أول نوفمبر 1954 نقطة تحول فاصلة في تقرير مصيرها ، وتتويجا عظيما لمقاومة ضروس ، واجهت بها مختلف الاعتداءات على ثقافة شعبها ، وقيمته ، ومقومات شخصيته ، وتمتد جذور نضالها اليوم في شتى الميادين في ماضي أمته المجيد .  
لقد تجمع الشعب الجزائري في ظل الحركة الوطنية ، ثم انضوى تحت لواء جبهة التحرير الوطني ، وقدم تضحيات جساما من أجل أن يتكفل بمصيره الجماعي في كنف الحرية والهوية الثقافية الوطنية المستعادتين . ويشيد مؤسساته الدستورية الشعبية الأصيلة .  
وقد توجت جبهة التحرير الوطني ما بذله خيرة أبناء الجزائر من تضحيات في الحرب التحريرية الشعبية بالاستقلال ، وشيدت دولة عصرية كاملة السيادة

إن إيمان الشعب بالاختيارات الجماعية مكنه من تحقيق انتصارات كبرى ، طبعتها استعادة الثورات الوطنية بطابعها ، وجعلتها دولة في خدمة الشعب وحده ، تمارس سلطاتها بكل استقلالية ، بعيدة عن أي ضغط خارجي .  
إن الشعب الجزائري ناضل ويناضل دوما في سبيل الحرية والديمقراطية ، ويعتزم أن يبني بهذا الدستور مؤسسات دستورية ، أساسها مشاركة كل جزائري وجزائرية في تسيير الشؤون العمومية ، والقدرة على تحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية ، والمساواة ، وضمان الحرية لكل فرد فالدستور يجسم عبقرية الشعب الخاصة ، ومرآته الصافية التي تعكس تطلعاته ، وثمره إصراره ، ونتاج التحولات الاجتماعية العميقة التي أحدثها ، وبمواقفته عليه يؤكد بكل عزم وتقدير أكثر من أي وقت مضى سمو القانون .

إن الدستور فوق الجميع ، وهو القانون الأساسي الذي يضمن الحقوق والحريات الفردية والجماعية ، ويحمي مبدأ حرية اختيار الشعب ، ويضفي الشرعية على ممارسة السلطات ، ويكفل الحماية القانونية ، ورقابة عمل السلطات العمومية في مجتمع تسوده الشرعية ، ويتحقق فيه تفتح الإنسان بكل أبعاده .

فالشعب المتحضر بقيمه الروحية الراسخة ، والمحافظ على تقاليده في التضامن والعدل ، واثق في قدرته على المساهمة الفعالة في التقدم الثقافي ، والاجتماعي ، والاقتصادي ، في عالم اليوم والغد .

إن الجزائر ، أرض الإسلام وجزء لا يتجزأ من المغرب العربي الكبير ، وأرض عربية ، وبلاد متوسطية وإفريقية تعزز بإشعاع ثورتها ، ثورة أول نوفمبر ، ويشرفها الاحترام الذي أحرزته ، وعرفت كيف تحافظ عليه بالتزامها إزاء كل القضايا العادلة في العالم .  
وفخر الشعب ، وتضحياته ، وإحساسه بالمسؤوليات ، وتمسكه العريق بالحرية ، والعدالة الاجتماعية ، تمثل كلها أحسن ضمان لاحترام مبادئ هذا الدستور الذي يصادق عليه وينقله إلى الأجيال القادمة ورثة رواد الحرية ، وبناء المجتمع الحر .

#### الباب الأول

#### المبادئ العامة التي تحكم المجتمع الجزائري

#### الفصل الأول

#### الجزائر

المادة الأولى : الجزائر جمهورية ديمقراطية شعبية . وهي وحدة لا تتجزأ .

المادة 2 : الإسلام دين الدولة .

المادة 3 : اللغة العربية هي اللغة الوطنية والرسمية .

المادة 4 : عاصمة الجمهورية مدينة الجزائر .

المادة 5 : العلم الوطني ، وخاتم الدولة ، والنشيد الوطني ، يحددها القانون .

#### الفصل الثاني

#### الشعب

المادة 6 : الشعب مصدر كل سلطة .

" السيادة الوطنية ملك الشعب " .

المادة 7 : السلطة التأسيسية ملك الشعب .

يمارس الشعب سيادته بواسطة المؤسسات الدستورية التي يختارها .

يمارس الشعب هذه السيادة عن طريق الاستفتاء وبواسطة ممثليه المنتخبين .  
لرئيس الجمهورية أن يلتجئ إلى إرادة الشعب مباشرة .

المادة 8 : يختار الشعب لنفسه مؤسسات ، غايتها ما يأتي :

- \* المحافظة على الاستقلال الوطني ، ودعمه ،
- \* المحافظة على الهوية ، والوحدة الوطنية ، ودعمهما ،
- \* حماية الحريات الأساسية للمواطن ، والازدهار الاجتماعي والثقافي للأمة ،
- \* القضاء على استغلال الإنسان للإنسان ،
- \* حماية الاقتصاد الوطني من أي شكل من أشكال التلاعب ، أو الاختلاس ، أو الاستحواذ ، أو المصادرة غير المشروعة .

المادة 9 : لا يجوز للمؤسسات أن تقوم بما يأتي :

- \* الممارسات الإقطاعية ، و الجهوية ، و المحسوبية ،
- \* إقامة علاقات الاستغلال والتبعية ،
- \* السلوك المخالف للخلق الإسلامي وقيم ثورة نوفمبر .

المادة 10 : الشعب حر في اختيار ممثليه .

لا حدود لتمثيل الشعب إلا ما نص عليه الدستور وقانون الانتخابات .

### الفصل الثالث

#### الدولة

المادة 11 : تستمد الدولة مشروعيتها وسبب وجودها من إرادة الشعب .  
شعارها : " بالشعب وللشعب" .  
وهي في خدمته وحده .

المادة 12 : تمارس سيادة الدولة على مجالها البري ، ومجالها الجوي ، وعلى مياهها .

كما تمارس الدولة الصلاحيات التي يقرها القانون الدولي على كل منطقة من مختلف مناطق المجال البحري التي ترجع إليها .

المادة 13 : لا يجوز البتة التنازل أو التخلي عن أي جزء من التراب الوطني .

المادة 14 : تقوم الدولة على مبادئ التنظيم الديمقراطي والعدالة الاجتماعية .

المجلس المنتخب هو الإطار الذي يعبر فيه الشعب عن إرادته ، ويراقب عمل السلطات العمومية .

المادة 15 : الجماعات الإقليمية للدولة هي البلدية والولاية . البلدية هي الجماعة القاعدية .

المادة 16 : يمثل المجلس المنتخب قاعدة اللامركزية ومكان مشاركة المواطنين في تسيير الشؤون العمومية

المادة 17 : الملكية العامة هي ملك المجموعة الوطنية . وتشمل باطن الأرض، والمناجم ، و المقالع ، والموارد الطبيعية للطاقة ، والثروات المعدنية، الطبيعية ، والحية ، في مختلف مناطق الأملاك الوطنية البحرية ، والمياه، والغابات .

كما تشمل النقل بالسكك الحديدية ، والنقل البحري والجوي ، والبريد والمواصلات السلكية واللاسلكية، وأملاكاً أخرى محددة في القانون .

المادة 18 : الأملاك الوطنية يحددها القانون ، وتتكون من الأملاك العمومية والخاصة التي تملكها كل من الدولة والولاية ، والبلدية .

يتم تسيير الأملاك الوطنية طبقاً للقانون .

المادة 19 : تنظيم التجارة الخارجية من اختصاص الدولة .

يحدد القانون شروط ممارسة التجارة الخارجية ومراقبتها .

المادة 20 : لا يتم نزع الملكية إلا في إطار القانون ، ويترتب عليه تعويض قبلي عادل، ومنصف .

المادة 21 : لا يمكن أن تكون الوظائف في مؤسسات الدولة مصدراً للثراء ، ولا وسيلة لخدمة المصالح الخاصة .

المادة 22 : يعاقب القانون على التعسف في استعمال السلطة .

المادة 23 : الدولة مسؤولة عن أمن كل مواطن . وتتكفل بحمايته في الخارج .

المادة 24 : تنتظم الطاقة الدفاعية للأمة ، ودعمها ، وتطويرها ، حول الجيش الوطني الشعبي .

تتمثل المهمة الدائمة للجيش الوطني الشعبي في المحافظة على الاستقلال الوطني ، والدفاع عن السيادة الوطنية .

كما يضطلع بالدفاع عن وحدة البلاد ، وسلامتها الترابية ، وحماية مجالها البري والجوي ، ومختلف مناطق أملاكها البحرية .

المادة 25 : تتمتع الجزائر عن اللجوء إلى الحرب من أجل المساس بالسيادة المشروعة للشعوب الأخرى وحريتها . وتبذل جهودها لتسوية الخلافات الدولية بالوسائل السلمية .

المادة 26 : الجزائر متضامنة مع جميع الشعوب التي تكافح من أجل التحرير السياسي والاقتصادي ، والحق في تقرير المصير ، وضد كل تمييز عنصري .

المادة 27 : تعمل الجزائر من أجل دعم التعاون الدولي ، وتنمية العلاقات الودية بين الدول ، على أساس المساواة ، والمصلحة المتبادلة ، وعدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية ، وتبني مبادئ ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وأهدافه .

#### الفصل الرابع الحقوق والحريات

المادة 28 : كل المواطنين سواسية أمام القانون . ولا يمكن أن يتذرع بأي تمييز يعود سببه إلى المولد ، أو العرق ، أو الجنس ، أو الرأي ، أو أي شرط أو ظرف آخر ، شخصي أو اجتماعي .

المادة 29 : الجنسية الجزائرية ، معرفة بالقانون .

شروط اكتساب الجنسية الجزائرية، والاحتفاظ بها، أو فقدانها، أو إسقاطها، محددة بالقانون .

المادة 30 : تستهدف المؤسسات ضمان مساواة كل المواطنين والمواطنات في الحقوق والواجبات بإزالة العقبات التي تعوق تفتح شخصية الإنسان، وتحول دون مشاركة الجميع الفعلية في الحياة السياسية ، والاقتصادية، والاجتماعية، والثقافية .

المادة 31 : الحريات الأساسية وحقوق الإنسان والمواطن مضمونة ، وتكون تراثا مشتركا بين جميع الجزائريين والجزائريات ، واجبههم أن ينقلوه من جيل إلى جيل كي يحافظوا على سلامته ، وعدم انتهاك حرمة .

المادة 32 : الدفاع الفردي أو عن طريق الجمعية عن الحقوق الأساسية للإنسان وعن الحريات الفردية والجماعية ، مضمون .

المادة 33 : تضمن الدولة عدم انتهاك حرمة الإنسان .

ويحظر أي عنف بدني أو معنوي .

المادة 34 : يعاقب القانون على المخالفات المرتكبة ضد الحقوق والحريات ، وعلى كل ما يمس سلامة الإنسان البدنية والمعنوية .

المادة 35 : لا مساس بحرمة حرية المعتقد ، وحرمة حرية الرأي .

المادة 36 : حرية الابتكار الفكري والفني والعلمي مضمونة للمواطن .

حقوق المؤلف يحميها القانون .

لا يجوز أي مطبوع أو تسجيل أو أية وسيلة أخرى من وسائل التبليغ والإعلام إلا بمقتضى أمر قضائي .

المادة 37 : لا يجوز انتهاك حرمة حياة المواطن الخاصة ، وحرمة شرفه ، ويحميها القانون .

سرية المراسلات والاتصالات الخاصة بكل أشكالها مضمونة .

المادة 38 : تضمن الدولة عدم انتهاك حرمة المسكن .

فلا تفتيش إلا بمقتضى القانون، وفي إطار احترامه. ولا تفتيش إلا بأمر مكتوب صادر عن السلطة القضائية المختصة .

المادة 39 : حريات التعبير ، وإنشاء الجمعيات ، والاجتماع ، مضمونة للمواطن .

المادة 40 : حق إنشاء الجمعيات ذات الطابع السياسي معترف به .

ولا يمكن التذرع بهذا الحق لضرب الحريات الأساسية، والوحدة الوطنية، والسلامة الترابية ، واستقلال البلاد ، وسيادة الشعب .

المادة 41 : يحق لكل مواطن يتمتع بحقوقه المدنية والسياسية، أن يختار بحرية موطن إقامته ، وأن ينتقل عبر التراب الوطني .

حق الدخول إلى التراب الوطني والخروج منه مضمون له .

المادة 42 : كل شخص يعتبر بريئا حتى تثبت جهة قضائية نظامية إدانته ، مع كل الضمانات التي يتطلبها القانون .

المادة 43 : لا إدانة إلا بمقتضى قانون صادر قبل ارتكاب الفعل المجرم .

المادة 44 : لا يتابع أحد ، ولا يوقف أو يحتجز إلا في الحالات المحددة بالقانون، وطبقاً للأشكال التي نص عليها .

المادة 45 : يخضع التوقيف للنظر في مجال التحريات الجزائية للرقابة القضائية، ولا يمكن أن يتجاوز مدة ثمان وأربعين ( 48 ) ساعة .

يملك الشخص الذي يوقف للنظر حق الاتصال فوراً بأسرته .

ولا يمكن تمديد مدة التوقيف للنظر، إلا استثناءً و وفقاً للشروط المحددة بالقانون .

ولدى انتهاء مدة التوقيف للنظر، يجب أن يجري فحص طبي على الشخص الموقوف ، إن طلب ذلك ، على أن يعلم بهذه الإمكانية .

المادة 46 : يترتب على الخطأ القضائي تعويض من الدولة .

ويحدد القانون شروط التعويض و كلياته .

المادة 47 : لكل مواطن تتوفر فيه الشروط القانونية أن ينتخب وينتخب .

المادة 48 : يتساوى جميع المواطنين في تقلد المهام والوظائف في الدولة دون أية شروط أخرى غير الشروط التي يحددها القانون .

المادة 49 : الملكية الخاصة مضمونة .

حقوق الإرث مضمونة .

الأموال الوقفية وأموال الجمعيات الخيرية معترف بها .

ويحمي القانون تخصيصها

المادة 50 : الحق في التعليم مضمون .

التعليم مجاني حسب الشروط التي يحددها القانون .

التعليم الأساسي إجباري .

تنظم الدولة المنظومة التعليمية .

تسهر الدولة على التساوي في الالتحاق بالتعليم والتكوين المهني .

المادة 51 : الرعاية الصحية حق للمواطنين .

تتكفل الدولة بالوقاية من الأمراض البوئية والمعدية ومكافحتها .

المادة 52 : لكل المواطنين الحق في العمل .

يضمن القانون في أثناء العمل الحق في الحماية ، والأمن ، والنظافة .

الحق في الراحة مضمون ، ويحدد القانون كليات ممارسته .

المادة 53 : الحق النقابي معترف به لجميع المواطنين .

المادة 54 : الحق في الإضراب معترف به ، ويمارس في إطار القانون . ويمكن أن يمنع القانون ممارسة هذا الحق ، أو يجعل حدوداً لممارسته في ميادين الدفاع الوطني والأمن ، أو في جميع الخدمات أو الأعمال العمومية ذات المنفعة الحيوية للمجتمع .

المادة 55 : تحظى الأسرة بحماية الدولة والمجتمع .

المادة 56 : ظروف معيشة المواطنين الذين لم يبلغوا سن العمل ، والذين لا يستطيعون

القيام به ، والذين عجزوا عنه نهائياً ، مضمونة .

الفصل الخامس

الواجبات

المادة 57 : لا يعذر بجهل القانون .

يجب على كل شخص أن يحترم الدستور وقوانين الجمهورية .

المادة 58 : يجب على كل مواطن أن يحمي ويصون استقلال الوطن، وسيادته، وسلامة ترابه .

يعاقب القانون بكل صرامة على الخيانة والتجسس والولاء للعدو، وعلى جميع الجرائم المرتكبة ضد أمن الدولة .

المادة 59 : على كل مواطن أن يؤدي بإخلاص واجباته تجاه المجموعة الوطنية .

التزام المواطن إزاء الوطن وإجبارية المشاركة في الدفاع عنه ، واجبان مقدسان دائمان .

تضمن الدولة احترام رموز الثورة، و أرواح الشهداء، و كرامة ذويهم، والمجاهدين .

المادة 60 : يمارس كل واحد جميع حرياته، في احترام الحقوق المعترف بها للغير في الدستور، لا سيما احترام الحق في الشرف ، وستر الحياة الخاصة ، وحماية الأسرة والشبيبة والطفولة .

المادة 61 : كل المواطنين متساوون في أداء الضريبة .

ويجب على كل واحد أن يشارك في تمويل التكاليف العمومية، حسب قدرته الضريبية .  
لا يجوز أن تحدث أية ضريبة إلا بمقتضى القانون .

ولا يجوز أن تحدث بأثر رجعي ، أية ضريبة ، أو جباية ، أو رسم ، أو أي حق كيفما كان نوعه.

المادة 62 : يجازي القانون الأباء على القيام بواجب تربية أبنائهم ورعايتهم، كما يجازي الأبناء على القيام بواجب الإحسان إلى آباءهم ومساعدتهم .

المادة 63 : يجب على كل مواطن أن يحمي الملكية العامة ، ومصالح المجموعة الوطنية ، ويحترم ملكية الغير .

المادة 64 : يتمتع كل أجنبي يكون وجوده فوق التراب الوطني قانونيا بحماية شخصه وأملاكه طبق للقانون .

المادة 65 : لا يسلم أحد خارج التراب الوطني إلا بناء على قانون تسليم المجرمين وتطبيقا له .

المادة 66 : لا يمكن بأي حال من الأحوال أن يسلم أو يطرد لاجئ سياسي يتمتع قانونا بحق اللجوء.

## الباب الثاني

### تنظيم السلطات

#### الفصل الأول

#### السلطة التنفيذية

المادة 67 : يجسد رئيس الجمهورية ، رئيس الدولة ، وحدة الأمة .

وهو حامي الدستور .  
ويجسد الدولة داخل البلاد وخارجها.  
له أن يخاطب الأمة مباشرة.

المادة 68 : ينتخب رئيس الجمهورية ، عن طريق الاقتراع العام المباشر والسري .

يتم الفوز في الانتخابات بالحصول على الأغلبية المطلقة من أصوات الناخبين المعبر عنها .

ويحدد القانون الكيفيات الأخرى للانتخابات الرئاسية .

المادة 69 : يمارس رئيس الجمهورية ، السلطة السامية في الحدود المثبتة في الدستور .

المادة 70 : لا يحق أن ينتخب لرئاسة الجمهورية إلا من كان جزائري الجنسية أصلا، ويدين بالإسلام ، وعمره أربعون سنة كاملة يوم الانتخاب ، ويتمتع بكامل حقوقه المدنية والسياسية .

المادة 71 : مدة المهمة الرئاسية خمس (5) سنوات .

يمكن تجديد انتخاب رئيس الجمهورية .

المادة 72 : يؤدي رئيس الجمهورية اليمين أمام الشعب بحضور جميع الهيئات العليا في الأمة ، خلال الأسبوع الموالي لانتخابه .

ويباشر مهمته فور أدائه اليمين .

المادة 73 : يؤدي رئيس الجمهورية اليمين حسب النص الآتي :

"وفاء للتضحيات الكبرى ولأرواح شهدائنا الأبرار وقيم ثورة نوفمبر، أقسم بالله العلي العظيم أن أحترم الدين الإسلامي وأمجده، و أدافع عن الدستور، وأحترم حرية اختيار الشعب، ومؤسسات الجمهورية وقوانينها، وأحافظ على سلامة التراب الوطني ووحدة الشعب و الأمة ، وأحمي الحريات والحقوق الأساسية للإنسان والمواطن ، وأعمل بدون هوادة من أجل تطور الشعب وازدهاره ، وأسعى بكل قواي في سبيل تحقيق المثل العليا للعدالة ، والحرية ، والسلم في العالم" .

المادة 74 : يضطلع رئيس الجمهورية ، بالإضافة إلى السلطات التي تخولها إياه صراحة أحكام أخرى في الدستور ، بالسلطات والصلاحيات الآتية :

- (1)- هو القائد الأعلى لجميع القوات المسلحة للجمهورية ،
- (2)- يتولى مسؤولية الدفاع الوطني ،
- (3)- يقرر السياسة الخارجية للأمة ويوجهها ،
- (4)- يرأس مجلس الوزراء ،
- (5)- يعين رئيس الحكومة وينهي مهامه ،
- (6)- يوقع المراسيم الرئاسية ،
- (7)- يعين في الوظائف المدنية والعسكرية للدولة ،

- (8)- له حق إصدار العفو وحق تخفيض العقوبات أو استبدالها ،  
(9)- يمكنه أن يستشير الشعب في كل قضية ذات أهمية وطنية عن طريق الاستفتاء ،  
(10)- يعين سفراء الجمهورية والمبعوثين فوق العادة إلى الخارج، وينهي مهامهم،  
ويتسلم أوراق اعتماد الممثلين الدبلوماسيين الأجانب ، وأوراق إنهاء مهامهم،  
(11)- يبرم المعاهدات الدولية ويصادق عليها ،  
(12)- يسلم أوسمة الدولة ، و نياشينها، وشهاداتها التشريفية.

المادة 75 : يقدم رئيس الحكومة أعضاء حكومته الذين اختارهم لرئيس الجمهورية الذي يعينهم .

يضبط رئيس الحكومة برنامج حكومته، ويعرضه في مجلس الوزراء .

المادة 76 : يقدم رئيس الحكومة برنامجها إلى المجلس الشعبي الوطني للموافقة عليه

يجري المجلس الشعبي الوطني لهذا الغرض مناقشة عامة .

ويمكن رئيس الحكومة أن يكيف برنامجها في ضوء هذه المناقشة .

المادة 77 : في حالة عدم موافقة المجلس الشعبي الوطني على البرنامج المعروض عليه ، يقدم رئيس الحكومة استقالة حكومته لرئيس الجمهورية .

يعين رئيس الجمهورية من جديد رئيس حكومة حسب الكيفيات نفسها .

المادة 78 : إذا لم تحصل من جديد موافقة المجلس الشعبي الوطني ينحل وجوبا .

وتجري انتخابات تشريعية جديدة في أجل أقصاه ثلاثة أشهر .

المادة 79 : ينفذ رئيس الحكومة وينسق البرنامج الذي يوافق عليه المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 80 : تقدم الحكومة سنويا للمجلس الشعبي الوطني بيانا عن السياسة العامة .

تعقب بيان السياسة العامة مناقشة لعمل الحكومة .

يمكن المجلس الشعبي الوطني أن يختتم هذه المناقشة بلانحة أو بإيداع ملتمس رقابة، طبقا لأحكام المواد 126 و 127 و 128 ، أدناه .

لرئيس الحكومة أن يطلب تصويتا بالثقة .

المادة 81 : يمارس رئيس الحكومة ، زيادة على السلطات التي تخولها إياه صراحة أحكام أخرى في الدستور ، الصلاحيات الآتية :

- (1)- يوزع الصلاحيات بين أعضاء الحكومة مع احترام الأحكام الدستورية ،
- (2)- يرأس مجلس الحكومة ،
- (3)- يسهر على تنفيذ القوانين والتنظيمات ،
- (4)- يوقع المراسيم التنفيذية ،
- (5)- يعين في وظائف الدولة دون المساس بأحكام الفقرتين 7 و 10 من المادة 74 .

المادة 82 : يمكن رئيس الحكومة أن يقدم استقالة حكومته لرئيس الجمهورية .

المادة 83 : لا يجوز بأي حال من الأحوال أن يفوض رئيس الجمهورية سلطته في تعيين أعضاء المجلس الدستوري الذي يختص بتعيينهم، وفي تعيين رئيس الحكومة وأعضائها، وأعضاء المجلس الأعلى للأمن، وأعضاء المجلس الإسلامي الأعلى، وإنها مهامهم .

كما لا يجوز أن يفوض سلطته في اللجوء إلى الاستفتاء ، وحل المجلس الشعبي الوطني، وتقرير إجراء الانتخابات التشريعية قبل أو في أوانها، وتطبيق الأحكام المنصوص عليها في المواد من 86 إلى 91 في الدستور، وكذلك السلطات المحددة في الفقرات : 1، 2، 3، 4، 6، 8، 10، 11، من المادة 74 ، وأحكام المادتين 117 و 118 من الدستور .

المادة 84 : إذا استحال على رئيس الجمهورية أن يمارس مهامه بسبب مرض خطير مزمن ، يجتمع المجلس الدستوري وجوبا ، وبعد أن يتثبت من حقيقة هذا المانع بكل الوسائل الملائمة ، يقترح بالإجماع على المجلس الشعبي الوطني التصريح بثبوت المانع .

يعلن المجلس الشعبي الوطني ثبوت المانع لرئيس الجمهورية بأغلبية ثلثي أعضائه ، ويكلف رئيسه بتولي رئاسة الدولة بالنيابة مدة أقصاها خمسة وأربعون يوما، ويمارس صلاحياته مع مراعاة أحكام المادة 85 من الدستور

وفي حالة استمرار المانع ، بعد انقضاء خمسة وأربعين يوما ، يعلن الشغور بالاستقالة وجوبا ، حسب الإجراء المنصوص عليه في الفقرتين السابقتين ، وطبقا لأحكام الفقرات الآتية من هذه المادة .

في حالة استقالة رئيس الجمهورية أو وفاته، يجتمع المجلس الدستوري، وجوبا، ويتثبت الشغور النهائي لرئاسة الجمهورية .

وتبلغ فوراً شهادة الشغور النهائي للمجلس الشعبي الوطني الذي يجتمع وجوبا .



يتولى رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني مهام رئيس الدولة مدة أقصاها خمسة وأربعون يوما ، تنظم خلالها انتخابات رئاسية .

ولا يحق لرئيس الدولة المعين بهذه الطريقة أن يترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية

يمارس رئيس الجمهورية المنتخب مهامه طبقا لأحكام المواد من 67 إلى 74 من الدستور .

وإذا اقترنت وفاة رئيس الجمهورية بشغور المجلس الشعبي الوطني بسبببطله، يجتمع المجلس الدستوري وجوبا لإثبات الشغور النهائي لرئاسة الجمهورية .

يضطلع رئيس المجلس الدستوري بمهمة رئيس الدولة في الظروف المبينة في الفقرات السابقة من هذه المادة وفي المادة 85 من الدستور .

المادة 85 : لا يمكن أن تقال أو تعدل الحكومة القائمة إبان حصول المانع لرئيس الجمهورية ، أو وفاته ، أو استقالته ، حتى يشرع رئيس الجمهورية الجديد في ممارسة مهامه .

يستقيل وجوبا رئيس الحكومة القائمة قانونا ، إذا ترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية، ويمارس وظيفة رئيس الحكومة حينئذ أحد أعضائها الذي يعينه رئيس الدولة .

لا يمكن في فترتي الخمسة والأربعين يوما، تطبيق الأحكام المنصوص عليها في الفقرتين 8 ، و 9 من المادة 74 ، والمواد 75، 90، 120، 127، و 128 من الدستور .

لا يمكن ، خلال الفترتين السابق ذكرهما ، تطبيق أحكام المواد 87، و 88، و 89، و 91 من الدستور ، إلا بموافقة المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، بعد استشارة المجلس الدستوري ، والمجلس الأعلى للأمن .

المادة 86 : يقرر رئيس الجمهورية، إذا دعت الضرورة الملحة، حالة الطوارئ أو الحصار، لمدة معينة بعد اجتماع المجلس الأعلى للأمن، واستشارة رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني ورئيس الحكومة ، ورئيس المجلس الدستوري ، ويتخذ كل التدابير اللازمة لاستتباب الوضع .

ولا يمكن تمديد حالة الطوارئ أو الحصار، إلا بعد موافقة المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 87 : يقرر رئيس الجمهورية، الحالة الاستثنائية ، إذا كانت البلاد مهددة بخطر داهم يوشك أن يصيب مؤسساتها الدستورية ، أو استقلالها ، أو سلامة ترابها و لا يتخذ مثل هذا الإجراء إلا بعد استشارة المجلس الدستوري، و الاستماع إلى المجلس الأعلى للأمن ، ومجلس الوزراء.

تخول الحالة الاستثنائية رئيس الجمهورية أن يتخذ الإجراءات الاستثنائية التي تستوجبها المحافظة على استقلال الأمة والمؤسسات الدستورية في الجمهورية .

يجتمع المجلس الشعبي الوطني وجوبا .

تنتهي الحالة الاستثنائية، حسب الأشكال والإجراءات السالفة الذكر التي أوجبت إعلانها.

المادة 88 : التعبئة العامة يقرها رئيس الجمهورية .

المادة 89 : إذا وقع عدوان فعلي على البلاد ، أو يوشك أن يقع حسبما نصت عليه الترتيبات الملائمة لميثاق الأمم المتحدة ، يعلن رئيس الجمهورية الحرب، بعد اجتماع مجلس الوزراء، والاستماع إلى المجلس الأعلى للأمن . يجتمع المجلس الشعبي الوطني وجوبا . ويوجه رئيس الجمهورية خطابا للأمة يعلمها بذلك .

المادة 90 : يوقف العمل بالدستور مدة حالة الحرب ، ويتولى رئيس الجمهورية جميع السلطات .

المادة 91 : يوقع رئيس الجمهورية اتفاقيات الهدنة ومعاهدات السلم .

ويتلقى رأي المجلس الدستوري في الاتفاقيات المتعلقة بهما . ويعرضها فورا على المجلس الشعبي الوطني ليوافق عليها صراحة .

## الفصل الثاني السلطة التشريعية

المادة 92 : يمارس السلطة التشريعية مجلس واحد يسمى المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

وله السيادة في إعداد القانون والتصويت عليه .

المادة 93 : يرأب المجلس الشعبي الوطني عمل الحكومة وفقا للشروط المحددة في المادتين 76 و 80 من الدستور .

المادة 94 : واجب المجلس الشعبي الوطني في إطار اختصاصاته الدستورية، أن يبقى وفيًا لثقة الشعب ، ويظل يتحسس تطلعاته

المادة 95 : ينتخب أعضاء المجلس الشعبي الوطني عن طريق الاقتراع العام المباشر والسري .

المادة 96 : ينتخب المجلس الشعبي الوطني لمدة خمس سنوات .

ولا يمكن تمديد الفترة النيابية إلا في ظروف خطيرة جدا لا تسمح بإجراء انتخابات عادية .

ويثبت المجلس الشعبي الوطني هذه الحالة بقرار ، بناء على اقتراح رئيس الجمهورية ، واستشارة المجلس الدستوري .

المادة 97 : يحدد القانون كليات انتخاب النواب ، لا سيما عددهم ، وشروط قابليتهم للانتخاب ، وحالات التنافي مع العضوية في المجلس .

المادة 98 : إثبات عضوية النواب من اختصاص المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 99 : النيابة في المجلس الشعبي الوطني ذات طابع وطني وهي قابلة للتجديد .

المادة 100 : كل نائب لا يستوفي شروط قابلية انتخابه أو يفقدها ، يتعرض لإسقاط صفته النيابية .

ويقرر المجلس الشعبي الوطني هذا الإسقاط بأغلبية أعضائه .

المادة 101 : النائب مسؤول أمام زملائه الذين يمكنهم تجريده من صفته النيابية، إذا اُقترف فعلا يخل بشرف وظيفته .

يحدد القانون الحالات التي يتعرض فيها النائب للإقصاء .

ويقرر المجلس الشعبي الوطني هذا الإقصاء بأغلبية أعضائه ، دون المساس بحق المتابعات الأخرى الواردة في القانون .

المادة 102 : يحدد القانون الحالات التي يقبل فيها المجلس الشعبي الوطني استقالة أحد أعضائه .

المادة 103 : الحصانة النيابية معترف بها للنائب مدة نيابته .

لا يمكن أن يتابع أي نائب أو يوقف ، وعلى العموم ، لا يمكن أن ترفع عليه دعوى مدنية أو جزائية ، أو يسلط عليه أي شكل من أشكال الضغط ، بسبب ما عبر عنه من آراء ، أو ما تلفظ به من كلام ، أو بسبب تصويته خلال ممارسة مهمته النيابية .

المادة 104 : لا يجوز الشروع في متابعه أي نائب بسبب فعل إجرامي إلا بتنازل صريح منه أو بإذن من المجلس الشعبي الوطني الذي يقرر رفع الحصانة عن النائب بأغلبية أعضائه .

المادة 105 : في حالة تلبس أحد النواب بجنحة أو جناية ، يمكن توقيفه ، ويخطر مكتب المجلس الشعبي الوطني فورا .

يمكن مكتب المجلس الشعبي الوطني أن يطلب إيقاف المتابعة وإطلاق سراح النائب ، على أن يعمل فيما بعد بأحكام المادة

104 أعلاه .

المادة 106 : يحدد القانون شروط استخلاف النائب في حالة شغور مقعده .

المادة 107 : تبتدى الفترة التشريعية وجوبا ، في اليوم العاشر الموالي لتاريخ انتخاب المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، تحت رئاسة أكبر النواب سنا ، وبمساعدة أصغر نائبين منهم .

ينتخب المجلس الشعبي الوطني مكتبه ، ويشكل لجانته .

المادة 108 : ينتخب رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني للفترة التشريعية .

المادة 109 : يحدد القانون تنظيم المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، وعلمه ، وميزانيته ، والتعويضات التي تدفع لأعضائه .  
يعد المجلس الشعبي الوطني نظامه الداخلي ، ويصادق عليه .

المادة 110 : جلسات المجلس الشعبي الوطني علانية . وتدون مداولاته في محاضر تنشر طبقا لما يحدده القانون .

يجوز للمجلس الشعبي الوطني أن يعقد جلسات مغلقة بطلب من رئيسه ، أو من أغلبية أعضائه الحاضرين، أو بطلب من الحكومة .

المادة 111 : يكون المجلس الشعبي الوطني لجانته ، في إطار نظامه الداخلي .

لجان المجلس الشعبي الوطني دائمة .

المادة 112 : يجتمع المجلس الشعبي الوطني في دورتين كل سنة . ومدة كل دورة ثلاثة أشهر على الأكثر .

يمكن أن يجتمع المجلس الشعبي الوطني في دورة غير عادية بمبادرة من رئيس الجمهورية ، أو بطلب من ثلثي أعضاء المجلس ، أو بطلب من رئيس الحكومة .

تختتم الدورة غير العادية بمجرد ما يستنفذ المجلس الشعبي الوطني جدول الأعمال الذي استدعي للاجتماع من أجله .

المادة 113 : لكل من رئيس الحكومة وأعضاء المجلس الشعبي الوطني حق المبادرة بالقوانين .

تكون اقتراحات القوانين قابلة للمناقشة ، إذا قدمها عشرون نائبا .

تعرض مشاريع القوانين على مجلس الوزراء ، ثم يودعها رئيس الحكومة مكتب المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 114 : لا يقبل اقتراح أي قانون ، مضمونه أو نتيجته تخفيض الموارد العمومية ، أو زيادة النفقات العمومية ، إلا إذا كان مرفقا بتدابير تستهدف الزيادة في إيرادات الدولة ، أو توفير مبالغ مالية في فصل آخر من النفقات العمومية تساوي على الأقل المبالغ المقترح إنفاقها .

المادة 115 : يشرع المجلس الشعبي الوطني في المجالات التي حولها إياه الدستور .

ويدخل كذلك في مجال القانون ما يأتي .

- (1)- حقوق الأشخاص وواجباتهم الأساسية ، لا سيما نظام الحريات العمومية ، وحماية الحريات الفردية ، وواجبات المواطنين ،
- (2)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بقانون الأحوال الشخصية ، وحق الأسرة ، لا سيما الزواج ، والطلاق ، والبنوة ، والأهلية ، والتركات ،
- (3)- شروط استقرار الأشخاص ،
- (4)- التشريع الأساسي المتعلق بالجنسية ،
- (5)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بوضعية الأجانب ،
- (6)- القواعد المتعلقة بالتنظيم القضائي ، وإنشاء الهيئات القضائية ،
- (7)- القواعد العامة للقانون الجزائي ، والإجراءات الجزائية ، لا سيما تحديد الجنايات والجنح ، والعقوبات المختلفة المطابقة لها ، والعفو الشامل ، وتسليم المجرمين .
- (8)- القواعد العامة للإجراءات المدنية وطرق التنفيذ ،
- (9)- نظام الائتزمات المدنية والتجارية ،
- (10)- نظام الانتخابات ،
- (11)- التقسيم الإقليمي للبلاد ،
- (12)- المصادقة على المخطط الوطني ،
- (13)- التصويت على ميزانية الدولة ،
- (14)- إحداث الضرائب و الجبايات والرسوم والحقوق المختلفة، وتحديد أساسها ونسبها
- (15)- النظام الجمركي ،
- (16)- نظام البنوك والقروض والتأمينات ،
- (17)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بالتعليم ،
- (18)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بالصحة العمومية ، والسكان ،
- (19)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بقانون العمل والضمان الاجتماعي ،
- (20)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بالبيئة وإطار المعيشة ،
- (21)- القواعد العامة المتعلقة بحماية الثروة الحيوانية والنباتية ،
- (22)- حماية التراث الثقافي والتاريخي ، والمحافظة عليه ،
- (23)- النظام العام للغابات والأراضي الرعوية ،
- (24)- النظام العام للمياه ،
- (25)- النظام العام للمناجم والمحروقات ،
- (26)- إنشاء أوسمة الدولة ونياشينها وألقابها التشريفية .

المادة 116 : يمارس رئيس الجمهورية السلطة التنظيمية في المسائل غير المخصصة للقانون .

يندرج تطبيق القوانين في المجال التنظيمي الذي يعود لرئيس الحكومة

المادة 117 : يصدر رئيس الجمهورية القانون في أجل ثلاثين يوما ، ابتداء من تاريخ تسلمه إياه .

المادة 118 : يمكن رئيس الجمهورية أن يطلب من المجلس الشعبي الوطني إجراء مداولة ثانية في قانون تم التصويت عليه ، ويكون هذا الطلب خلال الثلاثين يوما الموالية لتاريخ إقراره .

وفي هذه الحالة لا يتم إقرار القانون إلا بأغلبية ثلثي أعضاء المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 119 : يمكن رئيس الجمهورية أن يوجه خطابا إلى المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 120 : يمكن رئيس الجمهورية أن يقرر حل المجلس الشعبي الوطني أو إجراء

انتخابات تشريعية قبل أوانها ، بعد استشارة رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني ورئيس الحكومة .

وتجري هذه الانتخابات في أجل أقصاه ثلاثة أشهر .

المادة 121 : يمكن المجلس الشعبي الوطني أن يفتح مناقشة حول السياسة الخارجية، بناء على طلب رئيس الجمهورية ، أو رئيس المجلس . يمكن ، عند الاقتضاء ، أن تتوج هذه المناقشة بإصدار لائحة من المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، يبلغها رئيسه إلى رئيس

الجمهورية .

المادة 122 : يصادق رئيس الجمهورية على اتفاقيات الهدنة ، ومعاهدات السلم والتحالف والاتحاد، والمعاهدات المتعلقة بحدود الدولة ، والمعاهدات المتعلقة بقانون الأشخاص، والمعاهدات التي تترتب عليها نفقات غير واردة في ميزانية الدولة بعد أن يوافق عليها المجلس الشعبي الوطني صراحة .

المادة 123 : المعاهدات التي يصادق عليها رئيس الجمهورية، حسب الشروط المنصوص عليها في الدستور ، تسمو على القانون .

المادة 124 : يمكن أعضاء المجلس الشعبي الوطني استجواب الحكومة في إحدى قضايا الساعة .

يمكن لجان المجلس الشعبي الوطني أن تستمع إلى أعضاء الحكومة .

المادة 125 : يمكن أعضاء المجلس الشعبي الوطني أن يوجهوا أي سؤال شفوي أو كتابي إلى أي عضو في الحكومة .

ويكون الجواب عن السؤال الكتابي كتابيا ، خلال أجل أقصاه ثلاثون يوما وتتم الإجابة عن الأسئلة الشفوية في جلسات المجلس

إذا رأى المجلس الشعبي الوطني أن جواب عضو الحكومة شفويا كان أو كتابيا يبرر إجراء مناقشة ، تجري المناقشة حسب

الشروط التي ينص عليها النظام الداخلي للمجلس الشعبي الوطني .

تنشر الأسئلة والأجوبة طبقا للشروط التي يخضع لها نشر محاضر مناقشات المجلس الشعبي الوطني .

المادة 126 : يمكن المجلس الشعبي الوطني لدى مناقشة بيان السياسة العامة، أن يصوت على ملتزم رقابة ينصب على مسؤولية الحكومة . ولا يقبل هذا الملتزم إلا إذا وقع سُبُغ (1/7) النواب على الأقل .

المادة 127 : تتم الموافقة على ملتزم الرقابة بتصويت أغلبية ثلثي النواب .

ولا يتم التصويت إلا بعد ثلاثة أيام من تاريخ إيداع ملتزم الرقابة .

المادة 128 : إذا صادق المجلس الشعبي الوطني على ملتزم الرقابة ، يقدم رئيس الحكومة استقالة حكومته إلى رئيس الجمهورية .

### الفصل الثالث السلطة القضائية

- المادة 129 : السلطة القضائية مستقلة .
- المادة 130 : تحمي السلطة القضائية والحريات، وتضمن للجميع ولكل واحد المحافظة على حقوقهم الأساسية .
- المادة 131 : أساس القضاء مبادئ الشرعية والمساواة .
- الكل سواسية أمام القضاء، وهو في متناول الجميع ويجسده احترام القانون.
- المادة 132 : يصدر القضاء أحكامه باسم الشعب
- المادة 133 : تخضع العقوبات الجزائية إلى مبادئ الشرعية والشخصية
- المادة 134 : ينظر القضاء في الطعن في قرارات السلطات العمومية .
- المادة 135 : تعلق الأحكام القضائية ، وينطق بها في جلسات علنية .
- المادة 136 : على كل أجهزة الدولة المختصة أن تقوم ، في كل وقت وفي كل مكان ، وفي جميع الظروف ، بتنفيذ أحكام القضاء .
- المادة 137 : يختص القضاء بإصدار الأحكام .
- ويمكن أن يعينهم في ذلك مساعدون شعبيون حسب الشروط التي يحددها القانون .
- المادة 138 : لا يخضع القاضي إلا للقانون .
- المادة 139 : القاضي محمي من كل أشكال الضغوط والتدخلات والمناورات التي قد تضر بأداء مهمته أو تمس نزاهة حكمه .
- المادة 140 : القاضي مسؤول أمام المجلس الأعلى للقضاء عن كيفية قيامه بمهمته ، حسب الأشكال المنصوص عليها في القانون .
- المادة 141 : يحمي القانون المتقاضى من أي تعسف أو أي انحراف يصدر من القاضي
- المادة 142 : الحق في الدفاع معترف به .
- الحق في الدفاع مضمون في القضايا الجزائية .
- المادة 143 : تمثل المحكمة العليا ، في جميع مجالات القانون ، الهيئة المقومة لأعمال المجالس القضائية والمحاكم .
- تضمن المحكمة العليا توحيد الاجتهاد القضائي في جميع أنحاء البلاد ، وتسهر على احترام القانون .
- المادة 144 : يحدد القانون تنظيم المحكمة العليا ، وعملها ، واختصاصاتها الأخرى .
- المادة 145 : يرأس رئيس الجمهورية ، المجلس الأعلى للقضاء .
- المادة 146 : يقرر المجلس الأعلى للقضاء ، طبقاً للشروط التي يحددها القانون ، تعيين القضاة ، ونقلهم ، وسير سلمهم الوظيفي .
- ويسهر على احترام أحكام القانون الأساسي للقضاء، وعلى رقابة انضباط القضاة تحت رئاسة الرئيس الأول للمحكمة العليا .
- المادة 147 : يبدي المجلس الأعلى للقضاء رأياً استشارياً قليباً في ممارسة رئيس الجمهورية حق العفو .
- المادة 148 : يحدد القانون تأليف المجلس الأعلى للقضاء، وطرق تسيريه، وصلاحياته الأخرى .

### الباب الثالث: الرقابة والمؤسسات الاستشارية

#### الفصل الأول

#### الرقابة

- المادة 149 : تضطلع المجالس المنتخبة بوظيفة الرقابة في مدلولها الشعبي .
- المادة 150 : تقدم الحكومة للمجلس الشعبي الوطني ، عرضاً عن استعمال الاعتمادات المالية التي أقرها لكل سنة مالية .
- تختتم السنة المالية ، فيما يخص المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، بالتصويت على قانون يتضمن تسوية ميزانية السنة المالية المعنية .
- المادة 151 : يمكن المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، في إطار اختصاصاته ، أن ينشئ في أي وقت ، لجنة تحقيق في أية قضية ذات مصلحة عامة .
- المادة 152 : المؤسسات الدستورية وأجهزة الرقابة مكلفة بالتحقيق في تطابق العمل التشريعي والتنفيذي مع الدستور ، وفي ظروف استخدام الوسائل المادية والأموال العمومية وتسييرها .
- المادة 153 : يؤسس مجلس دستوري يكلف بالسهر على احترام الدستور .
- كما يسهر المجلس الدستوري على صحة عمليات الاستفتاء، وانتخاب رئيس الجمهورية ، والانتخابات التشريعية ، ويعلن نتائج هذه العمليات .
- المادة 154 : يتكون المجلس الدستوري من سبعة أعضاء :
- اثنان منهم ، يعينهما رئيس الجمهورية ، واثنان ينتخبهما المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، واثنان تنتخبهما المحكمة العليا من بين أعضائها . وبمجرد انتخابهم أو تعيينهم ، يتوقفون عن ممارسة أي عضوية أو أي وظيفة أو تكليف أو مهمة أخرى .
- يضطلع أعضاء المجلس الدستوري بمهامهم مرة واحدة غير قابلة للتجديد مدتها ست سنوات . ويجدد نصف عدد أعضاء المجلس الدستوري كل ثلاث سنوات .
- يعين رئيس الجمهورية رئيس المجلس الدستوري لفترة واحدة مدتها ست سنوات غير قابلة للتجديد .
- المادة 155 : يفصل المجلس الدستوري ، بالإضافة إلى الاختصاصات التي خولتها إياه صراحة أحكام أخرى في الدستور ، في دستورية المعاهدات والقوانين ، والتنظيمات ، إما برأي قبل أن تصبح واجبة التنفيذ . أو بقرار في الحالة العكسية .

كما يفصل في مطابقة النظام الداخلي للمجلس الشعبي الوطني للدستور .

- المادة 156 : يخطر رئيس الجمهورية ، أو رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني ، المجلس الدستوري .
- المادة 157 : يتداول المجلس الدستوري في جلسة مغلقة ، ويعطي رأيه أو يصدر قراره في ظرف العشرين يوماً الموالية لتاريخ الإخطار .
- يحدد المجلس الدستوري قواعد عمله .
- المادة 158 : إذا ارتأى المجلس الدستوري عدم دستورية معاهدة أو اتفاق ، أو اتفاقية ، فلا تتم المصادقة عليها .
- المادة 159 : إذا قرر المجلس الدستوري أن نصاً تشريعياً أو تنظيمياً غير دستوري ، يفقد هذا النص أثره ، ابتداء من يوم قرار المجلس .
- المادة 160 : يؤسس مجلس محاسبة ، يكلف بالرقابة البعيدة لأموال الدولة ، والجماعات الإقليمية ، والمرافق العمومية .

يعد مجلس المحاسبة تقريراً سنوياً ، ثم يرفعه إلى رئيس الجمهورية .

يحدد القانون تنظيم مجلس المحاسبة ، وعمله ، وجزاء تحقيقاته .

## الفصل الثاني المؤسسات الاستشارية

المادة 161 : يؤسس لدى رئيس الجمهورية مجلس إسلامي أعلى .

يتكون المجلس الإسلامي الأعلى من أحد عشر عضوا يعينهم رئيس الجمهورية من بين الشخصيات الدينية .  
وينتخب المجلس الإسلامي الأعلى رئيسه من بين أعضائه .

المادة 162 : يؤسس مجلس أعلى للأمن يرأسه رئيس الجمهورية . مهمته تقديم الآراء إلى رئيس الجمهورية في كل القضايا المتعلقة بالأمن الوطني .

يحدد رئيس الجمهورية كليات تنظيم المجلس الأعلى للأمن وعمله .

### الباب الرابع

#### التعديل الدستوري

المادة 163 : لرئيس الجمهورية حق المبادرة بالتعديل الدستوري، و بعد أن يصوت عليه المجلس الشعبي الوطني، يعرض على إستفتاء الشعب للموافقة عليه ثم يصدره رئيس الجمهورية.

المادة 164 : إذا رأى المجلس الدستوري أي تعديل دستوري لا يمس البنية المبادئ العامة التي تحكم المجتمع الجزائري و حقوق الإنسان و المواطن و حرياتهما، لا يمس بأي شيء التوازنات الأساسية للسلطات و المؤسسات الدستورية، و علل رأيه أمكن رئيس الجمهورية أن يصدر القانون الذي يتضمن التعديل الدستوري مباشرة دون أن يعرضه على الإستفتاء الشعبي، متى أحرز ثلاثة أرباع من أصوات أعضاء المجلس الشعبي الوطني.

المادة 165 : يعرض القانون الذي يتضمن مشروع التعديل الدستوري، بعد أن يقره المجلس الشعبي الوطني، حسب الشروط نفسها التي تطبق على النص التشريعي، على إستفتاء الشعب للموافقة عليه، خلال الخمسة و الأربعين يوما الموالية لإقرار المجلس إياه.

المادة 166 : يصبح القانون الذي يتضمن مشروع التعديل الدستوري لاغيا، إذا رفضه الشعب و لا يمكن عرضه من جديد على الشعب من خلال نفس الفترة التشريعية.

المادة 167 : يصدر رئيس الجمهورية نص التعديل الدستوري الذي أقره الشعب.

حكم إنتقالي

يمس التجديد الجزئي الأول ثلاثة أعضاء من المجلس الدستوري، على أن يستخرج كل واحد منهم بالقرعة بين كل عضوين عينتهما أو انتخبتهما سلطة واحدة.

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For the other constitutions, you can visit : <http://www.majliselouma.dz/>